



“When You Talk - We Listen!”



MANITOBA PUBLIC UTILITIES BOARD

Re: MANITOBA PUBLIC INSURANCE CORPORATION (MPI)
2020/2021 GENERAL RATE APPLICATION

HEARING

Before Board Panel:

Irene Hamilton, QC - Board Chairperson
Robert Gabor, QC - Board Chair
Carol Hainsworth - Board Member

HELD AT:

Public Utilities Board
400, 330 Portage Avenue
Winnipeg, Manitoba
October 24, 2019
Pages 2628 to 2842

1 APPEARANCES

2

3 Kathleen McCandless) Board Counsel

4 Robert Watchman)

5 Roger Cathcart) Consultant

6 Brian Pelly (np)) Advisor

7 Blair Manktelow (np)) Advisor

8

9 Steven Scarfone) Manitoba Public

10 Michael Triggs) Insurance

11 Anthony Guerra)

12 Jeff Crozier)

13 Ted Meira)

14

15 Byron Williams) CAC (Manitoba)

16 Katrine Dilay)

17 Chris Klassen (np))

18 Christine Williams (np))

19 (Articling student)

20 Chim Undi (np))

21 (Articling student))

22

23 Charlotte Meek (np)) CMMG

24 James Wood (np))

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APPEARANCES (CONT'D)

Christian Monnin (np))Bike Winnipeg
Charles Feaver (np))
Curtis Unfried)IBAM
Jennifer Sokal)
(Articling student)
Denis Guenette)Attorney General
Tamara Edkins)of Manitoba
(Articling Student)

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1	LIST OF UNDERTAKINGS		
2	NO.	DESCRIPTION	PAGE NO.
3	39	MPI to provide a short written	
4		submission on any jurisprudence	
5		that might exists on the	
6		interpretation that the Corporation	
7		is taking with respect to reserves	
8		regulation, as set out in the	
9		capital maintenance plan, which	
10		allows a five (5) year build,	
11		three (3) year release provision	
12		if not exactly at 100 percent MCT	2703
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1 --- Upon commencing at 9:00 a.m.

2

3 THE CHAIRPERSON: Good morning,
4 everyone. Today we are starting into that portion of
5 the hearing that deals with closing remarks. I would
6 ask Ms. McCandless to proceed.

7 MS. KATHLEEN MCCANDLESS: Thank you.
8 Good morning, Madam Chair, and members of the panel.

9 I note that MPI did answer some
10 undertakings last night and this morning. So perhaps
11 before I begin, if they could just enter those
12 exhibits on the record.

13 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: Yes. I don't
14 know if we have them available quite yet to -- to
15 speak to. We were going to mark them at the outset of
16 our presentation.

17 MS. KATHLEEN MCCANDLESS: That's fine,
18 yeah.

19

20 CLOSING REMARKS BY BOARD COUNSEL:

21 MS. KATHLEEN MCCANDLESS: We have now
22 completed the evidentiary part of this public hearing
23 with respect to the 2020 General Rate Application, or
24 GRA, filed by Manitoba Public Insurance. The Board
25 will soon deliberate upon the application for base

1 rates and premiums charged for compulsory vehicle and
2 driver insurance rates to take effect on March 1,
3 2020.

4 As counsel for the Board. I do not
5 take a position on the merits of any part of the
6 application or the positions taken by any of the
7 parties. My role is to summarize the matters that are
8 before the Board and outline issues that it may wish
9 to consider in making its decision.

10 Now some context for the application
11 this year. Rate indications are interest sensitive,
12 and market interest rates are always changing. These
13 realities give rise to a significant risk of
14 estimation error in deriving Basic rate indications.

15 Adoption of a naive interest rate
16 forecast reduces the complexity of making that
17 forecast, and using rate indications derived in
18 accordance with actual -- accepted actuarial practice
19 in Canada rather than Basic net income projections
20 shorten the length of the forecast, but significant
21 uncertainty still remains.

22 To further mitigate this uncertainty,
23 in recent prior GRAs, the PUB has routinely rec --
24 requested the Corporation to provide an update to its
25 rate indications to reflect market interest rates at

1 approximately the time the GRA hearing commences.
2 When providing these updates in the past, the
3 Corporation did not amend its application, but rather
4 provided the update for evidentiary purposes. The PUB
5 typically relied on this update in its Order on the
6 application.

7 For the 2020 GRA, the Corporation
8 proposed a new approach, which the Board accepted.
9 The approach called for the initial application and
10 public notice to reflect a provisional rate request,
11 derived in the usual manner, but with a declared
12 intention of amending the application or updating the
13 application to reflect an updated rate request based
14 on market interest rates at the end of September,
15 2019.

16 The provisional rate request for an
17 overall .1 percent rate level increase was based on
18 market interest rates as at February 28, 2019. This
19 also included continuation of the 2.0 percent net
20 capital maintenance provision approved by the Board in
21 Order 159/'18 for the 2018/'19 rating year only, which
22 the Corporation felt was necessary in transition to
23 its new proposed Capital Management Plan.

24 The Corporation provided an update to
25 its provisional rate request on October 4th to reflect

1 market interest rates as at -- at Sep -- September 30,
2 2019, and requested an amendment to its application as
3 a result of this update. Over the period from March
4 to September, 2019. The ten (10) year Government of
5 Canada bond yield fell fifty-eight (58) basis points,
6 from 1.94 percent to 1.36 percent, pushing the Basic
7 rate indication upwards to an overall 1.5 percent rate
8 level increase.

9 But because Basic's financial
10 performance over the same time period significantly
11 exceeded expectations, improving Basic's financial
12 condi -- pos -- position, the Corporation amended its
13 application and removed the request for continuation
14 of the net capital maintenance provision. Combined,
15 these changes led to the amended rate request for an
16 overall .6 percent rate level decrease.

17 The average rate adjustment proposed by
18 MPI for each major vehicle class is as follows.

19 For private passenger, an overall
20 decrease of .9 percent.

21 For the commercial class, an overall
22 increase of .8 percent.

23 For the public class, an overall
24 increase of 10.9 percent.

25 For motorcycles, an overall increase of

1 5.1 percent.

2 For trailers, an overall decrease of
3 5.1 percent.

4 And for off-road vehicles, an overall
5 decrease of 11 percent.

6 After consideration of insurance use
7 and territory, and capping and balancing for
8 experience rate adjustments, the results were modelled
9 by the Corporation to assess the impact of various
10 rate and classification changes.

11 In total, the vehicle population for
12 the year of the application is one million one hundred
13 and sixty-one thousand one hundred and fifty-nine
14 (1,161,159) vehicles, to which the proposed rate would
15 be applied as follows.

16 Four hundred and forty (440) -- forty-
17 four (44) -- pardon me, four hundred and thirty-four
18 thousand one hundred and sixteen (434,116) vehicles,
19 or 37.4 percent of the overall fleet, would see a rate
20 increase, the majority of which would be ninety-nine
21 dollars (\$99) or less.

22 Six hundred and ten thousand four
23 hundred and thirty (610,430) vehicles, or 52.6 percent
24 of the overall fleet, would receive a rate decrease.

25 And one hundred and sixteen thousand

1 (116,000) -- sixteen (16) -- six hundred and thirteen
2 (613) vehicles, or 10 percent, would receive no
3 changes in rates.

4 With respect to rate making in
5 accordance with accepted actuarial practice, as
6 always, the Corporation's estimate of its overall rate
7 requirement is sensitive to the methods and assumption
8 -- assumptions used in its derivation. For the 2020
9 GRA, particular attention was given to two (2)
10 assumption areas, rate indications by major use class,
11 and treatment of the expected return on investment
12 assets supporting Basic total equity.

13 With respect to rate indications by
14 major use class, the Corporation ack -- acknowledged
15 potential weaknesses in its use of a common set of
16 loss development assumptions in the analysis of
17 serious versus other losses for accident benefits
18 other indexed and weekly indemnity in deriving rate
19 indications for the private passenger, commercial, and
20 public major use classes.

21 The potential weakness related to
22 observed differences in loss development patterns
23 between serious and other losses, with serious losses
24 typically being slower to emerge, and that the
25 Corporation's analysis approach does not fully

1 recognize those differences. The Corporation agreed
2 to take this issue under consideration for the 2021
3 GRA.

4 With respect to the treatment of
5 expected return on investment assets supporting Basic
6 total equity, consistent with pri -- recent prior
7 GRAs, the Corporation derives its estimate of the
8 Basic breakeven rate requirement to exclude
9 recognition of the expected return on investment
10 assets supporting Basic total equity, which it
11 acknowledges is a cash flow to Basic insurance
12 operations.

13 The Corporation considers this cash
14 flow to be a capital adjustment, which it prefers to
15 address exclusively within its new proposed Capital
16 Management Plan. Furthermore, the Corporation
17 believes the appropriate definition of breakeven in
18 this context is that it should encompass only the
19 expected cashflows relating to the policies to be
20 issued in the coming rating year, thereby excluding
21 the expected return on investment assets supporting
22 Basic total equity, which relates to the results of
23 prior rating years.

24 The Corporation has acknowledged that
25 rate making in accordance with accepted actuarial

1 practice in Canada permits the est -- estimation of
2 rate indications either with or without recognition of
3 the expected return on investment assets supporting
4 Basic total equity.

5 With respect to financial results, the
6 Corporation has provided to the Board its actual
7 financial results with respect to the 2018/'19 year,
8 as well as for the first six (6) months of the current
9 year, 2019/'20. For the 2018/'19 fiscal year, Basic
10 incurred net income of \$78.8 million compared with
11 forecasted net income of \$135.6 million at last year's
12 GRA, a reduction of \$56.7 million.

13 This negative variance was attributed
14 by the Corporation to an increase of \$75.1 million in
15 total claims incurred cost, primarily due to an
16 actuarial adjustment of \$54.9 million, increased
17 comprehensive claims of \$16.2 million, higher
18 writedown DPAT (sic), premium deficiency than
19 forecasted of \$15.5 million, and lower than forecasted
20 interest rates of \$49.1 million.

21 These increases in costs were offset by
22 lower than forecast collision claims of \$40.9 million,
23 reinsurance recoveries of \$13.5 million, and lower
24 property damage claims of \$5.3 million. Overall,
25 there was a negative variance of \$74.8 million and --

1 in underwriting results -- results from that presented
2 last year. Investment income was \$208.5 million,
3 \$16.7 million higher than the \$191.8 million forecast
4 last year.

5 With respect to the current year,
6 2019/'20, the subject of last year's GRA, MPI last
7 year forecast for Basic a net income of \$17.9 million
8 for rating purposes, resi -- rev -- revised to a net
9 income of \$29.7 million in this GRA.

10 This forecast was further updated on --
11 on October 4th to a net income of \$108.4 million,
12 based on a September 30th interest rate update, which
13 included actual experience based on the second quarter
14 update, and an updated forecast for the remainder of
15 the year. Some of this variance was attributable to
16 an increase in the forecast of total claims incurred
17 of \$9.8 million, a favourable interest rate impact of
18 \$80.6 million, and forecasted investment income, being
19 \$85.7 million higher due to interest rate changes.

20 The change in investment income offset
21 the increase in total claims incurred, reflecting the
22 immunization of MPI's net income to changes in
23 interest rates by its asset liability management
24 strategy.

25 With respect to the second quarter

1 update, MPI filed its second quarter report and the
2 course of these proceedings. The Corporation reported
3 that for the first six (6) months of 2019/'20, it had
4 net income of \$164.2 million, an improvements of \$91.4
5 million from last year for the same period. MPI
6 reported net income of \$119.5 million related to
7 Basic, compared to a net income of \$39.4 million for
8 the same period last year, an improvement and \$80.1
9 million over the six (6) month period.

10 MPI reported an increase in earned
11 revenues of \$35.7 million, which was attributed to an
12 increase in mode of -- motor vehicle premiums of 4.2
13 percent. This increase was primarily attributed to a
14 growth in the number of vehicles and the value of
15 vehicles, as well as increases associated with demerit
16 drivers on the driver safety rating scale.

17 MPI also recor -- reported an increase
18 in investment income of \$99 million, mainly due to
19 higher unrealized gains on bonds to related to a
20 decline in interest rates.

21 Total claims costs increased by \$41
22 million, or 7.5 percent, due to an increase of \$50
23 million in bodily injury claims incurred, offset by a
24 decrease of \$10.8 million reduction in physical damage
25 claims incurred.

1 MPI indicated that it was currently
2 ahead of its planned forecast for the 2019/'20 year
3 based on the results for the first six (6) months due
4 to higher than forecast investment income and
5 favourable claims experience. The Corporation has now
6 forecasted Basic net income of \$108 million for
7 2019/'20, a net loss of \$10.1 million for 2020/'21,
8 and a net loss of \$17.5 million, based on the .6
9 percent applied-for rate decrease.

10 MPI has acknowledged that although it
11 does expect a deterioration in the claims experienced
12 during the last six (6) months of the current year,
13 Basic's performance in the first two (2) quarters have
14 exceeded expectations, and are not forecasted to
15 materially diminish during the remainder of the year.

16 With respect to the rate stabilization
17 reserve and dynamic capital adequacy testing, this
18 Board in previous Orders has stated that the purpose
19 of the RSR, the rate stabilization reserve, is to
20 protect motorists that would otherwise -- from rate
21 increases that would otherwise have been necessary due
22 to unexpected variances from forecasted results and
23 due to events and losses arising from nonrecurring
24 events or factors.

25 Although not required by statute, as in

1 the competitive insurance market, the Corporation has
2 undertaken an annual bas -- Basic dynamic capital
3 adequacy testing investigation as a matter of good
4 governance. The DCAT investigation entails
5 development of a Basic financial forecast and
6 stressing of that forecast under a number of plausible
7 adverse scenarios covering a variety of risk
8 categories. The report on the DCAT investigation
9 includes an opinion from the signing actuary on the
10 financial condist -- condition of Basic. This report
11 has been included with the annual Basic GRA for many
12 years.

13 Over the course of several years, the
14 Corporation worked with the Board and Interveners
15 towards the development of a consensus approach to
16 adapting the Basic DCAT investigation to estimate an
17 appropriate Basic target capital range reflecting
18 Basic experience and risk characteristics.

19 With the passing of the reserves
20 regulation in April, 2019, the role of the DCAT
21 investigation in the GRA has been diminished. As this
22 Board is aware, the validity of that regulation is
23 subject to a challenge brought before this Board by
24 the Consumers' Association of Canada (Manitoba)
25 branch, referred to as CAC.

1 While the DCAT investigation continues
2 to provide insight into the resiliency of Basic's
3 capital position, the single Basic target capital
4 level, based on a 100 percent minimum capital test
5 ratio set out in the reserves regulation, effectively
6 severs the link between the DCAT investigation and the
7 setting of Basic target capital levels.

8 The recommendation of the expert
9 witnesses Dr. Simpson and Ms. Sherry, who were called
10 as experts by CAC, was that the Basic target capital
11 range should continue to be set as an adaptation of
12 the DCAT investigation, in line with the latest
13 efforts of the collaborative review process.

14 With respect to the proposed Capital
15 Management Plan, as directed by the Board in Order
16 159/'18, the 2020 GRA sets out the Corporation's
17 proposed Capital Management Plan for approval by the
18 Board. Features of the Corporation's proposed Capital
19 Management Plan, or CMP, include: a

20 A single Basic target capital level
21 based on a 100 percent minimum capital test ratio as
22 set by the reserves regulation;

23 A commitment to transfer excess
24 retained earnings from the Extension line to Basic,
25 where excess is determined relative to the single

1 Extension target capital level, or minimum level of
2 200 percent for minimum capital test ratio, as set by
3 the reserves regulation;

4 A phase-in approach to move towards the
5 Basic target capital level over a number of years
6 through capital build or capital release provisions;

7 Determination of the need for any
8 capital build or capital release provisions in each
9 GRA, after consideration of the Basic rate level
10 change indication, and the expected capital transfers
11 from Extension;

12 Use of judgmentally selected five (5)
13 year and three (3) year phase-in periods for capital
14 build and release provisions, respectively;

15 Imposition of a judgmentally selected 5
16 percent cap on the combination of the overall Basic
17 rate indication and any capital build provision;

18 And imposition of a judgmentally
19 selected 5 percent cap on any capital release
20 provision.

21 The reserves regulation states as
22 follows with respect to the Basic RSR. For the
23 purpose of Section 18 of the Act, the minimum amount
24 the Corporation must maintain in its rate stabilize --
25 rate stabilization reserve is the amount determined

1 using a MCT ratio of 100 percent. The Corporation's
2 proposed CMP reflects the Corporation's interpretation
3 of the reserves regulation that compliance is
4 satisfied if the Corporation establishes a plan to
5 bring the Basic MCT ratio to at least 100 percent
6 within a period of five (5) years or less.

7 Because the forecasted capital
8 transfers from Extension to Basic have now an impact
9 on the Basic rate request, this necessarily draws
10 elements of the Extension forecast within the
11 oversight of the Public Utilities Board. These and
12 other aspects of the Capital Management Plan present
13 new issues under the regulatory process, including:

14 The enforcement of the reserves
15 regulation;

16 The compliance of the CMP with the
17 reserves regulation, and whether the CMP supports the
18 purpose of the regulation;

19 The appropriateness of the caps and
20 phase-in periods;

21 The degree to which the Board reviews
22 Extension operations;

23 How and when changes to the minimum
24 capital test should be recognized in testing
25 compliance with the reserves regulation and in

1 applying the Capital Management Plan.

2 MPI's board of directors directed that
3 \$60 million be transferred from the Extension line of
4 business to the Basic RSR as at February 28, 2019, to
5 raise the RSR to \$309.8 million, and total equity of
6 249.7 million to support rate stabilization. This
7 transfer resulted in Basic having an MCT ratio of 51.5
8 percent.

9 This is the fifth consecutive year in
10 which the board of directors has directed a transfer
11 to Basic RSR. Between 2013 and four (4) -- 2013 and
12 '14, and 2018/'19, the Basic line of business has
13 received transfers from competitive lines totaling
14 \$273.3 million. The Corporation has, as of year-end
15 2018/'19, fifty-one (51) -- \$511.8 million in retained
16 earnings, including \$309.8 million in Basic, \$99.2
17 million in Extension, and \$103.9 million in Special
18 Risk Extension.

19 Overall corporate total equity, as at
20 February 28, 2019, including accumulated other
21 comprehensive income was \$442.1 million of which
22 \$249.7 million relates to Basic operations,
23 \$94.7 million to Extension, and \$97.7 million to
24 Special Risk Extension.

25 Based on the results at the end of the

1 second quarter and based on the October 4th update,
2 MPI is forecasting that it will transfer \$75.1 million
3 from Extension retained earnings to Basic in 2019/'20.

4 On this basis, it is forecasting total
5 Basic retained earnings of \$439.3 million and after
6 accumulated other comprehensive income total Basic
7 equity of \$390.1 million and the calculated MCT ratio
8 of 96.4 percent.

9 Now on to investments. In the 2019
10 GRA, the Board heard that MPI would be separating its
11 co-mingled investment portfolio into five (5) unique
12 portfolios that back the Corporation's liabilities and
13 surplus.

14 The five (5) unique portfolios include
15 Basic claims, Basic rate stabilization reserve,
16 employee future benefit or pension, Extension, and
17 Special Risk Extension or SRE.

18 In this application, MPI provided an
19 update on the progress to date in the transition to
20 the new portfolios which was substantially completed
21 at the end of the second quarter of 2019/'20. MPI
22 expects the process to be fully completed in the
23 fourth quarter of 2019/'20 and first quarter of the
24 2020/2021 year.

25 The funds available for investment are

1 primarily unearned premium reserves and unpaid claims
2 reserves. The investment portfolio supports the
3 payment of accident claims and the pension obligations
4 of the Corporation.

5 The Corporation's investment assets are
6 currently over \$2.9 billion. The size of the Basic
7 line of business investment portfolio including the
8 Basic claims portfolio and RSR portfolio is projected
9 to \$2.4 billion for 2019/'20 and grow to twenty-three
10 (23) billion for '23/'24.

11 Historically, the Corporation's
12 investment income has been a major component of its
13 income and have offset its annual underwriting losses.
14 Basic net income was \$208.5 million in 2019 --
15 2018/'19 primarily as the result of realization of
16 gains on the transition from the consolidated
17 investment portfolio into the five (5) unique
18 portfolios.

19 In the original application forecast
20 using a naive interest rate forecast at February 28,
21 2019 of 1.94 percent, the Basic investment income was
22 projected to be \$72.8 million for 2019/'20 and
23 \$74.2 million for 2020/'21.

24 Based on the September 20th naive
25 interest rate forecast update of 1.36 percent, the

1 Corporation is now projecting investment income of
2 \$158.6 million for Basic to offset a revised
3 underwriting loss now forecast at \$50.2 million.

4 Net income is now forecast to be
5 \$108.4 million for 2019/'20.

6 With respect to operating expenses, the
7 total corporate expenses were \$288.2 million in
8 2018/'19 and are forecast to grow to \$303.6 million in
9 the current year.

10 MPI forecast total corporate
11 expenditures to be \$306 million in 2020/'21 and
12 \$309 million in 2021/'22.

13 MPI's global corporate costs are to be
14 allocated among the insurance and non-insurance
15 categories of business and by automobile lines of --
16 lines of business in a way that does not give rise to
17 cross subsidization.

18 Costs are allocated to Basic through an
19 integrated cost allocation methodology which was
20 approved by the Board in Board order 157/12 There
21 have been no material changes to the integrated cost
22 allocation methodology in this application.

23 Upon the completion of the allocation
24 process, expenses attributable to the Basic program
25 are established for normal operations and improvement

1 initiatives.

2 Total Basic expenses were \$218.8
3 million in 2018/'19 or 75.9 percent of corporate
4 expenses and were forecast to be \$229.5 million in
5 2019/'20. Thereafter, Basic expenses are forecast to
6 increase to \$231.7 million in 2020/'21 and
7 \$233 million in 2021/'22.

8 Salaries and benefits are a major
9 component of the operating expenses of Basic
10 representing over 58 percent of the total operating
11 expenses in the year of the application.

12 Since 2015/'16, the Corporation has
13 experienced a compound annual growth of salaries and
14 benefits of 1.8 percent with compensation that has
15 grown from \$116 million in 2015/'16 to \$124.2 million
16 in 2018/'19.

17 Salaries and benefits are forecast to
18 be \$133.7 million in the current year, \$137.2 million
19 in 2020/'21, and \$139.6 million in 2021/'22. Forecast
20 annual growth is 4 percent.

21 MPI is now forecasting an increase in
22 compensation expenses net a vacancy allowance of
23 9.95 percent in 2019/'20 and an increase of
24 2.96 percent in 2020/'21. MPI attributed the large
25 growth in compensation in the current year to filling

1 a large number of vacancies.

2 At the end of July 2019, actual
3 full-time equivalents year to date was one thousand
4 eight hundred and eight (1,808) full-time equivalents
5 compared to a budget of one thousand nine hundred and
6 eleven point one (1,911.1) for normal and specialty
7 program staffing representing one hundred and two
8 point three (102.3) vacant positions.

9 With respect to capital expenditures,
10 MPI projected Basic capital expenditures at
11 \$31.9 million for 2019/'20, \$45.7 million for
12 2020/'21, and \$40.9 million for 2021/'22.

13 MPI is forecasting in the next five (5)
14 years \$130.7 million in capital expenditures in
15 ongoing and future information technology projects.

16 MPI also provided an update to its
17 Legacy System Modernization Project, now referred to
18 as Project NOVA. This relates to the replacement of
19 dated legacy systems at a budgeted cost of
20 \$106.8 million which includes an estimate of
21 \$85.4 million plus a 25 percent contingency of
22 \$21.4 million. This represents the current MPI
23 Board-approved budget as MPI has not received final
24 projecting from product vendors.

25 With respect to the information

1 technology strategy, MPI presented its strategy for
2 2019/'20. In indicated that it continues to leverage
3 enterprise architecture concepts to link business
4 strategy to IT project investments through the use of
5 business and technical capabilities.

6 This year's strategy focuses
7 extensively on Project NOVA and its transformational
8 impact on MPI's business. This annual strategy is
9 aligned to keep priorities, mission, vision, and
10 values identified in the 2019/'20 annual business plan
11 and builds upon the 2018/'19 strategy.

12 As with prior GRAs, MPI indicated that
13 significant changes and practices have been adopted
14 moving forward. In particular, six (5) main streams
15 were being followed: the move toward proven
16 technologies; identification of all risks of a project
17 prior to project initiation; the use of a project
18 sponsor; alignment, when possible, to industry best
19 practices and vendor-provided software; the value
20 management process being ingrained in MPI culture and
21 project lifestyle; and IT capabilities being created
22 to support business capabilities to solve a business
23 objective.

24 Five (5) major influences have been
25 identified for this year. These are legacy

1 modernization or Project NOVA which is a corporate
2 initiative aimed to modernize the MPI core legacy
3 systems to deliver MPI products and services to core
4 personal and commercial customers with greater
5 business agility and improved customer experience
6 while reducing MPI's technology risk.

7 Information security and IT risk
8 management processes. MPI has formed the information
9 security office which managed three (3) key governance
10 functions, information security, IT risk and
11 compliance management, and information security
12 architecture.

13 Technology risk management program.
14 The technology risk management program provides
15 regular investment and technology systems and
16 processes.

17 Enterprise architecture process.
18 Enterprise architecture is the discipline of
19 proactively and holistically understanding business
20 and IT capabilities by identifying and analyzing the
21 execution of change towards the desired business
22 vision and outcomes.

23 Agile delivery. MPI recognized that in
24 replacing the core legacy systems the way these
25 systems need to be configured and delivered also

1 needed to change. MPI has determined that adopting
2 agile design and delivery practices are key to
3 providing business value and to effectively work with
4 any modern platform provider.

5 With respect to benchmarking and
6 information technology. Overall, the Gartner
7 consulting benchmarking results indicate that MPI has
8 maintained the same IT score three point one (3.1)
9 from 2016/'17 to 2017/'18.

10 IT spending relative to operating
11 expenses has continued to decrease annually. MPI's IT
12 spend as a percentage of overall operating expenses
13 has stabilized to 5.4 percent. Compared to its peer
14 group at 5.42 percent, MPI spend is slightly lower at
15 5.37 percent.

16 MPI has formed a single consolidated
17 unit overseeing the management of its major IT vendor
18 contracts for the purpose of standardization and
19 identification of opportunities for improvements and
20 cost efficiencies.

21 The IT full-time equivalent as a
22 percentage of company employees is 17.2 percent
23 compared to the peer average of 13.6 percent. MPI
24 in-house versus contractor proportion has decreased
25 from the previous year to 27.5 percent. The peer

1 average is 30.4 percent.

2 MPI reported that it will be refreshing
3 its IT benchmarking services with a request for
4 proposals having been issued to source a new
5 benchmarking service provider.

6 On the issue of road safety. In
7 order 130/17 following the 2018 GRA, the Board
8 directed that a technical conference take place in
9 early 2019 on the issue of road safety. In this GRA,
10 the Board heard from Ward Keith who contracted with
11 the Board to facilitate the technical conference and
12 prepare a report.

13 Mr. Keith's report on the technical
14 conference which took place in April of 2019 was filed
15 in this application, and it provided a summary of the
16 issues reviewed by the participants in the conference
17 along with specific action items undertaken by MPI
18 arising from that conference.

19 With respect to the road safety budget,
20 MPI is forecasting to spend \$13.9 million in Basic
21 road safety and loss prevention programs in 2019/'20.
22 The largest component is spent on driver education
23 including the high school driver education program
24 which is approximately \$4 million or 29 percent of the
25 overall budget.

1 Impaired driving prevention strategies
2 are the second largest expenditure at \$2.8 million or
3 20 percent of the overall budget.

4 Speed management expenditures are
5 forecast at \$0.9 million or nine hundred thousand
6 (900,000) or 6 percent of the overall budget.

7 The balance of the road safety programs
8 are advertising and sponsorships, road safety
9 programming and road watch, which is increased
10 enforcement.

11 MPI has discontinued the immobilizer
12 program in 2019/'20 as a result of all new vehicles
13 now having built-in electronic immobilizer technology.
14 MPI attributed a reduction in auto crime strategy
15 spending of \$900,000 to the discontinuation of this
16 program.

17 One last item, Madam Chair, I believe I
18 misspoke when referring to the Basic claims portfolio.
19 It is projected to be \$2.4 billion for 2019/'20 to
20 grow to \$3 billion in 2023/'24.

21 Madam Chair and members of the panel, I
22 have attempted to comment on the main issues that
23 arose this year. I would like to thank MPI and the
24 Interveners for their cooperation extended throughout
25 the hearing.

1 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you,
2 Ms. McCandless.

3 Mr. Scarfone, do you have exhibits to
4 file, or do you want to proceed with your closing
5 remarks at this point?

6 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: I think we'll
7 file these exhibits now. I apologize we didn't have a
8 list before -- before Ms. McCandless began, so let's
9 just get these on the record.

10 Exhibit number 95 -- MPI Exhibit
11 number 95 is a response to undertaking number 14.

12

13 --- EXHIBIT NO. MPI-95: Response to Undertaking 14

14

15 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: Exhibit
16 number 96 is a response to undertaking number 21 and
17 Appendix 1.

18

19 --- EXHIBIT NO. MPI-96: Response to Undertaking 21
20 and Appendix 1

21

22 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: MPI Exhibit
23 number 97 is a response to undertaking number 15 and
24 Appendix 1.

25

1 --- EXHIBIT NO. MPI-97: Response to Undertaking 15
2 and Appendix 1

3

4 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: MPI Exhibit
5 number 98 is a response to undertaking number 19.

6

7 --- EXHIBIT NO. MPI-98: Response to Undertaking 19

8

9 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: MPI Exhibit
10 number 99 is a response to undertaking number 32.

11

12 --- EXHIBIT NO. MPI-99: Response to Undertaking 32

13

14 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: MPI Exhibit
15 number 100 is a response to undertaking number 34.

16

17 --- EXHIBIT NO. MPI-100: Response to Undertaking 34

18

19 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: MPI Exhibit 101
20 is a response to an undertaking in the commercially
21 sensitive information module number 1.

22

23 --- EXHIBIT NO. MPI-101: MPI response to an
24 undertaking in the
25 commercially sensitive

1 information module
2 number 1

3

4 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: And the last
5 three (3) would be 102 which is the closing submission
6 that was circulated this morning.

7

8 --- EXHIBIT NO. MPI-102: MPI's closing submissions

9

10 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: Exhibit
11 number 103 will be MPIC's closing presentation in the
12 form of a PowerPoint presentation.

13

14 --- EXHIBIT NO. MPI-103: MPI's closing PowerPoint
15 presentation

16

17 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: And lastly,
18 Exhibit number 104 is Madam Chair's submission on the
19 regulatory process. You'll recall my comments from
20 the opening -- my opening statement. So that 104 is
21 our last exhibit that addresses that issue.

22

23 --- EXHIBIT NO. MPI-104: Chairperson's submissions
24 on the regulatory process

25

1 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you,
2 Mr. Scarfone. Please proceed.

3 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: And before I
4 begin with our presentation proper, Mr. Triggs has a
5 couple things that he'd like to say, if that pleases
6 the -- the panel?

7 THE CHAIRPERSON: Certainly.
8 Mr. Triggs...?

9 MR. MICHAEL TRIGGS: Thank you,
10 Madam Chair. I'll keep this very brief for a minute
11 or two (2).

12 MPI has spoken a lot about transparency
13 and enhanced transparency. But as I look around the
14 room, I realize that -- now this being my eleventh GRA
15 that I'm somewhat long in the tooth here, and there's
16 a lot of people who haven't had the seen -- seen how
17 things have changed over the years.

18 And with that, I just wanted to make
19 importance to remind the people how things have in
20 fact changed. If the -- Mr. Gabor who was here
21 three (3) years ago, and we saw the difficulties and
22 challenge of getting information related to the BI3
23 project which had been implemented in 2010, challenges
24 getting IT business cases.

25 And you contrast that to what is today.

1 I think it is a very open and robust disclosure of
2 everything that MPI has to show.

3 So that is the change is -- we've
4 spoken to, but it's not -- the importance is not the
5 fact things have changed. The importance is the
6 transparency is out there.

7 And Manitobans have the right to know.
8 They -- they need to know where their money is going.
9 They know -- they need to know how MPI operates its
10 business. They need to know what MPI does with it --
11 the money it is taken in.

12 And the only real way to do that is for
13 the Corporation to be transparent and open as a
14 possible on that, and we think that that is our goal
15 that we want to -- well, I don't think -- that is our
16 goal that we want to accomplish, and we'll continue to
17 try and improve year over year to be more transparent
18 on that.

19 But with transparency is also -- comes
20 when you're disclosing. You're not hiding anything.
21 As Mr. Graham says, you know, pulling back the covers.
22 I guess that's an Australian terminology.

23 But at least the point that you're
24 showing what's out there, and there's -- mistakes have
25 been made and mistakes will be made in the future as

1 well.

2 But our point in showing this isn't to
3 point fingers at people, to criticize people. It is
4 to learn from those mistakes and improve for the
5 future, so that next year and the year after, there's
6 improvements for how MPI delivers its service to
7 Manitobans, and that is the spirit of intent in which
8 we bring forth the transparency.

9 And with that, I'll just leave that for
10 Mr. Scarfone and Mr. Guerra to conclude our
11 presentation.

12 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you,
13 Mr. Triggs.

14 Mr. Scarfone...?

15

16 FINAL ARGUMENT BY MANITOBA PUBLIC INSURANCE:

17 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: Thank you,
18 Madam Chair. So these are the Corporation's closing
19 remarks for the 2020 general rate application. We
20 have a presentation to make this morning, but of
21 course, I encourage the Board, should there be any
22 questions concerning the slides that you're about to
23 see, certainly interrupt me, ask those questions.

24 But the foundation of this particular
25 slide presentation is found in the closing

1 submission -- the written argument that is more
2 comprehensive, more robust, and will have all of
3 the -- should have all of the information that the
4 panel needs in response to any questions you might
5 have this morning.

6 So the agenda for the closing is before
7 you. I tend to address the first four (4) items on
8 the agenda, and Mr. Guerra will then take over and
9 address numbers 5 through 8.

10 So the summary of our request is set
11 out by Ms. McCandless is the adjusted rate indication
12 of 0.6 percent -- a negative 0.6 percent which stems
13 from having removed the capital maintenance provision
14 and updating the interest rate forecast as of the end
15 of September.

16 The rates, as you know, are in effect
17 for thirteen (13) months with the proposed changes to
18 the fiscal year. We are seeking approval of the
19 capital management plan, and the last three (3)
20 bullets set out there the discontinuance of the anti-
21 theft discount, and no changes to driver premiums and
22 vehicle discounts through the driver safety rating,
23 and no changes to fleet rebates and surcharges. So
24 that is the relief that the Corporation is seeking in
25 this year's general rate application.

1 So these are the areas that I want to
2 discuss concerning the overall rate indication. You
3 can see them there before you, and we'll proceed now
4 with the drivers of the rate change.

5 The required rate was 3.3 percent.
6 That's the AAP rate. It's then adjusted, as Mr.
7 Johnston indicated, for two (2) reasons: One (1), for
8 vehicle upgrade. That traditionally serves to lower
9 the rate indication, as does vehicle volume.

10 This year, it did not. The forecast
11 was off, and so you see there where that number is
12 normally a negative, it's a positive. And then by
13 removing the capital maintenance provision, you arrive
14 at an AAP breakeven required rate change of negative
15 point six (.6).

16 And this is how the negative point six
17 (.6) rate decrease affects the major classes. For the
18 purposes of most Manitobans, you look to that top
19 line, of course, the private passenger vehicle, and
20 you'll see that the indicated rate change for most of
21 us is negative .9 percent.

22 Of the Interveners that were in
23 attendance for this hearing, the motorcycles -- and
24 I'll get -- I'll touch on that more -- show an
25 increase of 5.1 percent. And there before you is the

1 -- the remainder of the major classes and the various
2 indications based on the negative point six (.6) rate
3 decrease, the overall rate decrease.

4 This particular slide shows the
5 forecasted revenues from the Basic premiums, and it's
6 important there to note that there is forecasted some
7 increases in total earned revenues over the next five
8 (5) years. And you'll -- you'll note that from that
9 that -- that the business is growing. And so that,
10 you'll hear from me later, is important in terms of
11 the capital requirements of the Corporation, because
12 as we heard last year, as the business grows, as the
13 Corporation grows, so does its capital needs based on
14 the MCT percentage.

15 Prudent fiscal management is a -- is a
16 continuing goal of the Corporation, and reducing
17 expenses is -- is something that the Corporation
18 prides itself on. You'll see there that total Basic
19 expenses are down by 2 percent, and there's a number
20 of itemized lists there that show how that number is
21 arrived at, the -- the most important of which, we
22 say, is the claims expense, which again, is down 2
23 percent. Operating expenses, 4.5 percent. And total
24 Basic allocated corporate expenses are down 2.3
25 percent, Madam Chair.

1 This, Madam Chair, is a depiction of
2 operating expenses as a -- oh, thanks, Anthony. Thank
3 you. This particular slide is operating expenses that
4 shows net premiums earned -- compared against net
5 premiums earned.

6 And this particular slide, as Ms.
7 Campbell explained, you want the percentage to be
8 lower, while recognizing the need to deliver good
9 customer service. And so there's a balance there that
10 has to be struck, but lower percentages essentially
11 mean that MPI uses the money collected from the
12 ratepayers more efficiently, more prudently, as that
13 number decreases.

14 Ms. McCandless touched upon the
15 employees, which, of course, are MPI's largest
16 expense. And the budget would say that the Basic
17 salaries are expected to grow at an annual average of
18 only 2.3 percent over the next few years, and that's
19 from 2019/20 to 2021/22.

20 The budget full-time equivalent numbers
21 -- MPIC is not forecasting increases to the FTE
22 numbers; that is, they don't expect it to grow. But
23 those numbers, as you may recall, Madam Chair, the --
24 the full-time equivalent occupancy -- or, vacancy
25 allowance is for those positions that are being held

1 in anticipation of those positions being filled one
2 day. And so that number is constantly moving and
3 being adjusted as -- as people retire.

4 On the vacancy allowance number, it was
5 an unusual year for MPIC for retirements, and turnover
6 led to an understatement of that particular allowance
7 in this year's rate application. But the Corporation
8 has confidence that as the accuracy of that number
9 improves, with the implementation of NOVA, it will be
10 adjusted to a number that more accurately affects --
11 aff -- reflects the needs of the Corporation in terms
12 of its employees.

13 On the PIPP side, the weekly indemnity
14 claims -- as we heard from Mr. Johnston, there's a
15 long-standing problem in increasing the claims
16 persistency. That is the number of claims that are
17 open for longer than 24 months.

18 To address this concern, you heard last
19 year that MPIC has now hired thirteen (13) additional
20 claims management staff to address this, and through
21 active case management, the Corporation is hoping to
22 reduce the long-tail PIPP claims and return people to
23 work. And so that, too, is a work in progress.

24 On centralized reserving, MPIC is
25 continuing with its efforts to improve the consistency

1 and adequacy of its case reserves. And the
2 centralized reserving system, which we heard evidence
3 about last year and again this year, seeks to improve
4 this forecasting.

5 The change in the fiscal year is
6 something that the Corporation is doing primarily as a
7 result of the government asking MPIC to do so to align
8 with their fiscal year. The Corporation notes that it
9 has a very low impact on very few ratepayers.

10 You'll recall the evidence that it
11 really only affects those customers that are renewing
12 in March of -- of -- on the calendar year. And the
13 March customers used to be at the front of the queue,
14 and as the graph shows, they will then be moved to --
15 to the back of the queue in terms of their renewal.

16 So the rate stabilization reserve is
17 what I want to touch upon next, and it'll move into
18 the capital side of this submission. As Ms.
19 McCandless indicated, the RSR is to protect -- protect
20 motorist from rate increases that would otherwise have
21 been necessary due to unexpected variances from
22 forecasted results. So that's one (1) aspect of it.
23 Or it could be used for events and losses arising from
24 non-recurring events or factors.

25 So this year, there was a transfer of

1 \$60 million that occurred in February of 2019, and
2 that served to increase the minimum capital test from
3 37 percent to 52 percent. And you heard Mr. Johnston
4 indicate that the two (2) biggest drivers of
5 increasing that MCT percentage are the transfers that
6 occur from the Extension line of business over the
7 past four (4) or five (5) years along with the
8 retention of the RSR income -- investment income.

9 And as Mr. Bunston indicated, and Mr.
10 Johnston, there was also an increase to the Basic MCT
11 that resulted from the new investment strategy ma --
12 being implemented, so that -- that investment
13 strategy, under the ALM study, served to lower the
14 capital needs of the Corporation.

15 So you'll see that after the transfer,
16 the Corporation was at 52 percent. By the end of Q1,
17 as the strategy -- the investment strategy became
18 implemented, that MCT number rose to 87 percent. And
19 then end of Q2, which was September 1st, the
20 Corporation was essentially at 100 percent MCT, as
21 we've heard.

22 Mr. Johnston testified that the
23 investment income on the RSR was not used in the
24 calculation of the AAP breakeven rate, and there --
25 I'll touch upon that later. Mr. Johnston's of the

1 view that that particular investment income, that
2 money, should be -- should remain on the capital side
3 of the business and not be included in AAP rate
4 making.

5 And the last line there is important
6 because it says:

7 "The retention of that investment
8 income has no material impact on the
9 overall rate indication."

10 And there is something that the -- the
11 Board can look to to confirm what I'm about to say.
12 It's Undertaking number 15. MPI fil -- filed it as
13 Exhibit number 42. And if you look at pro forma line
14 -- Pro Forma 3, line 7, you'll see that, essentially,
15 what happens is if the RSR investment income was used
16 in the calculation of the AAP breakeven rate -- so
17 different than what Mr. Johnston does, and as
18 advocated by Mr. Pelly, I believe. If it was used on
19 that side, on the AAP rate side, it would trigger a
20 capital build provision on the capital side.

21 And so by triggering a capital build
22 provision, you're essentially moving money from one
23 (1) side to the next, and the overall rate indication
24 would be -- would have been the same this year. So we
25 have a negative 6 percent rate indication, with a

1 retention of the RSR investment income.

2 Had that particular income been applied
3 to rate making, the triggering of the build provision
4 under the capital management plan would have brought
5 the overall rate indication to a negative point six
6 (.6). So there's no mat -- that's why the slide said
7 there's no maperial -- no material impact, regardless
8 of which way the -- the investment income is handled.

9 The reserves regulation, as Ms.
10 McCandless said, was enacted back in April of 2019,
11 and it requires MPIC to be at 100 percent on a go-
12 forward basis. Section 3, we say, is the important
13 part of that particular regulation, the germane
14 portion of that regulation, which speaks to what use
15 the Corporation should make of the surplus monies in
16 the rate stabilization reserve. And if you look at
17 Section 3, it makes it pretty clear that once that
18 target is met, any excess money in the RSR, the Basic
19 RSR, should be applied for the purpose of lowering the
20 rate indication.

21 It's important to -- to remember when
22 hearing submissions later on about the reserves
23 regulation, Madam Chair, that Mr. Graham maintains
24 that while that we're moving the needle on having more
25 reserves than we have in the past, we are still at

1 what he calls the minimum of the minimum. It's a
2 minimum capital test: not a dollar more, not a dollar
3 less. And through management action, as we've heard,
4 and the financial success of the Corporation in the
5 past number of months, we have achieved -- we have
6 essentially achieved that target as of now.

7 On the investment side, there ar -- are
8 a couple of things I want to discuss with you. One
9 (1) is the status of the asset liability management
10 study, its implementation, MPI's risk appetite,
11 reducing the interest rate risk for the Basic
12 portfolio, and lastly, the ongoing benefit of the
13 shadow portfolios that were looked at in this year's
14 rate application.

15 So when I mention questioning MPI's
16 risk appetite, it really is a matter of looking at how
17 the Corporation decided to hedge its interest rate
18 risk. You'll recall from the ALM study that it was
19 based on a nominal lial -- liability benchmark; that
20 is, the MPI portfolios are founded on a nominal
21 liability benchmark.

22 The shadow portfolios, on the other
23 hand, were founded on a real liability benchmark. And
24 so my understanding of that is the Corporation has
25 assumed a 2 percent inflation risk by adopting the

1 nominal liability benchmark, and they haven't hedged
2 real interest rate risk. And that's the -- that's the
3 difference.

4 And it's important to remember, and
5 this was canvassed last year at length, that the
6 Corporation made that decision based on its forecast
7 of inflation. And there was no evidence last year nor
8 this year that would suggest that that inflation
9 forecast is going to rise for an extended period of
10 time above 2 percent.

11 And so we say the nominal liability
12 benchmark is still the best benchmark, and -- and tho
13 -- those were the reasons the Corporation and its
14 board of directors selected that. And that was an
15 investment decision that wa -- that they made at the
16 outset of the study.

17 Now, the CAC -- and you heard some
18 evidence from Mr. Makarchuk on this -- when examining
19 the shadow portfolios, it was important to note that
20 Mr. Williams was having him look at one (1) of the
21 shadow portfolios and move it around and -- and try
22 and move it in the real liability benchmark. So what
23 we have, Madam Chair, is we have portfolios that are
24 designed on the nominal liability benchmark, a
25 different platform, and they're injected onto a --

1 another platform. And Mr. Williams there is asking
2 Mr. Makarchuk, how do we deal with this and -- and
3 move them over with the real return bonds?

4 And Mr. Makarchuk quite candidly said,
5 well, you would have to shorten your provincials or --
6 or do something weird because it doesn't work. And --
7 and the comparison that they were trying to make isn't
8 a fair one. And -- and that's why I brought to the
9 Board's attention that all of the slides that were put
10 forward by the Mercer group indicated that this was
11 based on a real liability benchmark, because that is
12 not what the MPIC portfolio is founded upon.

13 Other benefits of the -- of the ALM
14 study are the mitigation of interest rate risk. We
15 know that by doing that, the Corporation hopes to
16 avoid further large-magnitude net income losses. The
17 de-risking of the Basic claims portfolio, as I've
18 indicated, decreases the capital that's required in
19 the calculation of the MCT.

20 And lastly, the segregated portfolios
21 are now what I've -- I've referred to as a fit for the
22 purpose. They're more closely aligned to the
23 objectives of each of the portfolios.

24 So for example, the RSR portfolio,
25 which doesn't have any liabilities to back, has more

1 growth assets in it than the Basic claims portfolio,
2 which is comprised entirely of fixed-income, lower-
3 risk investments, because the primary purpose of those
4 investments, those bonds, are to back the liabilities
5 of the Basic program.

6 You don't have that same objective for
7 the RSR, and again, there's different objectives for
8 the pension portfolio. So again, they're more closely
9 aligned to the objective and the segregated portfolio
10 strategy MPI says is -- is a better way of doing
11 things than the old commingled version of the -- of
12 the investment fund.

13 So on the ongoing benefit of those
14 shadow portfolios, Madam Chair, a couple things to
15 remember -- that the securities in those portfolios
16 are contrary to MPIC's inves -- investment objectives
17 and the risk tolerance. So we heard evidence about
18 growth assets that were in the Basic claims portfolio.
19 The Corporation decided against purchasing growth
20 assets for the Basic claims portfolio.

21 The Corporation also decided against
22 leveraging. Leveraging is -- is a strategy, Madam
23 Chair, that would have an investor borrow money to
24 purchase securities. And we heard from Mr. Makarchuk
25 that it's a risky proposition.

1 But that is what the shadow portfolios
2 have done. They've -- they've made use of a leveraged
3 investment strategy, taken on more risk. Risk is
4 something that the Corporation and its board of
5 directors wanted to avoid. So remember that when
6 we're looking at the comparisons that we saw on how
7 each of the shadow portfolios was performing against
8 the actual portfolios.

9 The second thing is the -- the time
10 frame. So the comparison was made for a six (6) month
11 period. You heard Mr. Makarchuk say that's highly
12 unusual. Normally, it's about five (5) years. So
13 bear that in mind when looking at the comparisons.

14 And lastly, the preliminary comparison
15 does, we say, show the reasonableness of the
16 portfolios selected by the Corporation. And here are
17 those comparisons. So the returns are largely similar
18 for the Basic claims portfolio, with MPI having
19 outperformed the shadow portfolios over the first six
20 (6) months. In our -- in our view, that means
21 nothing, because as we heard Mr. Makarchuk say, it's
22 not a six (6) month race, it's a five (5) year race.
23 And so that number can move around, and nothing should
24 really be taken from that.

25 On the pension side, the MPIC Basic

1 portfolio -- or sorry, the MPIC pension portfolio,
2 that should read, has underperformed, particularly the
3 unconstrained shadow portfolio for pension. That
4 unconstrained shadow portfolio has outperformed the
5 actual pension portfolio by twice the amount. But
6 again, that particular shadow portfolio contains
7 investments that the Corporation was not prepared to
8 purchase, strategies that the Corporation was not
9 prepared to employ, like leveraging.

10 And so those numbers, we say, should be
11 -- should be looked at with caution, and -- and
12 remembering those two (2) important points, the
13 comparison time frame and the objectives of the
14 Corporation and its risk tolerance.

15 The last thing I might mention, Madam
16 Chair, is -- is concerning the utility of the shadow
17 portfolio on an ongoing basis. Bear in mind that you
18 are looking at this through the lens of hindsight. So
19 it's easy for people to look back and say, well, we
20 should have done this. If you had have purchased
21 these securities, or if you had have employed the real
22 liability benchmark, you would have been doing better,
23 and you would have been bringing in more investment
24 return for the customers, lowering claims costs.

25 And the benefit of hindsight,

1 particularly where it concerns investments, is -- is
2 something to be avoided, in our view. That -- I guess
3 the analogy might be none of us would be here today,
4 Madam Chair, if in 1984, we had bought Apple stock,
5 but we didn't, and we're all still working.

6 So remember that, and -- and we think
7 that at this stage, the asset liability management
8 study, which is almost fully implemented, should be
9 left alone. Let the investments run their course, and
10 -- and see how the fund performs over the next couple
11 of years.

12

13 (BRIEF PAUSE)

14

15 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: The Motorcycle
16 Group intervened this -- this year, Madam Chair, and
17 raised a couple of concerns. One is -- is the concern
18 that they normally have, and -- and that is that their
19 rate increase, notwithstanding what's happening to the
20 private passenger vehicles, their particular premiums
21 are going up.

22 We do note on this slide, that
23 notwithstanding that, Manitoba motorcyclists pay the
24 lowest rates in Canada, and that's important, because
25 that's an inherently risky mode of transportation, as

1 we know. And we heard evidence for Mr. Johnston that
2 the large majority of their claims costs are on the
3 injury side. PIPP benefits being paid to
4 motorcyclists, and most of them are long-term injury
5 claims, which means they are particularly sensitive to
6 interest rate changes. The -- the claims generally
7 are longer than twenty-four (24) months, and some of
8 them, as you might expect, are lifetime claims.

9 So you'll see there that the rate
10 change disproportionately affected by changes in the
11 new money yield used for rate making, a significant
12 proportion of the loss costs, as I've said, are for
13 the long PIPP benefits. And the other drivers of the
14 rate increase -- or the increase in the forecasted
15 overall claims costs and a low upgrade factor, which
16 results in the required rate change of 5.1 percent.

17

18 (BRIEF PAUSE)

19

20 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: And there you
21 see the 5.1 percent. So their bill goes up by forty-
22 one dollars (\$41) this year, as opposed to some of the
23 other indicated rate changes.

24 On the Extension side, which is before
25 this tribunal because of the Capital Management Plan,

1 I would suggest, Mr. Graham indicated there that. He
2 inherited an organization that was in some respects
3 secretive, and he made reference to a black hole of
4 money that sat with Extension. It was difficult for
5 MPIC, in his view, to defend itself because of our
6 reluctance to be transparent on the Extension side.

7 So this year, the Public Utilities
8 Board had look-see into Extension. So as a result of
9 having proposed a Capital Management Plan, it became
10 necessary for the -- the Board to understand how much
11 money the Corporation makes on the Extension side,
12 what its forecast was for its capital targets, because
13 as you'll hear later, transfers only occur once
14 Extension line of business reaches 200 percent MCT,
15 and that the extra money will be backing Basic,
16 essentially. So prior to the \$60 million transfer
17 that occurred earlier this year, the Extension MCT, as
18 the application says, was at 527 percent.

19 And so I've -- as I've indicated, that
20 makes Extension revenues important to discuss before
21 this Board, but we do have to be careful about the
22 depth that the PUB examines revenues and expenses,
23 because it is a competitive line of business. And so
24 we would disagree with Ms. McCandless when she
25 mentioned oversight. We would characterize it better

1 as insight into Extension, not oversight.

2

3

(BRIEF PAUSE)

4

5 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: So that leads me
6 into the proposed Capital Management Plan, why we need
7 one, largely as a result of the reserves regulation,
8 which serves as the anchor point to the Capital
9 Management Plan. Secondly, you'll recall from
10 application in the overview section, there's an
11 attachment there that has the mandate letter -- the
12 mandate letter sent to MPIC from the government that
13 asks for MPIC to engage this Board to implement a
14 Capital Management Plan with MCT targets. And so
15 that's another reason that we say we need one.

16 And lastly, it's the method by which
17 this Board will ensure compliance with the regulation,
18 should this Board find that the regulation is valid.
19 And when we say compliance -- and I'll get into this
20 in a bit -- the Capital Management Plan sets out the
21 mechanism to achieve and -- and be at that 100 percent
22 MCT target under the regulation.

23 We say that the Capital Management Plan
24 makes good sense, and -- and should be approved by
25 this Board. And -- and I don't want to simplify

1 things, but more capital equals more stability and
2 less volatility. That the Corporation's view.

3 We understand that there's opposing
4 views, particularly from Ms. Sherry, who would say 100
5 percent MCT means the Corporation is holding too much
6 ratepayer money. We disagree.

7 The transfers have moved from being
8 discretionary to nondiscretionary. And they're
9 automatic, so to the extent that the threshold in the
10 Extension line of business exceeds 200 percent, there
11 will be an automatic transfer every year, and I'll
12 show you a slide to that effect later. But there is a
13 pace to the rebuilds. Should a -- a build provision
14 be required, it will be spread over five (5) years to
15 help mitigate any build associated volatility.

16 On the -- the point that I raised about
17 more capital, it's important to -- to remember -- and
18 -- and Mr. Todd took issue with this -- the upper
19 range of the -- of the target last year was \$315
20 million, as ordered by the PUB. You heard Mr.
21 Johnston indicate that the current dollar amount for
22 100 percent MCT is about 375 million.

23 So we are now holding \$60 million more
24 in capital than the upper target from last year. So
25 when you hear Dr. Simpson say that the range is more

1 volatile than -- than a point source, and -- and I
2 think Mr. Todd said the same thing, that, in our view,
3 doesn't make sense, because how can there be more
4 volatility at three seventy-five (375) than there is
5 three fifty (350)?

6 And so we disagree with that, but they
7 would say, well, yes, but there are other factors,
8 including that -- that represents too much capital.
9 Well, that's an academic debate, but the -- the --
10 there's no doubt that holding more capital has to mean
11 less volatility, more money to draw from the RSR in
12 the event those unforeseen events happen to occur.

13 And -- and lastly, we would note that
14 the Corporation has achieved its 100 percent MCT --
15 MCT target without any build provision, without any
16 ask of ratepayers in this year's rate application.

17

18 (BRIEF PAUSE)

19

20 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: So Mr. Todd
21 provided some expert evidence. He -- he did what I
22 would call an objective evaluation of the Capital
23 Management Plan. And we say that MPIC's Capital
24 Management Plan addresses two (2) common regulator
25 concerns. He said, Regulators are commonly concerned

1 with avoiding cross subsidization and limiting anti-
2 competitive activity.

3 The benefits derived by Extension, and
4 -- and there's no question that Extension does derive
5 benefits from the Basic program, need to be offset
6 with capital transfers from Extension to Basic, and
7 that's exactly what the Capital Management Plan does.
8 It contemplates transfers to offset any anti-
9 competitive activity, and certainly, there's no cross
10 subsidization of Extension by Basic. Mr. Todd
11 indicated it's the exact opposite. The subsidization
12 is flowing the other way, the money is going from
13 Extension to Basic.

14 And lastly, he said, Transferred --
15 transfers should be used to ensure the capital target
16 is met. And -- and there was the exchange with Mr.
17 Todd. During his testimony, he's talking about the
18 210 percent there. So he's talking about the
19 Extension. He said, That 10 percent would be
20 available for transfer, and then it's used to lower
21 the rate indication. Well, he said, It could be used
22 in a number of ways. It could be used to reduce
23 rates. It could be used to provide a rebate.

24 And I asked him, It might also be used
25 to achieve the capital target of Basic?

1 And he said, Yes, if the monopoly is
2 lower than 100 percent, yes. Mr. Todd said, That
3 would be the first recourse.

4 So if you're prioritizing use, in Mr.
5 Todd's view, again consistent with what's in the
6 Capital Management Plan, you first top up 200 percent.
7 That's what the money's for, top up the capital. Once
8 you're topped up in Basic, then you can think about
9 reducing rates, or perhaps even a rebate, but it's not
10 before you've met your 100 percent MCT target.

11 So this is the slide that we -- we've
12 produced that shows the anticipated transfers from the
13 Extension line of business. You'll see there the \$60
14 million that was already transferred in February. You
15 heard Mr. Johnston say that this coming year, another
16 75 million will be transferred. The reason for that
17 being higher than the following years is because the
18 60 million that was transferred in February did not
19 represent the full amount to bring it down to 200
20 percent MCT. So there's still extra money in there.
21 That extra money is going to be coming over this year
22 and in the form of \$75 million.

23 Thereafter, it's fairly consistent.
24 The projections are about 40 to \$45 million every year
25 transferred into Basic under the Capital Management

1 Plan. And there you see how it will affect the Basic
2 MCT, and the projections that are made on how that
3 number will -- will rise, I would suggest, with one
4 (1) exception in 2023. And the projections right now
5 are that in 2024, there would be excess capital in
6 Basic, resulting in a triggering of the capital
7 release provisions under the Capital Management Plan.

8 So this is -- this -- these next few
9 slides depict, in our view, to assist the Board in
10 understanding how the Capital Management Plan works.
11 And it -- and it will show you both the rate-making
12 side and the capital side, and how the two (2) work
13 together in coming up with the overall rate
14 indication.

15 So on this first slide, you see the
16 claims forecast less the Basic claims investment
17 income. And so when you remove the investment income,
18 you get what's called the actual -- the actuarial
19 claims cost, so that's the AAP rate that the
20 Corporation needs. And we'll label that box A.

21 On the capital side, Madam Chair, is
22 the 100 percent MCT target under the reserves
23 regulation. And so every year under the Capital
24 Management Plan, the Corporation will look to see
25 where it's at as compared against its target. So the

1 actual Basic MC -- MCT, whatever that number might be.
2 In this case, as depicted here, it's lower than the
3 target, which would of course mean we need to find a
4 way to get up to 100 percent MCT.

5 And as the Capital Management Plan
6 indicates, it does so not in year 1 or year 2. It's
7 spread out over five (5) years. So if the
8 Corporation's is -- is not at its target, it comes up
9 with a number that it needs to meet, and spreads that
10 out over five (5) years. The first two (2) years,
11 you'll see there, move together, because that's the
12 forecast period, and that gets you to step 3, which is
13 your MCT ratio.

14 And so we don't know what's happening
15 after years 1 and 2, because those are outside the
16 forecast period, but we know that this is what we need
17 to start moving up on that five (5) step depiction
18 that you saw earlier. So that is B, and there's C,
19 your 100 percent MCT target. So that's how the -- the
20 build provision operates under the Plan.

21 And there's the future state. So we
22 know that B is moving us closer to the target, but
23 we're not there yet, and the future state, as
24 indicated there, excess Extension, plus RSR investment
25 income, plus actual Basic MCT. Those would -- those

1 would be the factors that go into moving us toward the
2 goal of 100 percent MCT.

3 So on this particular side -- slide,
4 sorry, you have the financial source on one (1) side,
5 which is the premium that we collect from our
6 customers as against the AAP claims cost. That's a
7 level scale. That's the breakeven rate-making model.

8 However, when you include capital and
9 in there, there's the targeted MCT ratio that I spoke
10 of earlier that the Corporation would need to achieve
11 its 100 percent MCT target. You'll see, Madam Chair,
12 that -- that targeted MCT ratio is lower than the
13 Extension that was transferred from -- the capital
14 that was transferred from Extension, and the RSR
15 investment income that Mr. Johnston wants to retain.

16 So those two (2) factors are balanced
17 against the ratio. And you'll see that it tips the
18 scale. There's not enough money. There's not enough
19 capital to keep the -- to keep the scale balanced, and
20 so that's when the capital build comes in. And the
21 capital build rights the scale and puts -- puts the
22 Corporation back in balance.

23 That's scenario 1, that's the -- that's
24 the build provision. And it's the capital build and
25 the premium that makes up the overall rate indication.

1 And as I've said earlier, no matter what you do on
2 that side of the scale with that RSR investment
3 income, it's going to ultimately end up with the same
4 overall rate indication.

5 You just -- you either cli -- you
6 either give it to the ratepayers on this side, which
7 would trigger a build provision, or you collect it
8 from the ratepayers on the capital side, where you
9 keep it on the capital side and you don't collect
10 anything on the rate-making side.

11 And then in Scenario 2, Madam Chair,
12 this is that the other side of the Capital Management
13 Plan and the release provisions.

14 So here you'll see that the scale is
15 tipped in favour of too much money. So when you saw
16 that the MCT in 2024 was at a hundred and three
17 percent, that's this scenario where you have excess
18 capital and the financial need isn't as great as the
19 money that the Corporation is holding.

20 And so that then triggers the capital
21 release in the form of lower rates for MPIC customers
22 and the scale gets balanced and the premium is -- or
23 the overall rate indication would be the premiums less
24 the capital release.

25 And so that particular presentation or

1 that depiction we hope helps the panel in
2 understanding the capital management plan. That was
3 put together not by -- they don't teach those skills
4 at Robson Hall. That was put together by the
5 regulatory team, Mr. Meira and Mr. Crozier and his --
6 his team. So we hope that was of some assistance to
7 the -- to the Board.

8 I think we've frozen. Oh, here we go.
9 I'll just back up. It's frozen.

10

11 (BRIEF PAUSE)

12

13 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: Here we go. So
14 next topic is the transparency issue that Mr. Triggs
15 touched upon and fiscal prudence. Of course, number 1
16 on that list is Project NOVA representing the largest
17 capital project undertaken by the Corporation just
18 under a hundred million dollars.

19 And that's -- it's a business project
20 that's designed to upgrade the -- the systems that
21 MPIC has in place including the claims administration
22 reporting system. The insurance workstation that you
23 heard is made use of by both the brokers and MPIC.
24 Other topics for discussion are the service agreements
25 and the service delivery.

1 On Project NOVA, this particular slide
2 was taken from the application. Why is MPIC
3 modernizing its legacy systems? That is the result of
4 having two (2) independent consulting firms look into
5 MPIC systems to address those five (5) key issues,
6 none of which are more or less important than the
7 other.

8 But our mandate -- MPIC's mandate is
9 providing customer service good rates, and so we say
10 NOVA primarily is for the customer, and it will
11 enhance and facilitate MPI's vision of moving online,
12 and we can't do it without implementing the upgrade as
13 contemplated by Project NOVA.

14 There you see the three (3) factors for
15 Project NOVA: discipline meaning external
16 consultation to assess the candidacy and guidance for
17 the business case which is before this panel in the
18 confidential module.

19 You heard evidence from Mr. Bunko and
20 his team about the use of the new agile methodology
21 and the advantages that that particular methodology
22 will provide in ensuring that NOVA is implemented with
23 success, again the business case fully transparent in
24 the confidential module.

25 There was a panel that spoke about the

1 net present value and the benefit or the return of the
2 investment dollars on that particular project. That,
3 again, I won't touch upon in this public forum, but
4 it's all in the confidential module, and the panel
5 heard evidence on that.

6 And you'll also recall, Madam Chair,
7 that there the governance structure that was out --
8 that was set out for the panel that shows the
9 particular personnel that are involved in the
10 implementation of -- of NOVA along with an independent
11 program governance advisor.

12 And there is the governance model
13 before you, Madam Chair.

14

15 (BRIEF PAUSE)

16

17 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: So the key point
18 there is -- and Project NOVA, again a very large
19 capital project that is being undertaken by the
20 Corporation. The payback period estimated to be
21 fourteen (14) years, and the net present value using a
22 7.5 percent discount rate at \$12.7 million in the
23 positive.

24

25 (BRIEF PAUSE)

1 THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Scarfone --

2 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: Yes.

3 THE CHAIRPERSON: -- is this an
4 opportune time to take a break for a few minutes --
5 give you a chance to rest your voice -- or do you want
6 to keep going?

7 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: Well, I think --
8 I've got a couple more slides left, Madam Chair, and
9 then Mr. Guerra's going to take over. So maybe before
10 Mr. Guerra does that, we could take a break, and then
11 we can return and listen to his soothing voice for a
12 little while.

13 THE CHAIRPERSON: Sure. That's fine.
14 Thank you.

15 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: So service
16 agreements -- the Corporation had a service delivery
17 panel that presented on a number of issues, one of
18 which was the existing agreements that are currently
19 in place with all of MPIC's service providers.

20 So that would not only include the
21 Intervener Insurance Brokers Association of Manitoba
22 but also all the other service providers that the
23 Corporation engages to run its business. It's the
24 chiropractors, the repair industry -- all of that is
25 included under the -- the large topic of service

1 agreements.

2 And the -- the issue that Mr. Triggs
3 touched upon, the Corporation wants to be as
4 transparent as possible in providing to this Board the
5 details of those particular service agreements so that
6 the Board is satisfied that they're fair and
7 reasonable and provide good value for Manitobans that
8 the -- that they promote competition and that they
9 don't infringe upon anti-competitive negotiation
10 between service provider and Manitoba Public
11 Insurance.

12 And -- and as recognized by the IBAM
13 panel, MPIC and its service providers depend on one
14 another. They're business partners. And so it's
15 important that there be a good working relationship on
16 a go-forward basis with all of its service providers.

17 The Corporation would say some of these
18 agreements do not benefit MPI's core business
19 interests. And so -- and some subagreements do not --
20 are no longer fit into MPIC's mandate.

21 So we heard some evidence about a
22 funding agreement or a sponsorship agreement with
23 the -- with the brokers. That particular agreement
24 was put in an end by the new executive for those very
25 reasons.

1 And so when we speak to -- when we
2 speak to promoting competition, Madam Chair, it is, as
3 I've indicated -- the goal of that is to restrict
4 anti-competitive behaviour in arriving at the
5 negotiated terms of those service agreements. It is
6 in the best interests of ratepayers that agreements be
7 negotiated fairly.

8 So, Madam Chair, what -- what can this
9 Board do in terms of MPIC's agreements with the
10 service providers?

11 One recommendation that we think this
12 Board can make is that all future arrangements
13 affecting the compensation of service provider
14 association members comply with the terms of the
15 Competition Act. That's number 1.

16 Secondly, in the spirit of
17 transparency -- MPIC's ongoing commitment to
18 transparency, order that MPIC file all such
19 arrangements with this Board at the first general rate
20 application subsequent to them having been entered
21 into.

22 So once the contract is signed, once
23 the negotiations are done, the -- the Corporation
24 would propose that the agreements are no longer held
25 secret but rather put before this Board for

1 examination to ensure that they are meeting with the
2 requirements of not only the Competition Act but that
3 generally, they're fair and reasonable for Manitobans.

4 And lastly, order MPIC to file evidence
5 demonstrating that the compensation arrangements
6 reflect prudent costs are just and reasonable and
7 again comply with the Competition Act.

8

9 (BRIEF PAUSE)

10

11 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: On service
12 delivery, management has discretion to make service
13 delivery decisions. And MPIC, as we've heard with the
14 evidence that was provided by the Brokers Association,
15 views the presentation of its future online service
16 delivery model as another example of its increased
17 transparency with the PUB.

18 MPIC knows that its customers expect
19 and deserve the right to complete transactions online
20 by themselves if they so choose and that it supports
21 and it's committed to a shared distribution channel
22 with its brokers to deliver these services online.

23 As Mr. Triggs indicated, the
24 Corporation has sought to be open and transparent with
25 the PUB about this particular issue. This is not, we

1 would say, about airing dirty laundry. This is about
2 ensuring that MPI get online services delivery right.
3 This will affect not only the quality of customer
4 service but also, of course, revenues and costs.

5

6 (BRIEF PAUSE)

7

8 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: MPIC will expect
9 to provide updates to this Board in future GRAs but
10 does not seek or expect direction on how to go about
11 entering into these service delivery contracts.

12 And so this, Madam Chair, I would
13 suggest is the appropriate time to break. And -- and
14 if the -- if the panel has questions now or if they
15 want to wait till the end of the presentation, I'm
16 happy to oblige them in either respect.

17

18 (BRIEF PAUSE)

19

20 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: I'm just --
21 sorry, I'm just wondering during the break, the
22 PowerPoint presentation and the copy of the PowerPoint
23 presentation are now off. And I just want to make
24 sure that we don't -- that we haven't missed a page in
25 the written one we have.

1 Mr. Crozier's -- sorry -- Mr. Crozier
2 is shaking his head. Is -- I don't know if it's a
3 title page that was missed when it was printed, but
4 the -- the numbering is now off.

5 MR. JEFF CROZIER: Yes. Slide --
6 slide 17 was the rate stabilization reserve title
7 page, and I think in the PDFing process, the content
8 of slide 18 -- the following slide which just is the
9 definition of the rate stabilization reserve -- ended
10 up underneath -- or on that title page.

11 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Okay.

12 MR. JEFF CROZIER: So there's no
13 content, but they are off, and it's -- if you go to
14 slide 17, you'll see that's where it misaligns.

15 That being said, the exhibit that was
16 filed is an exact -- an exact copy of this.

17 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: That's fine. I
18 just want to make sure there is -- there wasn't an
19 important page that we've -- that we missed.

20

21 (BRIEF PAUSE)

22

23 THE CHAIRPERSON: Okay. Thank you
24 very much, Mr. Scarfone. At this point, I think we
25 will proceed to break, and we may have some questions

1 following the break, but once we're back, we will
2 know.

3 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: Thank you.

4 THE CHAIRPERSON: I'd like to adjourn
5 to 10:50, please. So that's -- ten (10) to 11:00,
6 we'll come back then. Thank you.

7

8 --- Upon recessing at 10:34 a.m.

9 --- Upon resuming at 10:55 a.m.

10

11 THE CHAIRPERSON: Okay. Thank you
12 very much.

13 Yes, Mr. Scarfone, we have a couple of
14 questions for you. The first is, I wondered if you
15 could point us to any case law or principle of
16 statutory interpretation that would support MPI's
17 interpretation of the reserves regulation as set out
18 in the capital maintenance plan, which allows a five
19 (5) year build, three (3) year release provision if
20 you're not exactly at 100 percent MCT.

21 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: So I -- I do
22 believe that we may have provided a response to that
23 particular question during the Information Request
24 process, Madam Chair. But what the Corporation can do
25 to specifically address your question is undertake to

1 provide a written submission -- a short wri -- written
2 submission on any jurisprudence that might exists on
3 the interpretation that the Corporation is taking with
4 respect to that.

5 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. That
6 would be helpful.

7 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: Yes.

8

9 --- UNDERTAKING NO. 39: MPI to provide a short
10 written submission on any
11 jurisprudence that might
12 exists on the
13 interpretation that the
14 Corporation is taking with
15 respect to reserves
16 regulation, as set out in
17 the capital maintenance
18 plan, which allows a five
19 (5) year build, three (3)
20 year release provision if
21 not exactly at 100 percent
22 MCT

23

24 THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Gabor...?

25 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Mr. Scarfone, if

1 we could go to page -- now, this is where we run into
2 the interesting... The one behind, sorry. I have it
3 as sixty-one (61). I guess it's prob -- it may be
4 sixty-two (62), yeah, on the screen.

5 I'm a little confused on what you're
6 proposing for the Board oversight over the
7 relationships with -- with service providers. Are you
8 suggesting that the Board would approve contracts?

9 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: No.

10 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Are you
11 suggesting that the Board -- so are you suggesting
12 that the Board could undo the contracts?

13 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: No.

14 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: So if the Board,
15 in your last bullet, looked at whether there are
16 prudent costs that are just and reasonable, and the
17 Board finds that they aren't, what are you suggesting
18 the Board's jurisdiction is?

19 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: Well, concerning
20 contracts entered into -- so for example, we -- you
21 might equate some of these service delivery contracts
22 to the collective agreement that -- that the
23 Corporation enters into with its unionized employees.
24 Certainly, you know, you've heard evidence that thar -
25 - there are increases that occur to the union

1 employees under that agreement that, we would suggest,
2 are of really no moment for this particular Board.

3 MPIC's bound by them. We have to pay
4 them. Those are expenses that we're -- we're
5 contractually bound by.

6 Similarly, for these service delivery
7 agreements, we're not asking that the -- that the --
8 that the Board approve them in any way, but we're
9 recommending, as we say here, that once they're
10 entered into, they would be examined to ensure that
11 they're fair and reasonable and just, and that they
12 provide benefit to Manitobans, and that they're --
13 they were fairly negotiated and in compliance with the
14 provisions of the Competition Act.

15 If the Board was to find that they
16 weren't, we would expect that there would be some
17 direction by the Board on how the Corporation might go
18 about ensuring that the next agreements are entered
19 into in what the Board de -- thinks is a fair and
20 reasonable manner.

21 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Okay. I don't
22 know if there's going to be any further comment in
23 relation to the issue about online. We asked
24 specifically that the parties address what the parties
25 thought our jurisdiction were on that issue and

1 further, what the parties sought in terms of either a
2 recommendation or a directi -- sorry, a directive or a
3 recommendation.

4 Unless your co-counsel is going to
5 raise it, I think I've heard all that you were
6 presenting on online. On those two (2) points,
7 though, does the -- does MPI have a position on what
8 our jurisdiction is and what you would seek in terms
9 of a -- a directive or recommendation?

10 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: So I'm told that
11 -- oh, sure. Yeah, Mr. Triggs will answer it because
12 he -- he touched upon this in the -- in the written
13 submission.

14 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Okay. I haven't
15 had an opportunity to read --

16 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: No, of course.

17 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: -- the written
18 submission --

19 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: Yes.

20 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: -- so.

21 MR. MICHAEL TRIGGS: Mr. Gabor, it is
22 dealt with in -- in detail in the written submission.
23 At the end of the day, this information is provided to
24 the Board as -- for transparency purpose, for
25 information purposes. We're on the brink of a major

1 transformational change in the way we do business, and
2 it's prudent upon MPI to bring this to the PUB's
3 attention. Do we want anything on the PUB on this
4 matter? No.

5 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Okay.

6 MR. MICHAEL TRIGGS: And we -- we
7 don't believe that you have jurisdiction to give
8 orders on the nature of the service provided, how it's
9 delivered, and -- and any sort of agreements that may
10 come regarding the compensation associated with the
11 delivery of that.

12 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Okay. Thank you,
13 sir.

14 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.
15 Mr. Guerra...?

16 MR. STEVEN SCARFONE: Just one (1)
17 last comment, madam Chair. So we do note Mr. Gabor is
18 correct in that when we adjourned before closing, the
19 Board asked for certain things be included in MPIC's
20 closing submissions, one (1) of which was the reserves
21 regulation, its validity, the various sub-issues under
22 Issue 18.

23 And so I don't want to leave the Board
24 thinking that MPIC is done on that front, but what we
25 proposed to do, because the onus would be on the

1 consumers' group, is to have them make their argument.
2 The presumption is in the favour of the validity. So
3 when they make their argument, MPIC will then address
4 that argument in its reply.

5 THE CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Thank you, Mr.
6 Scarfone.

7 Mr. Guerra...?

8 MR. ANTHONY GUERRA: Thank you, Madam
9 Chair. I'm going to go to the -- the next portion of
10 the presentation, which is the last four (4) bullet
11 points, five (5) to eight (8): road safety, driver
12 safety rating, improving the GRA process, and our
13 conclusion.

14 One might be tempted to think that I
15 will be speaking as long as My Learned Friend and --
16 and colleague, Mr. Scarfone, and I think Mr. Scarfone
17 also thought that would be the case as well when we
18 div -- divided up the -- the labour on -- on this
19 presentation, but the next few slides, we'll actually
20 -- we'll go through pretty quickly.

21 So in terms of the first issue of road
22 safety, there was a lot of discussion this year in --
23 in the process before and after -- or, sorry, the --
24 before and during the hearing process about road
25 safety. We had a two (2) day technical conference.

1 We had multiple days of the hearing process here
2 devoted towards the topic of road safety. We had over
3 thirty (3) Information Requests that -- that dealt
4 with directly or indirectly the issue of road safety.
5 And I -- I would note that that was among the top
6 three (3) most canvassed issues in the discovery
7 portion of -- of this GRA.

8 And -- and -- and the -- the topic you
9 see here obviously involves, from a budgetary
10 perspective, a -- a very modest budget compared to
11 other budgets that MPI was discussing this year,
12 namely, things like Project NOVA. And one would be
13 tempted to take a look at the current graph and seeing
14 the -- the minute changes from year to year and see
15 that as, perhaps, an area of concern. But we would
16 submit that the issue here is not the exponential
17 growth of the road safety budget but more importantly
18 the optimization of the budget.

19 And so the evidence that was present by
20 -- by MPI through the course of this proceeding were -
21 - were based upon the efforts that were being made by
22 MPI, in fact, to optimize its spending on road safety.
23 And MPI recognizes that road safety is an issue that -
24 - that should be dealt with to some extent in the --
25 the course of this hearing. The -- the issue really

1 becomes to what degree and how often and -- and
2 whether or not we engage in such a large endeavour
3 every other year with respect to this issue.

4 MPI would say that the issue of road
5 safety is very important and -- and -- and need not be
6 forgotten; however, there -- there was -- there was a
7 -- a lot of information covered this -- this past
8 application, an -- and we have to put that into the
9 context of -- of MPI's overall spend on -- on all of
10 its projects, including road safety.

11 MPI does have its priorities in order
12 with respect to its spending on road safety. We've
13 heard evidence from the road safety panel that it now
14 calculates its priorities on -- on costing other than
15 just the claims costs for -- for certain collisions,
16 but also the sl -- the social cost. And that allows
17 it to really understand what are the -- what are the
18 impacts of collisions on -- on Manitobans and -- and -
19 - and what -- what are the root causes of the -- of
20 the major accidents and how MPI can -- can use its
21 road safety budget to effectively try to mitigate some
22 of those risks.

23 So what I would submit for your
24 consideration is that, as I mention again, although
25 this graph is not suggesting any -- any major

1 increases in the road safety budget, the parties are
2 there.

3 We've seen a number of initiatives over
4 the last number of days of the Hearing that MPI's
5 undertaken to -- to meet some of these top priorities.

6 The next slide talks about all the
7 progress we've achieved to date through things like
8 the Driver's Ed high school education program, the
9 MELT program, the Save the 100 program, the distracted
10 driving offences notices, and then all the initiatives
11 that are either underway or will be underway soon.

12 And then, as Mr. Wennberg had mentioned
13 in his -- in his testimony, some of the future
14 possibilities, some of which look very attractive and
15 very enticing, and some that may not come to pass, but
16 it will be one (1) of those situations where research
17 and certainly gathering data and metrics will be very
18 important, and aligning those with established parties
19 and -- and the -- and measuring the costs of
20 collisions to decide what is the best use of the
21 existing road safety budget.

22 Mr. Wennberg also did not discount the
23 fact or the possibility of -- of there being further
24 spends on projects, but it has to be a case-by-case
25 situation.

1 With respect to how far or how often
2 the road safety issue should be canvassed at the --
3 before the Public Utilities Board, I would note that
4 there is a provincial road safety committee.

5 MPI would submit that that is really
6 the more proper forum for the collaborative discussion
7 about road safety initiatives and the future of road
8 safety projects in this province.

9 Although there certainly is that aspect
10 of MPI's spin towards road safety, it is often one (1)
11 component of the entire picture. The prime example,
12 as Mr. Wennberg talked about, the -- the use of the
13 cameras at intersections to -- to measure, to document
14 near collisions, to -- to get some more data on that
15 issue.

16 MPI can't do those types of initiatives
17 by them -- by itself, it needs the assistance of
18 sometimes the city or municipality in question, or
19 even the province.

20 And so, when it comes to analysing
21 MPI's spin on road safety, we should be mindful of the
22 other avenues available for that type of discussion
23 and -- and be mindful there are -- there -- there are
24 more dedicated lines for communicating on -- on those
25 issues.

1 That said, Mr. Wennberg did have some
2 comments about when he felt it would be most
3 appropriate to come to the Board with some insight
4 into road safety.

5 And -- and, quite frankly and I think
6 appropriately, he commented that it would be an ad hoc
7 situation. We have to realize that some of these --
8 these programs do take some time to ferment and that
9 we will -- we will need to be able to come back and to
10 be able to share with the Board some real data on
11 progress, and -- and it's not something that can
12 easily be done on an annual basis.

13 Sometimes there may be more to talk
14 about than others, and it really will come down to
15 what's -- what's currently available and what's being
16 worked on in terms of the -- the importance of -- of
17 this issue.

18 Now to the issue of driver safety
19 rating. This topic was canvassed briefly only because
20 it's still a work in progress. But there are some
21 things that MPI does know currently about the
22 situation.

23 We do know that Manitobans generally
24 like the current system, which is the registered owner
25 model system. It is seen as a fair way to establish

1 rates and to -- to deal with the issue of risk. It's
2 not perfect, but none of the models that were
3 canvassed that are -- are known were also deemed to be
4 perfect, as well.

5 It's about paying the right price in a
6 way that seems to be fair. And MPI thinks that most
7 Manitobans appreciate that the current system achieves
8 those objectives.

9 However, that's not the end of the
10 story. It's not just about what a majority of
11 Manitobans in a particular -- a particular survey have
12 -- have said about the system. It needs to be costed.
13 Alternatives needs to be considered. And, ultimately,
14 there needs to be a recent decision about what's best
15 for ratepayers going forward.

16 Therefore, MPI is continually examining
17 the issue and will be providing a pricing examination
18 on not only the current registered owner model, but
19 also the primary driver model and the driver premium
20 model which were discussed at some length in the DSR,
21 or driver safety rating panel.

22 More information would be provided
23 about the costs of each of these models in next year's
24 rate application.

25 And MPI does expect at that point it

1 will be coming back to the Utility Board with its
2 recommendations on -- on the -- the selection of -- of
3 one (1) of these models, whether it be continuing with
4 the -- the existing model or -- or moving to one (1)
5 of the -- the two (2) alternatives that Manitobans
6 have also indicated that they would be okay with, and
7 also meet the definitions of -- of being fair and --
8 and pricing risk at the -- at a fair price.

9

10 (BRIEF PAUSE)

11

12 MR. ANTHONY GUERRA: The final topic
13 I'd like to speak about is improving the GRA process.
14 And it was something that we had discussed about
15 commenting on.

16 I would not for the panel's
17 consideration that we did submit a separate written
18 response on the issue of improving the GRA process. I
19 would invite the panel members to -- to consider that.

20 I'm not going to go into as much depth
21 about the issue here because I do think it's canvassed
22 fairly in-depth in our written submission. And that
23 written submission is where you'll find some of the
24 concrete suggestions that MPI has to how to improve
25 thi -- this process.

1 So, we can certainly have a discussion,
2 and -- and I can answer some questions about it, but I
3 do suggest that -- that that -- that written document
4 be given a read prior to because I do think it will
5 answer a lot of the -- the questions the panel members
6 may have.

7 So, what -- what do we know at -- at
8 this point? Well, this year's rate application
9 involved the submission of over ten thousand (10,000)
10 pages of evidence. There were over two (2) rounds of
11 discovery that involved MPI which resulted in over
12 eight hundred and one (801) specific questions
13 answered.

14 That's not eight hundred and one (801)
15 individual Information Requests that were made. As we
16 know, Information Requests can contain many sub-
17 questions. These are all the questions that were
18 posed individual to MPI through those two (2) rounds
19 of -- of discovery.

20 Notwithstanding this robust discovery
21 system that we -- we currently have, as we've seen,
22 the hearing process is also an extension of the
23 discovery process; rightly or wrongly, that's just the
24 way it is.

25 in the context of that hearing, or this

1 hearing that we've engaged in, MPI undertook an -- to
2 provide another ninety (90) -- or sorry, thirty-nine
3 (39) documents through undertakings or -- or responses
4 to questions for undertakings, filed over a hundred
5 and four (104) exhibits.

6 And, as we know, we've -- now we're
7 into the third week of -- of the oral hearing.

8 The question that remains for -- for
9 MPI is -- is, what -- what information does the Board
10 ultimately need to make its decision. We would submit
11 that, in this case, we probably have too much
12 information that's being provided.

13 And, again, part of that is MPI trying
14 to be transparent and open with that. And -- and that
15 comes with some acknowledgment that there will be
16 increased production of -- of documents and
17 information.

18 But that doesn't necessarily mean that
19 it's all going to be read or -- or relevant. And so,
20 what we need is we need to have -- we need to have
21 someone take the reins in this process and decide
22 what issues are really going to be that important to
23 canvass.

24 We would submit that, for example, the
25 issue of road safety was canvassed very thoroughly and

1 probably could have been canvassed less thoroughly
2 with a very similar result that we would expect in
3 this case.

4 That's not to say it's not an important
5 issue, but we have to be mindful of -- of how
6 expansive this process has become and -- and ways in
7 which we can improve the process going forward.

8 So, at the end of the day, MPI is -- is
9 really asking, what is the best way to get information
10 that the -- that the Board deems to be important and
11 required to the Board.

12 And -- and MPI is prepared to make
13 certain -- to -- to follow along and -- and abide by
14 certain directions from the Board on this, but we
15 really do need to, I think, see the forest from the
16 trees on this.

17 And certainly, I would invite the --
18 the members of the Board to consider our written
19 submission with some helpful, practical suggestions on
20 -- on ways we can -- we can improve the process.

21 Before I leave the topic though, I do
22 want to kind of highlight what I think is a success
23 stor -- story here, and that is the -- the piloted
24 confidential process that we had this year.

25 It was proposed by MPI as a way to try

1 to make that the process of delivering confidential
2 information more efficiently to the Board and to the
3 Interveners, and also to provide a process that was
4 more fair to Interveners because, as you know, prior
5 to the implementation of this pilot project, and I
6 appreciate it is a pilot project for this year at this
7 point, and we would encourage the Board to consider
8 its use in future years, what was happening was
9 information would be presented to the panel without
10 Intervener scrutiny.

11 And -- and this year, we've -- we've
12 changed that. We've had confidential information
13 being provided to the Interveners before decisions
14 were made as to whether or not the information was
15 confidential that allowed Interveners, as you know, to
16 -- to comment and to -- to test the claims that were
17 being by or on behalf of MPI.

18 And so, we think that that process is -
19 - is only -- not only more fair to the Interveners,
20 but, also it -- it alleviates the need for multiple
21 motions, which can clog up the system, and I think
22 what we've seen here in this case is although it's
23 still a large undertaking, it -- it is certainly a lot
24 more efficient than -- than we've seen in the past.
25 And again, I would recommend that the -- the Board

1 consider using this process again in the future.

2 So finally, in conclusion, I just want
3 to highlight again the -- the topics that we raised.
4 Again, this is a positive story as -- as we like to
5 say at MPI, the fact that we are asking for a negative
6 rate indication overall.

7 This is more money in the pockets of
8 ratepayers and this is, in no uncertain terms, a -- a
9 success due to the -- the new commitment from our
10 executive and also the dedication of every employee of
11 this company to -- to working in the best interests of
12 its ratepayers.

13 We are asking for rates to be in effect
14 for the thirteen (13) month period, and we are asking
15 for approval of the proposed capital management plan,
16 and as you know, we are asking for this continuance of
17 the anti-theft discount for newly insured vehicles, no
18 changes to the DSR for the vehicle or driver premiums,
19 and no changes to fleet rebates or surcharges.

20 Before I -- I conclude, I do note that
21 I -- I forgot in my submission with respect to road
22 safety, to extend our appreciation to Mr. Keith, who
23 did provide his assistance with respect to the
24 technical conference and -- and did a fine job in
25 presenting his findings to the -- the Board through

1 the oral hearing.

2 So he is certainly missed around the
3 office, but obviously he -- he continues to benefit
4 the system after his -- after his leaving. So we do
5 want to extend that thanks to him as well.

6 And with that, subject to any
7 questions, those are my comments.

8 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr.
9 Guerra. Mr. Gabor...?

10 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Yeah, I'd just
11 like to put on the record, Madam Chair, that I -- I
12 look forward with interest to read the written
13 submission, and quite frankly would like to reserve
14 the right to ask questions on the written submission
15 at the time of reply, if -- if there are any
16 questions.

17 I appreciate Mr. Triggs' comment to the
18 question I asked, I'd just like to read it in the
19 written submission too and not just have my -- any
20 questions relate only to the reply.

21 Mr. Guerra, certainly we're always
22 looking at improving the process. I guess the
23 question I have is: is there a suggestion that the
24 kind of process we run or the scope of the process
25 relates to the rate requested by MPI?

1 MR. ANTHONY GUERRA: Sorry, can -- can
2 we rephrase that question. I'm not sure exactly what
3 you're asking for.

4 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: The -- the number
5 of issues and the scope of the process, is it a
6 different process if you're asking for a -- a negative
7 rate increase, versus a small rate increase, versus a
8 large rate increase?

9 MR. ANTHONY GUERRA: It's tempting to
10 look at the process like that, right? We are asking
11 for less money and therefore maybe there shouldn't be
12 as much scrutiny there.

13 And while I think there is some merit
14 to considering that, I think overall what we have to
15 do is we have to take a look at what are the issues
16 that are most pressing for ratepayers at the current
17 time, right?

18 And we will have some discussion about
19 that through the discovery process, and we have a --
20 we have a very robust discovery process.

21 The -- the problem is that sometimes
22 even though we have such a robust discovery process,
23 we -- we still -- we still don't understand the issues
24 well enough when it comes to the time of the hearing
25 and -- and often the hearing is -- is used to get to

1 that a-ha moment, that's really what we're all about
2 here.

3 And perhaps that is a -- a -- you know,
4 a fault of MPI in -- in not explaining the process
5 properly or where we're at properly, but I don't think
6 that's the case. I think we have a very robust
7 application, we have a very robust discovery process
8 and -- and I think it is incumbent upon the parties at
9 some point in time prior to the hearing to really take
10 a look at the evidence that's being put before them
11 and -- and decide for themselves what are the -- what
12 are the real issues in -- in dispute here, or that
13 need to be tested here.

14 And if there is any way in which the
15 issues, as they may have been originally assessed, to
16 be of importance, if there's any maybe common ground
17 there, that some of those issues can be decided to
18 either be not dealt with in the hearing, or dealt with
19 at a -- at an appropriate level.

20 And so that discussion is something
21 we've proposed last year. We would suggest that be
22 part of the solution, there's other recommendations
23 that we would make, but we would really strongly
24 suggest that -- that we have that -- that tough
25 discussion prior to the hearing, but what are the real

1 issues that -- that need, absolutely need to be
2 addressed with by way of an oral hearing here and --
3 and we would really focus the parties on making sure
4 that that discovery process is used to its fullest
5 extent.

6 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Wouldn't that be
7 part of the scoping process before the hearing and
8 before the application is filed?

9 MR. ANTHONY GUERRA: Well, I mean, yes
10 and -- and no. I do think that we will come out of
11 this hearing having some sense as to what is going to
12 be important going forward, and there are only so many
13 days of the year that we can devote to this process
14 and -- and certain things we know are not going to be
15 as -- as important next year.

16 And so with that, the decision needs to
17 be made, and we would submit be made by all the
18 parties involved that some issues just don't deserve
19 as much attention in the -- in the hearing process in
20 -- in one year versus another, and road safety might
21 be an example of that, going forward.

22 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: I understand the
23 road safety argument, certainly.

24 Is there evidence -- I mean, you talked
25 about the need for transparency. Is there evidence

1 that's just filed where there is no issue where MPI
2 wants the Board to take a position?

3 And I'll -- I'll be specific.

4 MR. ANTHONY GUERRA: Sure.

5 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: You filed an
6 application that had hundreds of pages about the
7 relationship with the Insurance Broker Association of
8 Manitoba, that was in the application, which I
9 understand completely.

10 The position is -- which was put today,
11 as I understand it in your written submission is, the
12 Board has no jurisdiction over the issue.

13 Doesn't that contradict this idea that
14 there is certain issues that should be before the
15 Board and there are other issues that shouldn't be so
16 we can reduce it? We have a major issue that was
17 before the Board this time, we specifically asked if
18 we have jurisdiction over it and for the parties
19 position Mr. Triggs indicated you -- your position.

20 MR. ANTHONY GUERRA: Right.

21 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: You spent a lot
22 of days --

23 MR. ANTHONY GUERRA: Absolutely, and -
24 -

25 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: -- and I read

1 every page, so I'm just trying to figure out how that
2 relates to an argument that, you know, how an argument
3 that we looked at this issue in a very serious manner,
4 all the parties, with the position, and it may have
5 been from the outset, it may have been later, that we
6 have no jurisdiction over it.

7 To your position that, you know, this
8 hearing is too long, we're looking at too many issues,
9 isn't the first issue to take off the issues where the
10 Board has no jurisdiction?

11 MR. ANTHONY GUERRA: Right. And --
12 and Mr. Triggs will -- will make one comment.

13 What I would say to that though is our
14 position is not that -- that the Board has absolutely
15 no jurisdiction to look at the arrangements that --
16 that are being made with respect to service providers.
17 The -- the issue is with respect to the choice on a
18 service delivery model. That's a different situation,
19 right?

20 It's what customers want and it's --
21 it's how that is going to be provided to them.

22 The Board cannot tell MPI it -- it has
23 to deliver online services a certain way, right.
24 That's -- that's the issue that we take concern with.

25 What's going to happen, however, is

1 that that decision is going to be made by MPI in
2 association with the brokers, and then a certain model
3 will go forward, right?

4 And so there will be some over -- there
5 will be some review of how we are currently serving
6 our customers in future applications, and so it's
7 important to know, from the Board's perspective, how
8 we got to that point.

9 With respect to service agreements
10 though and how we get into service agreements, there
11 is some benefit in having the Board take a look at our
12 current agreements and future agreements and saying
13 how were those agreements negotiated.

14 If they're negotiated as a result of --
15 of one, you know, one monopoly-style party abusing its
16 power with respect to MPIs monopoly, then that's a
17 concern.

18 And now going forward, as -- as Mr.
19 Graham has mentioned, the covers have been pulled
20 away. Everyone knows what's going on.

21 Now -- now next year, if MPI were to
22 negotiate an agreement in -- in the same type of way,
23 we would expect this Board to come to us and say what
24 are you doing? Why are you doing this? Where is the
25 proof that you have done this in the way that is in

1 the best interests of ratepayers? And if you don't
2 stop doing what you're doing, you -- we're going to
3 have some concerns here because we have to approve
4 your just and reasonable rates. And -- and maybe
5 these aren't rates that are just and reasonable.

6 So there is something for the -- for
7 the Board to say in terms of the way in which we
8 negotiate our agreements and that's why we are
9 presenting that. But I -- I want us to -- to separate
10 the issues of service agreements with service delivery
11 and how the -- how we choose those models.

12 There may be some critiques going
13 forward, but -- what we've done. But ultimately a
14 decision with respect to how we get the service
15 delivery is something that management has to make by
16 itself.

17 So subject to any questions -- or any
18 further comments by Mr. Triggs, that would be my
19 response to that.

20 MR. MICHAEL TRIGGS: I have nothing
21 further to add to what he said.

22 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Thank you.

23 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. We're
24 almost at 11:30. Ms. McCandless, is the Consumer's
25 Association expecting to proceed at one o'clock or is

1 it something that can be done sooner than that?

2 MS. KATHLEEN MCCANDLESS: I see Ms.
3 Dilay here, I assume we're waiting for Mr. Williams to
4 come probably at one o'clock?

5 MS. KATRINE DILAY: Sorry about that.
6 Yes, exactly, we're -- we're just finalizing our
7 presentation, copies are being made, so if we could
8 adjourn until -- or if we could start our presentation
9 at one o'clock that would be appreciated.

10 THE CHAIRPERSON: Certainly, we can do
11 that. So we will adjourn now until one o'clock this
12 afternoon. Thank you.

13

14 --- Upon recessing at 11:28 a.m.

15 --- Upon resuming at 1:01 p.m.

16

17 THE CHAIRPERSON: Good afternoon
18 everyone. Good afternoon, Mr. Williams. Please
19 proceed.

20

21 (BRIEF PAUSE)

22

23 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Good afternoon,
24 members of the panel. I'll be appearing with Ms.
25 Dilay, who is back by popular demand, and she will be

1 doing the thoughtful legal submissions. I'll be
2 covering the -- the -- generally, the issues relating
3 to the -- to the -- the rate approval exercise. And
4 we will switch off, and Ms. Dilay will also share the
5 recommendations of our client with the panel.

6 I would note that there is some -- some
7 CSI slides. What I would propose is let's just play
8 it -- we've designed them so that they can just be
9 read. If time permits, and we're okay schedule-wise,
10 then they're -- they -- we -- we've -- I'd aim them
11 for the back of our submissions, and we'll -- we'll be
12 at -- we'll check the clock and see where we are.

13 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr.
14 Williams. And good afternoon, Ms. Dilay.

15 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Ms. Dilay reminds
16 me that there are a -- a number of exhibits to be
17 entered on the record, including the written legal
18 brief, which was filed on Tuesday, which we would ask
19 be marked as CAC Exhibit 19.

20

21 --- EXHIBIT NO. CAC-19: Written legal brief

22

23 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: The response to
24 undertaking, which is CAC-20.

25

1 --- EXHIBIT NO. CAC-20: Response to Undertaking 36

2

3 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: A book of
4 authorities, which has been entered on Dropbox and
5 physical copies will be made available to the Board
6 tomorrow morning. We would ask that -- that be CAC-
7 21.

8

9 --- EXHIBIT NO. CAC-21: Book of authorities

10

11 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And then our
12 PowerPoint on the public record, CAC-22.

13

14 --- EXHIBIT NO. CAC-22: PowerPoint on the public
15 record

16

17 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And our
18 recommendations we would ask be CAC-23.

19

20 --- EXHIBIT NO. CAC-23: CAC recommendations

21

22 FINAL ARGUMENT BY CAC (MANITOBA):

23 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And some may
24 wonder in the context of an average rate -- a rate
25 reduction of, on average, of 0.6 percent, why this is

1 a -- a hearing of considerable intensity, public
2 interest, some media controversy.

3 And certainly from our clients'
4 perspective, this is a hearing that is worthy of
5 making a fuss about because of six (6) or seven (7)
6 fundamentally important issues. And one (1) of those,
7 in our clients' view, is a challenge by the provincial
8 cabinet to the legislatively granted independent rate
9 setting role of the Public Utilities Board, an
10 authority which it has exercised with distinction,
11 since 1989.

12 Another of the challenges in this
13 hearing has been by Manitoba Public Insurance, to the
14 traditional way that we have looked at how service
15 agreements are negotiated with the industry, with the
16 automotra -- automobile trades and others.

17 Another challenge is a challenge of the
18 marketplace, and of technology and consumer demand.
19 And that is a challenge to the traditional bricks and
20 mortar service delivery model, whether by brokers or
21 the MPI service centres, and how did they respond, and
22 how do we collectively respond to deliver rates for
23 service that are just and reasonable in the context of
24 Manitoba Public Insurance.

25 And obviously there's challenges to the

1 legacy systems of -- of the insurance business and
2 Manitoba Public Insurance, as well as of driver and
3 vehicle administration, Autopac online, AOL, cars and
4 the DVA. These challenges presage -- anticipate the
5 largest information technology investment in Manitoba
6 public insurance history. Some of the witnesses for
7 Manitoba public insurance describe it as a once-in-a-
8 lifetime opportunity.

9 There's also -- apart from the
10 economics, and the finance, and the emerging service
11 needs, there's a challenge of on -- the ongoing toll
12 of fatalities and serious injuries suffered by all
13 Manitobans, but disproportionately by rural
14 Manitobans. And in this hearing, uniquely among the
15 hearings our client has participated in, driven to
16 significant degree by the issues related to the
17 Capital Management Plan, there are challenges to the
18 myth that there is true competition in the Extension
19 market.

20 And this panel heard from a number of
21 distinguished witnesses. One (1) of the most
22 compelling and thoughtful, of course, was Mr. John
23 Todd, who shared his experience with the appropriate
24 regulatory treatment of nonutility services. And in
25 this hearing, there is a fundamental challenge to the

1 historic view of MPI that the benefits offered to
2 Extension or nonutility services, by virtue of its
3 relationship with the statutory monopoly, are not
4 relevant to setting of Basic rates. In this hearing,
5 they're central to a lot of the Board's deliberations.

6 Our client is a kind client, a
7 thoughtful client, but our -- the legal team knows not
8 to use the words average rate reduction with our
9 client, because there is no such thing as an average
10 rate reduction to a consumer. Each consumer
11 experiences an individual impact. Rates may be going
12 down. They may be going up. They may be going up
13 significantly, or going down significantly.

14 So amidst the immediate headlines of a
15 rate reduction, there are significant impacts both up
16 and down in this hearing for many individuals. Over
17 ninety thousand (90,000) private passenger vehicles
18 will receive rate increases between 4 and 5 percent.
19 An additional sixty thousand (60,000) will be facing
20 increases of between 3 and 4 percent. Over one
21 hundred and fifty thousand (150,000) consumers
22 experiencing volatility on the way up. So while rate
23 stability is a convenient myth in the corporate
24 boardroom or the legislative briefing note, it is not
25 -- it is never the lived experience for many Manitoba

1 consumers.

2 This hearing, like all hearings, but
3 this hearing in particular matters a great deal to our
4 clients. There's a choice for the regulatory process
5 to honour the legislative commitment to an independent
6 rate approval process, or to walk down the ICBC path,
7 the path of cabinet interference in the rate-setting
8 process.

9 This hearing matters for our clients
10 because there are significant grounds for concerns
11 that the traditional industrywide agreements are not
12 delivering value for customers, and risk running afoul
13 of the Competition Act. And I'll address this in more
14 detail when we get to issues related to brokers, but
15 the Board has asked generally what is its jurisdiction
16 with regard to these issues.

17 And our gen -- our client's general
18 comment is your jurisdiction is what it has always
19 been, to assess rates for service of Manitoba Public
20 Insurance. And in assessing rates for service for
21 Manitoba Public Insurance, part of that involves
22 looking at the arrangements with service providers and
23 whether Manitoba Public Insurance is giving value to
24 ratepayers, whether it's operating prudently and
25 reasonably.

1 Part -- the other part of the statutory
2 definition is rates for service, and so in looking at
3 the rates and whether they're just and reasonable,
4 there are also issues of consideration of are
5 consumers receiving that service fairly, are they
6 receiving it equally, or in the case of, let's say the
7 bricks and mortar service delivery model, are there
8 vulnerable consumers who are left out of reasonable
9 access to those services. That's part of the equation
10 in approving just and reasonable rates.

11 In approving just and reasonable rates,
12 this Board also, when you look at the broker issue,
13 but also the agreements with other elements of the
14 industry, always has to be alive to risk. That risk
15 could be a hail storm, a snowstorm, interest rates,
16 not that we've ever had any interest rate challenges
17 in -- in this jurisdiction, but it also could be a
18 legal risk, and so issues relating to possibly running
19 afoul of the Competition Act are risk that the Board
20 in its rate-setting exercise should be alive to.

21 Analytically what does that mean? It
22 does not mean that it is up to the Board to supervise,
23 conciliate, or dictate an agreement between MPI and
24 the -- and the brokers, or MPI and the chiropractors,
25 or any of the trades, but the Board has jurisdiction

1 to critically analyse those agreements, to make a
2 determination if the expenditures associated with them
3 are just and reasonable, to make a determination in
4 terms of whether the risks incorporated in those
5 relationships are undue, and the Board always has its
6 recommendation power, a general recommendation power
7 to offer advice.

8 One (1) of the issues our client will
9 struggle with, and we'll offer some suggestions, but
10 obviously in this hearing you'll -- we -- we've heard
11 a lot about whether the competitive market is -- is
12 competitive or not. We'll come back to that in a
13 little bit, but that's a place where advice might be
14 given by this Board, but not an actual decision be
15 made.

16 This hearing matters for rate payer --
17 payers, because there are real live issues related to
18 bricks and mortar services. One (1) of the most
19 important is maintaining services for rural -- and
20 maintaining or enhancing services for northern and
21 remote communities, both access to important bricks
22 and mortar services, as well as enhanced online
23 service opportunities for all Manitobans, especially
24 those who are currently under served.

25 And we've seen those maps with an --

1 MPI Appendix 14, where they looked at the -- the hot
2 map of where brokers were and where they weren't, and
3 we've certainly seen that -- that great big vacant
4 space in northern Manitoba where there's thirty-nine
5 (39) brokers -- thirty-nine (39) employees.

6 So clearly there are significant bricks
7 and mortar gaps already, and that is why, from a
8 consumer perspective, the opportunity for online
9 services is seen as a -- a critical opportunity to
10 provide value for rates for service. And that's not
11 for just rural and remote issues. It's also important
12 for all Manitobans who wish to access important online
13 services.

14 And again, our clients are supportive
15 of ensuring that not just urban consumers, but cost-
16 effective bricks and mortar services, are available to
17 all Manitobans in a manner that does not deny them the
18 choice of being served by MPI or by brokers.

19 This hearing also matters for
20 ratepayers because there are significant risks related
21 to the modernization of legacy systems, particularly
22 given the relationship between the insurance and
23 driver vehicle sides of the business.

24 Final two (2) points and why this
25 hearing is particularly important for our clients. In

1 other proceedings, this Board, the Public Utilities
2 Board, has made important statements about
3 reconciliation, especially in the Hydro context.

4 Our client is concerned that, unlike
5 Alberta, unlike British Columbia, there is no
6 Indigenous road safety strategy, notwithstanding
7 evidence of a disproportionate number of fatalities
8 and serious injuries in rural Manitoba, as well as the
9 MPI observations candidly offered of unlicensed
10 drivers and vehicles and unmet service needs in First
11 Nation communities. To our clients, that is a
12 pressing reconciliation concern.

13 And finally, this hearing matters to
14 our clients, our truly captive clients, because in the
15 face of overwhelming evidence of excess profits and
16 significant evidence of market failure in Extension,
17 it is critical to ensure that monopoly ratepayers
18 receive an appropriate transfer of all excess profits
19 consistent with an evidence-based risk analysis of
20 MPI's monopoly in non-utility lines of business.

21 In many hearings, it's -- it's -- it's
22 relatively easy to characterize the monopoly, whether
23 positively or adversely. This is a hearing with a lot
24 of nuance. Our client sees two (2) sides to Manitoba
25 Public Insurance in this hearing.

1 On the one side, there is evidence of
2 good intentions and transparency. Part of that comes
3 from the MPI concession of the appropriate --
4 appropriateness of transfers from Extension reserves
5 to Basic. Part of it comes from what was truly good
6 practice consumer engagement with regard to the driver
7 safety rating review. Part -- part of it was the
8 active efforts of Mr. Johnston and Mr. Wennberg and
9 their team to improve reserving and case management
10 with regard to the Personal Injury Protection Plan.
11 Those efforts should be noted and -- and
12 congratulated.

13 Our clients also see evidence of good
14 intention and transparency in the efforts to begin to
15 implement value management practices with regard to
16 information technology projects, in the benchmarking
17 exercises undertaken with regard to vehicle repair and
18 other service industry benchmarks, of the efforts to
19 address the failure to achieve value for money in
20 certain industry agreements, and the risk of non-
21 compliance with the Competition Act, and the efforts
22 to maintain and enhance consumer choice and ensure
23 value for money in the face of the inevitable,
24 disruption of the bricks and mortar service delivery
25 model.

1 So that's one side, but there's the
2 other side of MPI that our client does not and cannot
3 endorse -- endorse.

4 There is the sidestepping of the
5 inherent balancing the independent rate approval
6 process and the efforts to impose the risk tolerances
7 of the MPI Board of Directors on captive monopoly
8 subscribers through the reserves regulation.

9 There is a substantive failure to
10 comply with the intent of the shadow investment
11 portfolio, which was supposed to be a way to examine
12 the foregone opportunities in terms of higher return,
13 by taking on different risks in a prudent fashion, and
14 did not achieve that objective.

15 Our client also cannot endorse the
16 significant risk associated with the current approach
17 to the implementation of legacy systems modernization.

18 And finally, our client definitely does
19 not endorse the revi -- the revision to the collision
20 forecast for the last six (6) months of the 2019/20
21 year, achieved by taking into account the unusually
22 low collision experience over five (5) of the first
23 six (6) months of this year.

24 When the Board is looking at this rate
25 application, determining whether to grant the

1 reduction or a different reduction, keep rates the
2 same on average or an increase, our clients would ask
3 this Board to make a finding that, despite the efforts
4 of current MPI leadership, built into today's rates
5 and into the forecast rates is the cost of imprudence
6 that is embedded in the current rate application.

7 Captive monopoly customers continue to
8 bear significant current and future costs associated,
9 first, with the failure to reasonably manage complex
10 personal injury protection plan, or PIPP, cases,
11 especially between 2010 and September of 2018; the
12 failure to properly manage the physical damage re-
13 engineering project, resulting in a negative net
14 present value of \$50 million; an adventurous approach
15 to information technology projects, resulting in over
16 \$20 million in writeoffs in '17/'18 and '18/'19,
17 writeoffs that wrefec -- affect the retained earnings
18 related to the insurance lines of business to this
19 day.

20 Our clients notice well that there are
21 higher than peer techno -- information technology
22 full-time equivalent positions at MPI and that there
23 is evidence of imprudent industry-wide agreements,
24 leading in some cases to higher than Canadian average
25 labour rates. And as just one (1) example of the

1 ongoing cost of questionable value management
2 projects, there's the Driver Z program, a budget
3 revised from 5 million to 7.1 million, no initial net
4 present value analysis, and a current negative net
5 present value of \$1.6 million.

6 Before we leave this slide, these are
7 financial issues, but if we think of the PIPP, the
8 public -- personal injury protection plan issue,
9 they're very much human issues as well. The complex
10 disabilities -- the failure to manage that has a
11 financial cost, but it also brings a significant human
12 cost to the families and indi -- individuals directly
13 affected.

14 In terms of the thrust of our
15 submission, I'm going to have a couple of overview
16 comments, one (1) about the state of competition or
17 lack thereof, and just a -- a very brief overview of
18 the legal arguments. Ms. Dilay, I assure you, will be
19 the brains behind that operation, but I just want to
20 have a couple comments about that.

21 In the course of our clients'
22 submissions, if you think of the five (5) elements of
23 the Board's ordinary approach to -- to looking at just
24 and reasonable rates, our clients will have a few
25 comments about forecast reasonableness, they will have

1 a lot of comments about the prudence and
2 reasonableness of expenditures and investments, and
3 they will have a lot of comments as well about the
4 overall health of the Corporation, including prudent
5 reserves and the capital management plan. The
6 importance of consumer engagement will be highlighted
7 throughout the submissions as well.

8 A number of the questions of the Board,
9 Ms. Dilay will address in Part 2 of our submissions,
10 focussing on the reserve regulation analysis, and she
11 will also be making the recommendations. And there
12 are about eight (8) slides of confidential submissions
13 which will come at the end of our submissions.

14 The headline on slide 14 is 'We Are All
15 Captive'. Traditionally, it is Basic cus -- customers
16 who are described as captive, and the Extension market
17 is competitive. But in our clients' submission,
18 calling the Extension market 'competitive' does a
19 fundamental, profound injustice to that word.

20 The evidence of this hearing suggests
21 that Manitoba Public Insurance has held a 95 percent
22 share of the Extension market since at least 2008;
23 that it is earning excessive profit margins on that
24 line of business; that Extension receives an
25 inordinate benefit from its relationship with Basic,

1 including through seamless renewal and reassessment
2 transactions; that there is no structural separation
3 between the two (2) lines of business, leaving MPI
4 with the same access to com -- consumer information as
5 Basic insurance, unlike its "competitors" in the
6 private market; and that there was some evidence in
7 written MPI statements in 2014s (sic) of efforts to
8 inoculate the competitive lines of business from
9 competition.

10 The de facto Extension monopoly raises
11 questions of profound importance for the independent
12 rate approval process and is the reason why Mr. Todd
13 was brought as a generally accepted regulatory
14 practice expert.

15 This Board has been blessed with a
16 lengthy legal argument and authorities from the
17 consumers' association in terms of the reserve
18 regulation, it will be gifted with a very thoughtful
19 argument by Ms. Dilay, and there'll be a lot of
20 legislative history, a lot of cases, a lot of
21 statutory interpretation. But in our clients'
22 submission, at the big picture, there's a pe -- a -- a
23 clear path to a finding that the reserve regulation is
24 not valid and cannot be applied by the Public
25 Utilities Board in its independent rate setting

1 process.

2 And again, Ms. Dilay will go through
3 it, but here are the simple points that our client
4 would ask this Board to keep in mind: First, that it
5 has been granted independent rate approval authority
6 over the rates and services of Basic insurance by the
7 Legislature; secondly, that since 1989, the rate
8 stabilization reserve has been an integral element of
9 its rate approval function. It has been so by the
10 Board considering and determining the appropriate
11 level of the reserve for rate setting purposes, by the
12 Board considering and determining the appropriate
13 methodology for determining the RSR level, RSR being
14 rate stabilization reserve.

15 It has been an integral element of the
16 Board's independent rate approval process by the Board
17 considering and determining whether additional
18 premiums should be charged to rebuild the RSR, as it
19 did in the 1990s, or whether a rebate should be given
20 to consumers due to excessive reserves in the RSR.
21 That's evident in the Board's order, it's consistent
22 with our clients' opinion, and it was frankly and
23 candidly admitted properly by Mr. Johnston on the
24 October 14th transcript.

25 So there's the legislative authority,

1 the RSR functions exercised by the Board, and then on
2 slide se -- 16, you see a direct interference in that
3 legislative-granted authority, using even the words
4 'rate stabilization reserve', and usurping or
5 purporting to usurp the legislative granted --
6 legislatively granted authority of the Public
7 Utilities Board to determine an appropriate Basic
8 insurance rate stabilization reserve for rate setting
9 and to approve an appropriate methodology for the
10 determination of their rate stabilization reserve
11 levels.

12 Most ironically about that regulation -
13 - is it came in 2019, two (2) years after amendments
14 to the Crown Corporations Governance and
15 Accountability Act and to the MPI Act that expressly
16 took away the authority of Cabinet to impact vehicle
17 is -- insurance rates, an authority that had existed
18 prior in Section 33 of the MPI Act. Again, Ms. Dilay
19 will give more eloquent expression to those
20 submissions, thoughtful nuance, but in two (2) slides,
21 that is the thrust of our clients' submissions.

22 So our clients say the path is clear
23 but it's hard, and our client doesn't like to be in
24 this position, and I suspect the Board does not
25 either. But our job is simple. It is to honour the

1 legislative will as it comes to independent rate
2 approval, and that legislative will cannot be
3 overturned, sidestepped, or undermined by the Cabinet.

4 This Board is well familiar with the
5 concept of just and reasonable rates. In its opening
6 comments to this hearing, it talked about the
7 balancing act between the interests of ratepayers and
8 the financial health of the utility.

9 We will come back to that balancing act
10 when we come back to the reserve regulation because
11 historically, the Board has determined risk tolerances
12 for the reserve regulation balancing corporate -- the
13 monopoly's interest versus ratepayer's. That
14 balancing act, in our client's submission, has been
15 undermined, overtaken, and the -- the will of the MPI
16 Board of Directors has been substituted for balance.

17 The five (5) of the just and reasonable
18 rate analysis are set out at slide 19, and we just put
19 them there for the Board's reference. We're going to
20 the first one -- I think we are anyways -- ensuring
21 forecasts are reasonably reliable.

22 And our client is not going to be very
23 adversarial on forecast reasonableness. On the
24 expenditure to side, our client generally accepts the
25 reasonableness of the 2021 general rate application

1 forecast of Manitoba Public Insurance.

2 It does wish to flag three (3) areas of
3 uncertainty. One is interest rate direction during
4 the test year. A second is the recent history of
5 unfavourable experience relating to personal injury
6 protection plan variances -- unfavourable variances.
7 And the third is the possibility that unusually high
8 vacancy rates will extend into the 2020/2021 test year
9 potentially dampening or reducing test year
10 expenditures.

11 I will come back to the -- the PIPP
12 unfavourable variances as well as the vacancies in a
13 couple moments.

14 So that was expenditures for the
15 2020/'21 year. In terms of expenditure forecasts for
16 the 2019/'20 year, our client is uncomfortable with
17 the revision to the collision claims forecast for the
18 second half of the 2019/'20 year.

19 To take into account unusually
20 favourable experience in, what our client has termed,
21 the non-winter months, our client considers that
22 atypical for Manitoba Public Insurance practices, and,
23 in our client's view, that should not be relied upon
24 in any determination of the projected level of the
25 Basic rate stabilization reserve for the 2019/'20 year

1 end. In our client's view, those revisions are
2 atypically optimistic for Manitoba Public Insurance.

3 On the revenue side and going back to
4 the test year -- the 2020/'21 year -- our client
5 generally accepts the reasonableness of the
6 Corporation's forecasts. There is one exception, and
7 this is the matter of competing professional opinions
8 by Mr. Johnston and Ms. Sherry and that relates to
9 whether or not investment income from the rate
10 stabilization reserve should be taken into account in
11 the determination of the actuarially accepted rate.

12 And our client is not saying
13 Mr. Johnston is doing anything improper. He and
14 Ms. Sherry have a legitimate disagreement in terms of
15 admittedly somewhat opaque actuarial standards.

16 But from our client's perspective, they
17 do prefer the opinion of Ms. Sherry that the
18 investment income should be taken into account from
19 the rate stabilization reserve especially because such
20 a determination would appear to be more generally
21 consistent with industry practices. But they do
22 recognize ambiguity, and this is an issue that does
23 give them some analytic challenges as well.

24 I said I would come back to the
25 unfavourable experience related to the runoff related

1 to the personal injury protection lines of coverages.

2 Again, our client is generally -- is
3 not contesting the expenditure forecasts, but they do
4 feel it's incumbent to identify significant
5 uncertainty, and this is one.

6 And the -- the panel will recall that
7 once we take out the interest rate impacts, once we
8 cancel the methodological changes, the external
9 actuary in February of 2019 identified unfavourable
10 experience related runoff of about \$40 million between
11 the three (3) personal injury protection plan
12 coverages with most of those unfavourable developments
13 being in the -- the '16/'17 and '17/'18 year.

14 And this has been an endemic challenge
15 for Manitoba Public Insurance. This unfavourable
16 experience is primarily attributable to claims
17 persistency, claims extending -- complex claims
18 extending beyond -- considerably on into the future as
19 well as case reserving that MPI itself has described
20 as being inadequate and inconsistent.

21

22 (BRIEF PAUSE)

23

24 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And in terms of
25 the case reserving, there have been ongoing challenges

1 with its accuracy and consistency, particularly for
2 the 2010 to 2016 years.

3 To its credit, Manitoba Public
4 Insurance has introduced new centralized case
5 reserving methodology which is expected to lead to
6 greater consistency and reliability. But that doesn't
7 address the other longstanding issue which is the
8 persistence of these complex claims.

9 And MPI's evidence from last year in
10 CAC-1-36 which was confirmed in discussion with
11 Mr. Wennberg this year is that that claims
12 persistency -- some of the challenges have been
13 impacted by a longstanding failure to reasonably
14 manage complex claims.

15 And if you get a chance to go back to
16 CAC-1-36, Appendix A, Attachment A, there's a very
17 thoughtful explanation of the challenges of the
18 Corporation, particularly at page 8. Its challenges
19 were both staff reductions and actual technical
20 challenges in the case management of complex claims.
21 MPI has taken some efforts to standardize metrics and
22 case management. They hired new staff in September of
23 2018.

24 But as we've learned with these
25 personal injury protection plan claims, there's --

1 their so-called long tail claims, we won't know if the
2 case management is having its intended effect for
3 quite a while, not to the twenty-nine -- 2019
4 develops beyond the twenty four -- twenty-four (24)
5 to sixty (60) month period. Again, that is a source
6 of negative uncertainty around the expenditure
7 forecast.

8 On the upside, at least in terms of
9 expenditures for the test year, is the ongoing effects
10 of the very large vacancy rate driven by higher than
11 normal retirements and higher than normal turnover,
12 and we had this discussion both with Ms. Campbell and
13 Mr. Giesbrecht on October the 8th.

14 And in -- in our conversation at
15 page 480 and 481 of the transcript, Mr. Giesbrecht
16 noted that the disconnect between budgeted full-time
17 equivalents and unfilled positions may spill over into
18 the 2021 year. He was asked, would the extended level
19 of vacancies carry over into 2021? And he thought it
20 was fair to say that it would have some effect.

21 So that is an element that would tend,
22 all of other things being equal, to -- to drive --
23 push down claims costs. That is with regard to the
24 2021 year.

25 I do want to come back on behalf of our

1 clients to the 2019/'20 year. And as you know just
2 before the hearing started, there was a significant
3 amendment to the application, and one of the elements
4 to that amendment was a different treatment for
5 frequency -- collision frequency based upon the --
6 five (5) of the first six (6) months of 2019/'20.

7 So, Mr. Johnston is talking at page
8 1,089 of the transcript:

9 "They've had some low months, so
10 we've recognized favourable
11 collision frequency in the second
12 half of the year. We've assumed it
13 will continue."

14 Fortuitously or not, that conversation
15 was just after the -- the storm events of October 11th
16 and 12 and, as Mr. Johnston also candidly noted, not
17 liking our chances so much for this month, but
18 hopefully for the rest of the year.

19 And this Board will recall and can take
20 judicial notice of our typical experience in rate
21 hearings where the Corporation cautions about giving
22 undue weight to experience of the first half of the
23 test year.

24 And so, for our client -- sorry, not
25 the test year, excuse me, of the current year. For

1 our client, this approach -- and they have the highest
2 regard for Ms. Johnston, but this left them
3 uncomfortable.

4 And we canvassed this a little bit with
5 Mr. Johnston on the -- and Mr. -- and Mr. Graham on
6 the next slide, being slide 27, because winter is
7 coming, and the most volatile ti -- part of the
8 Manitoba Public Insurance year in terms of frequency
9 of collisions is winter.

10 And at the bottom of this slide, being
11 slide 27, we've put from the corporate risk scenario
12 analysis the events of a one (1) in forty (40) adverse
13 winter collision. We're not predicting it. We're
14 just noting that it would be \$66 million.

15 So, from our client's perspective, farm
16 boy that I am, there's a saying, don't cou -- count
17 your chickens before they're hatched. In this case,
18 our client would advise don't count your collision
19 frequency before it's defrosted. Let's -- that, to
20 our clients, is a bit imprudent.

21

22 (BRIEF PAUSE)

23

24 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: On slide 29, our
25 client -- this is the general section, excuse me,

1 where we're talking about the prudence and
2 reasonableness of both expenditures and investments.

3 Our client wants to start with
4 everyone's favourite topic, shadow portfolios, and
5 just to remind the Board of its words from last year.
6 Last year, the Board was presented with what it
7 considered to be two (2) reasonable options.

8 One (1) was the MPI selected investment
9 portfolio, a highly concentrated in fixed incomes,
10 extremely conservative approach, at least from a
11 nominal risk perspective, and the other was Mr.
12 Viola's approach based on the real world and on real
13 risk.

14 And the Board concluded ultimately that
15 the MPI proposal was reasonable and prudent but did
16 recognize that there was the potential, the risk, that
17 Manitoba Public Insurance had foregone an opportunity,
18 those words are emphasized, to hedge against long-term
19 risks by rejecting real return bo -- bonds.

20 And the Board directed the Corporation
21 to run shadow portfolios. And we've underlined the
22 words to be evaluated against the portfolio selected
23 by the Corporation.

24 And the Board wanted to do this as a
25 text of whether the Corporation's asset liability

1 strategy is reasonable. And our clients, while di --
2 disappointed in the Board's determinations,
3 appreciates the -- the care with which the Board made
4 that determination last year.

5 So, how would one reasonably test that
6 hypothesis of whether the Corporation had foregone an
7 opportunity? The Board to -- in our client's view,
8 that would appropriately be done consistent with the
9 Board direction by two (2) shadow portfolios, 1) to
10 test the hypothesis that in the real world, not the
11 nominal work, the MPI selected portfolio had foregone
12 an opportunity to hedge against long-term risks by
13 rejecting real return bonds.

14 And the very least, our client would
15 have expected Mercers (sic) and MPI to compare an
16 optimized shadow portfolio against the MPI selected
17 portfolio at a comparable level of real risk.

18 How can one test the foregone
19 opportunity unless it's at a comparable level of real
20 risk? The Board also wanted to see what an
21 unconstrained shadow portfolio would look like.

22 And from our client's perspective, to
23 test that hypothesis that, in the real world, rather
24 than the nominal world, the MPI selected portfolio had
25 undergone an opportunity to hedge against long-term

1 risks by unduly constraining the portfolio by not
2 being diversified.

3 To achieve and to reasonably test that
4 hypothesis, our client would have expected that
5 Mercers (sic) and MPI would have compared an
6 optimized, unconstrained shadow portfolio against the
7 MPI selected portfolio at a comparable level of real
8 risk.

9 Again, how can one test if an
10 opportunity has been foregone unless it's at a
11 comparable level of risk?

12 So, what are the issues with the -- the
13 Basic shadow portfolios? Our client does not intend
14 to focus on the pensions ones, but on the two (2)
15 Basic shadow portfolios.

16 There are five (5) profound concerns.
17 First, shadow portfolio was not investment 101
18 optimized while the MPI selected portfolio was.

19 Second, shadow portfolio 1 was
20 established with a significantly lower level of real
21 risk than the MPI selected portfolio rather than a
22 comparable level of risk.

23 Mysteriously, shadow portfolio 2, the
24 unconstrained portfolio, was con -- so-called
25 unconstrained portfolio, was compared against the

1 rejected 2017 MPI port -- portfolio rather than the
2 MPI selected portfolio.

3 And, again, shadow portfolio 2 was
4 established with a significantly lower level of real
5 risk than the MPI selected portfolio rather than a
6 comparable level of risk.

7 And finally, shadow portfolio 2
8 "unconstrained" was constrained by limits imposed by
9 the MPI Board of Directors.

10 Egotist that I am, I like to think that
11 I have a good sense of humour. Mr. Scarfone gets the
12 prize for best line of the Hearing when he tried to
13 mess -- rescue the Mercer's witness from what Mr.
14 Scarfone described as the abyss.

15 The result of the Mercer's analysis
16 thought in our client's submission, all joking aside,
17 was an analytical abyss. And here is the Mercer
18 witness candidly admitted -- admitting that shadow
19 portfolio 1 was not optimized. It wasn't on an
20 efficient frontier.

21 It was just another asset mix
22 constrained to move money from one (1) bucket to
23 another with no other buckets in play. Would that be
24 fair? "Right," says the Mercer's witness.

25

1 (BRIEF PAUSE)

2

3 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Significantly,
4 shadow portfolio 1 had significantly less real risk as
5 measured in standard volatility than the MPI
6 preference.

7 Again, the Board's instructions, or the
8 hypothesis to be tested, is whether an opportunity was
9 foregone. And here on slide 34, you see our -- our
10 legal team asking the Mercer's witness that they
11 should -- suggesting to them that they selected a
12 shadow por -- polio -- shadow portfolio for comparison
13 purposes that have less risk.

14 And that fact was conceded by the
15 Mercer's witness, and not just a little risk. Our
16 client suggested to the Mercer's witness that it was a
17 significant reduction in risk as measured in real
18 terms.

19 And as the Mercer's witness candidly
20 conceded, a move from four point five (4.5), which was
21 the MPI selected risk of that portfolio, to three
22 point two (3.2) is significant.

23 The same challenge spilled over into
24 shadow portfolio two (2). And here you see on slide
25 thirty-five (35) our conversation with the Mercer's

1 witness.

2 In neither shadow one (1) or shadow
3 portfolio two (2), did you start from the same level
4 of risk, real risk, as measured in the MPI selected
5 portfolio. Correct.

6 So if one were wanting to conduct an
7 apples to apples comparison, the same risk is the MPI
8 selected portfolio, that was not done by any of the
9 shadow portfolios on Basic use selected. That's
10 right.

11 Those are the most fundamental problems
12 with shadow portfolio one (1) and two (2) the
13 analysis. But if you'll recall the Board's words, it
14 was trying to test the shadow portfolios against the
15 MPI selected portfolios.

16 But if you remember that no doubt
17 stimulating investment portfolio discussion, there was
18 a -- the purple dot of -- called "current", which was
19 current 2017. That was the rejected MPI portfolio
20 before asset liability management was engaged in.

21 So here we are talking about shadow
22 portfolio two (2), and the question is put to the
23 Mercer's witness. When you're using the term "same
24 risk", you're comparing it to the rejected 2017
25 portfolio. Right, agreeing. Just to confirm, you're

1 not comparing it to the same risk as the MPI selected
2 portfolio.

3 Again, the witness confirms. And when
4 one looked to the same return, again the shadow
5 portfolio is being compared to the rejected 2017
6 portfolio. That was conceded. Again, not comparing
7 it to the selected MPI portfolio, again, that was
8 conceded.

9 Slide 37 is titled "unconstrained does
10 not mean unconstrained", and this was a nimble piece
11 of cross-examination by our learned PUB counsel asking
12 with regard to shadow portfolio two (2), when we're
13 talking about unconstrained really we're speaking
14 about unconstrained within what the MPI investment
15 committee provided, and that was again conceded by the
16 Mercer's witness.

17 Our clients with regard to the shadow
18 portfolios are in one area of agreement with both Mr.
19 Bunston and Mercers, and that is if this exercise is
20 to be undertaken, it is an exercise that requires some
21 time. And Mr. -- the Mercer's witness suggests it
22 should be over a full market cycle. Mr. Bunston gave
23 words to similar effect at pages 499 to 500 of the
24 transcript and our client cannot disagree with that.

25 I'm going to move away from the shadow

1 portfolios just to go back for a moment to our
2 client's underlying concerns with the asset liability
3 management strategy at Manitoba Public Insurance.

4 You often hear in this hearing the
5 suggestion that MPI has "de-risked" the portfolio. It
6 may have done so significantly in nominal terms, but
7 as PUB counsel put to the MPI witnesses, or the Mercer
8 witness, sorry, at slide 39, would it be overly
9 simplistic of me to suggest that the nominal liability
10 benchmark is not taken into inflation volatility, and
11 the witnesses conceded that would not be overly-
12 simplistic. That would be fair.

13 And again, that's one of our client's
14 concerns. It's not that it's de-risk, it's just
15 different risks and our client does not accept the
16 submission that it's low risk over time.

17 On that theme of MPI selecting a
18 portfolio of different risk not de-risked, is the
19 reality that the Basic portfolio is highly
20 concentrated. Provincial, Federal, and corporate
21 bonds with relatively high correlations. And frankly,
22 that's working out splendidly in the first six (6)
23 months of this year.

24 But that's from an asset perspective,
25 risky, because high correlations tend to impair the

1 benefits of diversification for assets.

2 And this was confirmed in our client's
3 conversation with the Mercer witness.

4

5 (BRIEF PAUSE)

6

7 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Just a couple of
8 last slides on the investment portfolio. Our client
9 is concerned not just with the interests of ratepayers
10 today but the interests of ratepayers five (5) years
11 from now and ten (10) years from now. And this is --
12 this description of the MPI investment portfolio
13 wasn't concocted by our clients. It's a good
14 discussion of the cost of capital of the Corporation
15 in the value management business case of the
16 Corporation.

17 And this analysis on slide 41 just
18 talks about the conservatism of the portfolio and --
19 and -- and the consequences of that in terms of the
20 expected total retu -- return over time. And our
21 clients think that that is an important point, not
22 just focussed on the income statement of this year or
23 next year, but on the entire family of Manitoba Public
24 Insurance consumers, including those consumers who
25 will be collecting PIPP benefits, personal injury

1 protection plan benefits, twenty (20) years from now.

2 Next slide, please.

3 And again, the Board has made its
4 determination in the short term, but our client
5 continues to question the reasonableness of the MPI
6 approach. They point to the superior returns over the
7 last five (5) years -- again, that's a relatively
8 short period -- of Saskatchewan SGI, which -- which
9 has on its hybri -- it bucket -- its bucket approach
10 does include for the longer-term claims an investment
11 pool of purely growth aflet -- assets.

12 So our clients' recommended finding
13 with regard to the investment portfolio is, first,
14 that the purpose of the shadow portfolio was to assess
15 whether MPI was foregoing opportunity for a comparable
16 level of risk; second, that that purpose has not been
17 achieved; and that third, MPI has not complied with
18 the PUB directions with respect to the shadow
19 portfolio. Our client will have additional
20 recommendations, which will be shared by Ms. Dilay
21 later.

22

23 (BRIEF PAUSE)

24

25 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Our client -- in

1 terms of slide 44, we're going to have a couple of
2 short snappers but on really important issues. One
3 (1) is on the personal injury protection plan, and
4 again, this is pointing out that there are -- are
5 excessive, imprudent, and unreasonable costs built
6 into PIPP, which are impacted by a couple of factors.

7 One (1) is unreasonable agreements with
8 certain service providers, which our client intends to
9 address in this -- the commercially sensitive
10 information portion of the submissions. We will note
11 that MPI, in our clients' view, has shown candor in
12 identifying these challenges and exploring alternative
13 models to retain service providers.

14 There are also excessive, imprudent,
15 unreasonable costs built into forecast PIPP
16 expenditures by the ongoing struggles of Manitoba
17 Public Insurance to manage complex claims, which were
18 exacerbated by imprudent staff reductions between two-
19 o-nine and 2017 and challenges in addressing and
20 developing appropriate case management skills,
21 practices, and metrics. And the financial and human
22 cost of those challenges endures.

23 To the Corporation's credit, it has
24 acknowledged the -- these cha -- challenges and is
25 attempting to address them. The outcome remains

1 uncertain.

2 The Board has heard a lot in terms of
3 physical damage re-engineering over the years. In
4 this hearing, we had the final assessment of the
5 program, and our clients do recommend to the Board
6 that it -- that it find that historic, current, and
7 future rates of Manitoba consumers have been adversely
8 affected by the imprudent rollout of the PDR project
9 physical damage re-engineering.

10 They would note that while the project
11 appears to be -- have been relatively favourably
12 received from consumers, it has failed to deliver
13 value for money resulting in a negative net present
14 value in the range of 49 million to 50 million with
15 the Gartners doing the calculations for MPI, including
16 obviously a significant write-off relating to the
17 customer claims reporting system.

18 Our client does acknowledge that MPI
19 has shown candour in admitting the challenges with
20 program delivery and prudence in writing off those
21 expenditures. But those write-offs from prior years
22 are reflected in today's reduced retaining earnings.

23 From our client's perspective -- and
24 some of this will be addressed in CSI -- but one of
25 the most important aspects of this hearing relates to

1 collision repair costs. The benchmarking exercise
2 that Manitoba Public Insurance has undertaken and the
3 lessons in the -- on the public record that -- that we
4 can take from that exercise.

5 Our client will address some of this in
6 commercially sensitive information, but on the public
7 record, they recommend the following findings. First,
8 that there appears to be excessive and unreasonable
9 costs built into certain industry agreements that
10 cannot be explained by the market realities of a
11 smaller province such as Manitoba or differences in
12 service quality, i.e., ICAR Gold. Again, we'll
13 elaborate on those in CSI.

14 Secondly, that there are grounds for
15 concern that the practice of industry wide agreements
16 historically undertaken by MPI may raise issues under
17 the Federal Competition Act and practical barriers to
18 competition.

19 Third, giving credit to Manitoba Public
20 Insurance, that the Corporation has shown prudence in
21 undertaking benchmarking exercises with regard to
22 vehicle repair and other service industry benchmarks.

23 Also that the Corporation has shown
24 reasonableness in removing the five (5) repair a week
25 minimum for the Direct Repair program -- I hope I have

1 that right -- which flowed from an industry agreement
2 and which posed an unfair barrier to smaller shops
3 including those in rural Manitoba.

4 A key recommendation from our client's
5 perspective which goes to whether the labour rates and
6 in collision repair are just and reasonable and goes
7 as well to the risks faced by the Corporation, if any
8 in terms of compliance with the Competition Act, is
9 that Manitoba Public Insurance should report back
10 during the next general rate application on industry
11 best practice in and ensuring compliance with the
12 Competition Act, value for money, and quality service
13 availability.

14 Included in that analysis should be an
15 assessment of viable alternatives to industry wide
16 agreements which may include, as ICBC appears to do,
17 the Irish (Phonetic) messenger model, the rate cards,
18 which there was some discussion in this hearing, and
19 RFPs or requests for proposals.

20 From our client's perspective looking
21 not just at next year's rates but rates over time,
22 this is one of the most prudent and reasonable and
23 important exercises that are -- that could be
24 undertaken, both in terms of rates levels but also the
25 risks faced by the Corporation.

1 At slide 47, I asked perhaps the
2 weirdest question in my legal career. I asked the
3 president of MPI -- and I've asked a few weird ones,
4 I'll concede that -- but I asked the president of MPI
5 to put on the consumer cap -- cloth cap, no doubt --
6 and discuss why consumers perhaps should be concerned
7 about the current status quo with many service
8 providers of the industry-wide agreements.

9 And at the top of this slide, here you
10 see the risk from a consumer perspective that
11 consumers and all -- MPI and ultimately consumers are
12 paid too much under a negotiated contract.

13 And Mr. Wennberg chipped in in the same
14 discussion and also spoke of the challenges from
15 the -- the Corporation's perspective with one of the
16 most notable -- and this is on the public record at
17 slides -- or pages 1797 to 1802 -- being the
18 commercial repair rates: 10 percent, 10 percent,
19 10 percent, moving from the high nineties to a
20 commercial repair -- he says a hundred and
21 thirty-three. It might be slightly different.

22 The rate that we pay on commercial
23 vehicles is the highest rate in North America. And
24 from our client's perspective, this is the consumer
25 interest, the public interest, and the regulatory

1 interest, and again, leads to our client's concern
2 that embedded in current and future rates may be
3 excessive labour costs, as represented in -- in this
4 transcript excerpt.

5

6 (BRIEF PAUSE)

7

8 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Madam Chair,
9 we're going well for time. I wonder -- what I'm going
10 to suggest is we're over a third of the way through.
11 I wonder if we could step down for five (5) --
12 five (5) minutes. I've got an important section here
13 and just -- I'd like to be a little fresher, if I
14 could, for that with your indulgence if that's
15 appropriate.

16 THE CHAIRPERSON: Certainly,
17 Mr. Williams. That's fine. It's 2:07. How about if
18 we reconvene at 2:15.

19

20 --- Upon recessing at 2:07 p.m.

21 --- Upon resuming at 2:17 p.m.

22

23 THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Williams...?

24 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Yes, thank you,
25 and the Public Utilities Board counsel has helpfully

1 reminded ourselves -- we will be coming to the -- Ms.
2 Dilay's argument in a few min -- well, in about an
3 hour -- to the legal submissions.

4 Obviously the Attorney General of
5 Manitoba is here. The Attorney General of Canada was
6 served and indicated the they -- they were not
7 appearing, but we have not filed that with the Public
8 Utilities Board, which is my oversight, for which I
9 apologize, and we will make sure that that is done
10 forthwith, with our apologies.

11 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

12 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: For -- the next
13 few slides are going to address issues related to the
14 bricks and mortar delivery model. And before we go
15 through the slides, I think it's important again to
16 just back up for a second and -- and share our
17 clients' interest in this issue, which is not to pick
18 on brokers or to pick on MPI, but to start with the
19 reality that these are living, breathing costs that --
20 that will -- will -- associated with broker
21 commissions that will affect consumers, but also
22 because our client saw the industry-wide agreement
23 with brokers as offering a window on the broader issue
24 of industry-wide agreements and insight into some of
25 the potential concerns that could flow from that, both

1 in terms of barriers to entry, in terms of barriers to
2 innovation, and in terms of alleged risks with the
3 Competition Act.

4 Our clients' keen interest in this
5 issue as well is because the relationship of brokers
6 and the intertwining in their commission structure --
7 but in how they deal with consumers between Basic and
8 Extension, offers important insight into that
9 relationship, which is central to the Board's
10 deliberations related to the Capital Management Plan.

11 And again going back to the Board's
12 jurisdiction to approve rates for service, the last
13 two (2) words in that equation, or in that
14 terminology, are "for service," and our client saw the
15 issues relating to bricks and mortar service delivery
16 models as offering insight into areas of the province
17 that are arguably under served, and that is an
18 important consumer issue which is germane to the
19 Board's approval to set rates -- to approve rates for
20 service.

21 Can we go back to slide 48 for a
22 minute?

23 Just some introductory comments on the
24 general theme that you've heard a lot of discussion in
25 this hearing about as exclusivity in British Columbia

1 versus primary models.

2 From our clients' respectful
3 submission, consumer choice is not achieved
4 exclusively through broker delivery models, and they
5 pointed out and we dealt with this with our cross-
6 examination of the insurance broker witnesses, in many
7 areas of insurance, Manitobans have the choice of
8 whether to purchase their insurance directly from a
9 broker, which is obviously their right in a free and
10 democratic society, or from other institutions, and
11 that could be online travel health insurance, that
12 could be mortgage income replacement insurance where
13 you could go to a broker or you could get it from your
14 bank, or car loan income replacement insurance.

15 That choice is present in many aspects
16 of the marketplace, and from our client's perspective,
17 consumers come in all shapes and sizes, all degrees of
18 sophisticated -- sophistication, and their autonomy is
19 best served by having those different choices.

20 Our clients do not doubt that captive
21 customers of Basic and Extension services have been
22 generally well served by a mixed bricks and mortar
23 delivery model, which relies primarily on brokers but
24 which provides consumers with the choice of receiving
25 services directly from Manitoba Public Insurance in

1 locations where that is available, and in our clients'
2 view, the model is prudent and superior to bro -- the
3 broker exclusivity model employed by ICBC, which both
4 denies consumer choice and leaves the Corporation
5 inordinately vulnerable to economic and other
6 pressures.

7 And by analogy, this Board could take
8 judicial notice of our legal aid system in Manitoba,
9 which has both a staff delivery service model and
10 contracted private sector services as well, delivering
11 the best of both worlds, more choice for legal aid
12 consumers, but also tools to maintain cost control for
13 -- for legal aid itself. And so from our clients'
14 perspective, that is a -- a fit analogy.

15 So while the bricks and mortar's model
16 has generally served many captive consumers well,
17 there are significant bricks and mortar service gaps
18 in rural Manitoba, in northern Manitoba, and in First
19 Nation communities, and those gaps, in our clients'
20 respectful view, might be ameliorated, at least in
21 part, by online services or enhanced telephone
22 options, which our client was interested to hear from
23 the brokers in the conversation on -- on Tuesday.

24 An important issue from our clients'
25 perspective for this Board, which is entrusted with

1 approving rates for service to keep its eye on, is
2 opportunities in a cost-effective way to support more
3 vulnerable rural bricks and mortar services.

4 Some of the interesting concepts that
5 came up in this hearing was potentially increased
6 compensation for towns where there may be a single
7 broker location and no alternatives within 50
8 kilometres, and conceptually, from our clients'
9 perspective, that might be a reasonable and prudent
10 opportunity, while keeping the level of commissions
11 the same, to invest more where services are less and
12 where volumes may be less, but having that bricks and
13 mortar service is important.

14 There were examples of innovative
15 efforts by Manitoba Public Insurance. The Island Lake
16 example of -- of going into remote communities with no
17 broker services and employing innovative payment
18 options, the Northern Store, because of the financial
19 inclusion challenges in those communities.

20 There is also examples of interest in
21 collaboration between brokers and MPI in terms of -- I
22 think was the Pimicikamak First Nation, but -- or
23 maybe it was Snow Lake - it might have been Snow Lake
24 -- I might have -- Snow Lake in terms of assisting
25 brokers to make periodic visits to communities that

1 have no bricks and mortar services, and also
2 potentially opportunities to use the telephone option
3 more creatively. And again, those are shared in
4 particular by the broker panel at -- at page 2472.

5 At the bottom of this slide, being
6 slide forty -- 49, you see an important statement by
7 Manitoba Public Insurance. Our clients are -- are
8 highly committed to prudence and reasonableness, but
9 our clients do concur both with -- with Manitoba
10 Public Insurance that it is important to support
11 communities where there are limited options in terms
12 of service.

13 In the course of this hearing, this
14 Board has received a significant amount of evidence in
15 terms of the comparisons with private sector broker
16 commissions. Our client cautions that that analysis
17 should be viewed with significant care, and there's a
18 number of reasons for that.

19 First of all, there are on the record
20 of this hearing substantial differences in the types
21 of services delivered by brokers in Manitoba to
22 captive Basic and Extension customers. It doesn't
23 mean the services are not important, but those
24 services are not easily comparable to private sector
25 services.

1 First of all, these distinctions relate
2 to the absence of the need to seek and filter
3 competitive quotes with regard to the Basic program.
4 They relate to the absence of the time-consuming
5 traditional "front-line underwriting function
6 exercise," and that's in contrast to the competitive
7 market, or as the broker panel conceded, for products
8 like special risk Extension.

9 These distinctions also relate to the
10 ease and convenience of the Extension form itself,
11 which leads -- assists in leading MPI to Extension
12 market dominance and reduces the demand for
13 competitive quotes from Extension, and these
14 distinctions from the private marker (sic) broker
15 commissions also relate to the simplicity and
16 standardization of the Basic and compulsory insurance
17 package.

18 In our clients' view, these fundamental
19 differences in the complexity of Basic and Extension
20 services make comparisons with broker commissions in
21 the competitive market largely unreliable.

22 Our clients also caution on slide 51,
23 that care should be exercising -- exercised -- I guess
24 I should be exercising -- care should be exercised in
25 reviewing standalone Basic commissions with any

1 jurisdiction.

2 One (1) of the reasons care should be
3 exercised is because of Manitoba's unique five (5)
4 year insurance renewal model with annual
5 reassessments. It is structurally distinct from any
6 other Canadian jurisdiction. So brokers and MPI are
7 engaged in a -- a live dispute before us in terms of
8 the actual volume of reassessments done in broker
9 offices. Our clients cannot offer an opinion on those
10 numbers. What they can say with certainty is that
11 structure is fundamentally different, admitted by the
12 brokers, admitted by MPI, from any other Canadian
13 jurisdiction. So that's one (1) point of caution in
14 terms of looking at standalone Basic commissions.

15 It is also analytically inappropriate
16 to review Basic commissions in isolation because
17 historically, and to this day, Basic and Extension
18 commissions are negotiated as part of the same
19 agreement. There are puts and takes in those
20 agreements. If you want to talk about the
21 reasonableness and prudence of the agreement and the
22 package, fair enough, but you can't cherry pick out of
23 that agreement, because it's a holistic agreement.

24 And that point is made in the -- the
25 2008 broker agreement. This is language from it. The

1 new service delivery model -- this is the language
2 from it -- was designed to maximize compensation based
3 on professionally managing the customer's overall
4 business portfolio. So can't cherry pick the Basic
5 commission out of there.

6 Just a final note in terms of -- from
7 our clients' perspective, it is not analytically sound
8 to compare Basic commissions to the overall corporate
9 expenditures. If you want to add in Extension, you
10 want to add in SRE, that is valid analytically,
11 otherwise, that type of analysis is deserving of no
12 weight.

13 In introducing this section, our client
14 said that -- suggested I -- I suggested on their
15 behalf that our client saw the brokering agreement is
16 offering a window on potential issues with broader
17 agreements.

18 And on slide 52, and I think 53, our
19 client indicates that there is some evidence on this
20 record to suggest that MPI and broker agreements,
21 operating procedures, and practices have sometimes
22 stifled innovation in service delivery to consumers
23 and created barriers to entry in the broker industry.

24 One (1) example of that is the 2008
25 agreement, which included a commitment agreed to by

1 MPI and brokers that MPI would not endeavour to
2 provide customers with the option of renewing vehicle
3 registration, insurance, or driver's licence online.
4 Our client questions whether that agreement was in the
5 consumer best interest.

6 On slide 52, pulling from Appendix 11
7 of CAC-1-1M, is the infamous -- infamous Section 19.
8 As of December 2013, both IBAM, representing the
9 brokers, and the Corporation believe that the Province
10 of Manitoba is well served by the existing size and
11 scope of our broc -- our broker force. No new
12 agencies need apply. I'm being sarcastic there.

13 As such, the Corporation will no longer
14 be accepting applications for new licences or
15 appointments. Of course, there is dispute about
16 whether applications can be made, whether they will be
17 accepted. But that is concerning to our client in
18 terms of the marketplace.

19 And here on slide 53, you see Mr.
20 Wennberg and Ms. Hora suggesting that there was a
21 strong message sent to people that Manitoba Public
22 Insurance, in terms of accepting new agency
23 applications, was not open for -- for business.

24 The first arrow or bullet on slide 53
25 is an important but disturbing quote from Appendix 3

1 of CAC-1-1. And a central issue in this hearing has
2 been the relationship between Basic and Extension,
3 given the significance of the Capital Management Plan
4 transfers, but also the live question: is the
5 Extension marketplace truly competitive?

6 And our client recognizes that the
7 authors of the statement may not be with the
8 Corporation anymore. But here is a 2014 briefing to
9 the MPI Board of directors.

10 Speaking of a relationship with
11 brokers, and on the second line, demonstrates
12 commitment to the broker distribution channel as well
13 as inoculation against competitive threats by
14 aggressive insurers that do not depend on the broker
15 distribution channel.

16 Again, on the next bullet or arrow, you
17 see reference to a suggestion in a 2016 board of
18 directors recommendation that the relationship between
19 brokers and MPI has been a critical factor in the
20 Corporation's ability to retain majority market share
21 in the competitive Extension and SRE environments.

22 Finally, at the bottom of page 53, on
23 this theme that the existing MPI broker relationship
24 may exacerbate certain market concerns, our clients
25 raise, as others have in this hearing, the concern of

1 whether consumers are being consistently advised of
2 their opportunity to choose non-MPI Extension service
3 offerings.

4 There were questions of one (1) of the
5 panel members of MPI. Do you survey that? Our client
6 asked the brokers, Is there mystery shopping to see if
7 Manitobans are even being advised of their right to
8 choose when it comes to the Extension service?

9 And there's -- apart from anecdote, and
10 we all have our anecdotes -- that issue is unresolved.
11 There is at least one (1) piece of survey evidence
12 suggesting that it is not clear that consumers are
13 being consistently advised even of their Extension
14 offerings from MPI. And again from a consumer, a
15 rates for service, a value of service perspective, and
16 consumer security perspective, that is concerning.
17 And that data related both to MPI service centres as
18 well as to brokers.

19

20 (BRIEF PAUSE)

21

22 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Our client would
23 never wish to diminish the value that many Manitobans
24 play on their broker -- place on their brokers, and --
25 and -- but there has been some suggestion in this

1 hearing by the insurance brokers that the broker model
2 is the cornerstone of the relatively low rates of
3 Manitoba.

4 Our client suggests that a more
5 reasonable hypothesis is the no-fault plan. And
6 certainly, British Columbia, where there is an
7 exclusive broker model, is no bastion of financial
8 rectitude. It is insignificant trouble right now, and
9 the exclusive broker model has not proven to be a
10 bulwark against its challenges.

11 An argument has been made in this
12 hearing, why look at the brokers? There's other fish
13 to fry. Our client agrees with Manitoba Public
14 Insurance that this is important. Brokers, Basic, and
15 Extension commissions holistically nego -- negotiated
16 are -- it's suggested here on slide 55, amount to \$85
17 million.

18 That doesn't necessarily mean the
19 number should be lower, but it doesn't need -- mean it
20 needs to be higher. Maybe it needs to be
21 redistributed. Our client has no position on that in
22 this hearing, but it does mean that magnitude of that
23 investment is definitely worry -- worthy of scrutiny.
24 And you see the compare -- comparison made to the cost
25 of the entire operation team of folks at MPI.

1 (BRIEF PAUSE)

2

3 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: This is one (1)
4 of those areas of the Board asked for positions on the
5 Board's jurisdiction. This is one (1) of the areas
6 where the evidence in this hearing, from our client's
7 perspective, being with regard to what is -- are the
8 current service offerings in terms of Basic and
9 Extension, and whether those need to be rev --
10 reviewed and reviewed more frequently.

11 Our client is very sympathetic to the
12 brokers on that point. We do not think it's within
13 the Board's jurisdiction, though, to order that
14 review. That would be a review initiated by Manitoba
15 Public Insurance or perhaps by its -- its board or
16 perhaps by the -- the Province. But from our clients'
17 perspective, that would be a valuable recommendation
18 that this Board, apart from its rate-approval
19 authority, could do.

20 Are Manitobans appropriately insured in
21 the Basic and Extension package for today's risk,
22 tomorrow's risk, five (5) years from now risk? That,
23 from our clients' perspective -- it's not the Board's
24 jurisdiction, we would submit, but it would be a
25 useful recommendation.

1 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: I -- I'm sorry,
2 Mr. Williams. Can you go through this again, the
3 recommendation? What I got is it's not the
4 jurisdiction --

5 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Sorry --

6 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: -- which I
7 understood to review the relationship. Then I heard
8 that --

9 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Sorry, sorry --

10 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: -- for --

11 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Yeah.

12 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: -- for MPI, so to
13 suggest --

14 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: So just -- so I'm
15 -- I'm speaking to the simple issue here, sir --

16 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Yes.

17 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: -- of whether the
18 Basic service offering -- you know, the five hundred
19 (500) deductible, the two hundred thousand (200,000)
20 third-party liability -- the Extension service
21 offering, the lower deductible -- our client is
22 suggesting that is worthy of review and periodic
23 review. What we are saying is that the Board -- this
24 Board, the Public Utilities Board, could make that
25 recommendation to MPI and to the government, and I

1 apologiz -- gize for being imprecise, but it can't
2 order it.

3 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Yeah. No, thank
4 you.

5

6 (BRIEF PAUSE)

7

8 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Our client has
9 some recommended findings. One (1) of them is that in
10 light of five year -- the five (5) year renewal
11 process and the issue of 90 percent clean
12 reassessments, there is fundamental dissatisfaction
13 with the existing broker commission structure both on
14 the part of Manitoba Public Insurance, in terms of
15 whether it's trailing fees or the 71 million guarantee
16 -- or on the part of brokers, in terms of are all
17 their services being compensated. That is a factual
18 finding we think is open to this Board to make.

19 And underlying that tension is a more
20 existential one relating to disruption in the broader
21 marketplace. That disruption is driven by consumer
22 demand, by technology, including online services. And
23 as the McKinsey (phonetic) report and the Conference
24 Board of Canada report appended to one (1) of the I --
25 IBAM Information Requests of the MPI, I think perhaps

1 one dash -- well, number 4, but I could be wrong --
2 there is a rapidly changing insurance operational
3 dynamic outside of Manitoba, and one (1) of the
4 primary targets is -- is auto insurance.

5 So we've got the historic challenges
6 related to the five (5) year renewals, and then we've
7 got the -- the -- the -- the issue of -- of a market
8 that is on the verge of disruption. And what are the
9 consequences?

10 And from a consumer perspective, our
11 clients' concern is making sure that they have cost-
12 effective service that is reasonably available that
13 preserves consumer choice. And that will lead to some
14 of our recommendations to come.

15 The final point on this slide, and I
16 apologize for this -- there is no one (1) size fits
17 all in terms of consumer, as we've said before. There
18 are some who want to be ear -- ad -- online conducting
19 those transactions with autonomy. There are others
20 who want to go down the street to the broker in their
21 neighbourhood and -- and have confidence in that
22 relationship. Our -- our clients' interest is value
23 for money and preserving consumer choice and options,
24 both in terms of service delivery model and the option
25 of MPI or -- or brokers for bricks and mortar.

1

2

(BRIEF PAUSE)

3

4

DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: We'll talk more about market dominance in Extension under the capital management plan discussion, but our clients believe that the broker panel offered significant insight on this issue.

9

First of all, and I can't remember what the IWS acronym stands for, but the -- the fact that it makes sale of MPI Extension products considerably easier than those of other providers was factually uncontested in this hearing.

14

Secondly, that it may be more convenient for customer and brokers to have both Basic and Extension coverage from the same provider. In the case of claims, you only have to deal with one (1) insurance company.

19

Third, as noted by Mr. McGregor on Tuesday, that sometimes it's a challenge getting other competitive service offerings in the Manitoba marketplace. In his words, the challenge has been getting other insurers to offer the product.

24

And finally, the -- the -- the fact, I think, admitted both by Ms. Chammartin and Mr.

25

1 McGregor that Extension commissions set by other
2 insurers are typically less than the commissions
3 offered by MPI -- again, factors collectively that may
4 help to explain Manitoba Public Insurance endemic
5 dominance in the Extension marketplace.

6 Our clients' recommended findings in
7 terms of the bricks-and-mortar service delivery model
8 are first of all, that Manitoba ratepayers will not be
9 well served by a service de -- delivery model that
10 seeks to inflexibly lock in the status quo or ignore
11 the realities of rapidly changing consumer market and
12 technological demands. They think there are three (3)
13 important principles in terms of accessibility and ch
14 -- choice and which would deliver value to ratepayers.

15 First of all, that Manitobans would be
16 well served by a service delivery model that commits,
17 in a cost-effective ma -- manner, to maintaining and
18 enhancing options from cons -- for consumers in
19 northern, rural, and remote communities; a model that
20 enables all ma -- Manitobans who choose to access
21 online MPI services; and ensuring that all customers
22 who wish to access MPI services through a bricks-and-
23 mortar option, where available, have the choice
24 between MPI and brokers.

25 Those, from our clients' perspective,

1 are important principles that they would recommend.

2

3

(BRIEF PAUSE)

4

5

DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Our clients would
6 be remiss if they did not note that there -- again,
7 these are high level estimates -- but that there are
8 certain delivery models which preserve consumer choice
9 for bricks-and-mortar services that have potential
10 significant cost savings on the commission side.
11 They're not speaking to whether or not there would be
12 corresponding cost increase on the MPI side.

13

One (1) is a shared delivery model,
14 which would preserve choice in person at the broker or
15 MPI and online, might offer potential savings over
16 five (5) years of 91 million. And another one (1) of
17 interest to our clients in terms of prudence and
18 reasonableness was choice for bricks-and-mortar
19 services both through brokers and MPI, and online
20 through MPI. Those savings were significantly larger,
21 estimated in the range of two hundred and thirty-seven
22 (237) over five (5) years.

23

Again, high level estimates -- we don't
24 know the puts and takes, but those are models that,
25 from our clients' perspective, offered access to that

1 important bricks-and-mortar services where available.

2 Just some final findings, and this is
3 consistent with our earlier commentary. First, that
4 the recommended finding that the package of broker
5 commissions offered in Manitoba are not easibly (sic)
6 comparable to other jurisdictions, given five (5) year
7 renewals, the absence of competition in Basic and
8 large -- dominantly in Extension, and the absence of
9 frontline underwriting for Basic and Extension.

10 Second, that there are grounds for
11 concern that the practice of industry-wide agreements
12 historically undertaken by MPI may raise issues under
13 the federal Competition Act.

14 Third, there are grounds for concern
15 that the practice of industry-wide agreements
16 historically undertaken by MPI may raise practical
17 barriers to competition.

18 And fourth, that consumers, whether
19 appearing at a broker's office or at MPI, should be
20 entitled to notice of the existence of competitive
21 options to MPI Extension.

22 Our clients don't have a lot of
23 optimism that the Extension market can prosper in
24 Manitoba, but our clients do believe that it's
25 important to take efforts to at least make sure that

1 Manitobans are aware of their choices.

2 Flowing from those recommended
3 findings, our client would recommend that MPI should
4 be directed to report back on the prudence and
5 reasonableness of existing compensation packages,
6 especially in light of evolving consumer needs and the
7 need to preserve and enhance service in rural northern
8 and remote communities.

9 Secondly, that MPI should be directed
10 to report back an alternative agreement models which
11 might deliver better value for captive ratepayers,
12 ensure compliance with the Com -- Competition Act and
13 reduce barriers to entry for competitive services.

14 And third, and, again, this would only
15 be a recommendation, but a review of existing Basic
16 and Extension service offerings would be consistent
17 with the recognition of evolving consumer needs and
18 ongoing market dynamics.

19

20 (BRIEF PAUSE)

21

22 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Turning from
23 brokers and bricks and mortar service delivery model
24 to information technology. Our client's observations
25 of the record of this Hearing are that they are mixed.

1 To the -- to the credit of MPI, and
2 certainly Mr. Remillard was helpful on this issue, MPI
3 continues to de -- demonstrate candour and learnings
4 from the physical damage re-engineering project.

5 And some of the lessons are not to be
6 industry leaders and create new and improved
7 technologies and, secondly and critically, making
8 software customization an exception, not the norm.

9 A second observation is that Manitoba
10 according -- Manitoba Public Insurance's in --
11 information technology service delivery processes,
12 according to Gartner, are somewhat more mature
13 generally than peer organizations, and every domain,
14 with the exception of Enterprise Architecture.

15 But despite its overall maturity,
16 Manitoba Public Insurance continues to have more
17 information technology full-time equivalence is a
18 percentage of total company employees than peers.

19 Also flagged in the Gartner report was
20 that our -- outsourced spending at \$10.2 million was
21 94 percent higher than the peer group average. And we
22 would note that there is a review of the IB -- IBM --
23 that should not be IBAM, it should be IBM on slide 64
24 -- agreement has been undertaken.

25 And third, as flagged by Gartner Group,

1 maintenance costs at 5.8 percent are significantly
2 higher than the peer group average as well.

3 Again, we discussed this with MPI, and
4 there were some reasons offered, but these are sources
5 of concern with the overall information technology
6 assessment, and also an indication of why those
7 Gartner benchmark reports have been so important and
8 insightful to the Board and of the importance of
9 ensuring that good benchmarking continues into the
10 future whether delivered by Gartner or otherwise.

11

12 (BRIEF PAUSE)

13

14 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: We've titled this
15 -- the discussion of Project Nova calculated risk or
16 leap of faith. There's no factual denying the
17 challenges by the MPI legacy programs, including
18 Autopac online cars, the claim adjuster reporting
19 system, whatever that acronym stands for, and, in
20 particular, the -- as well as the driver and vehicle
21 administration challenges.

22 On the calculated risk side of the
23 equation, our clients would note that Nova, or the
24 Legacy System management, is highly ambitious,
25 constituting the li -- largest IT project in MPI

1 history.

2 We would also note that its high-level
3 business case, very preliminary, has un -- undergone a
4 thoughtful review by two (2) very well regarded firms.
5 And we note our -- on our client's behalf with
6 interest significant, a internal and external prov --
7 project oversight is contemplated with interesting
8 user and consumer engagement anticipated.

9 Our clients will have some comments of
10 -- on Project Nova in the commercially sensitive
11 discussion. But for the purposes of the public
12 record, they would flag the following major risks
13 associated with the project.

14 One (1) is the complexity of addressing
15 a number of major Legacy Systems at generally the same
16 time and as part of the same project. And we've set
17 out four (4) there, including driver and vehicle
18 administration, the special risk Extension project,
19 AOL, and cars.

20 A second risk is the relative
21 inexperience of Manitoba Public Insurance with the
22 Agile methodology. As Mr. Bunkle (phonetic) notes,
23 it's an emerging skill set within the Corporation, but
24 they haven't built a lot of business cases around that
25 methodology.

1 Third, our client notes substantial
2 budget uncertainties given the stage of the pro --
3 project with Mr. Dessler noting there's a risk that
4 numbers may deviate from the \$106.8 million.

5 Fourth is the reliance of the business
6 case on broker's commissions.

7 And fifth, maybe not a risk, but a lack
8 of clarity, at least to our client, about whether MPI
9 would be held -- and that word should be whole on the
10 last arrow by the Provincial Government for the risks
11 and costs associated with the project.

12 In terms of information technology on
13 the public record, our client would not that MPI
14 continues to demonstrate some challenges with IT
15 expenditures related to full-time equivalence and
16 operational and maintenance expenditures.

17 That Project Nova is an important but
18 extremely high-risk project, in our client's view,
19 with significant uncertainties related to
20 implementation and budget.

21 And given the magnitude of the project
22 and potential impacts on service deliver of MPI and
23 government services, our client would recommend that
24 regular updates on the risk status budget and business
25 case should be delivered to the PUB which is

1 consistent with the Board's rate approval and function
2 and its authority to examine the prudence and
3 reasonableness of expenditures.

4

5 (BRIEF PAUSE)

6

7 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: I'm most nervous
8 about this part of our submissions because my learned
9 friend, Ms. Dilay, did a fantastic job, but I have to
10 deliver her findings so -- on road safety.

11 But the client and Ms. Dilay have asked
12 me to highlight the importance of road safety to all
13 Manitobans, but the grounds for concern, first with
14 the increase in serious injury over the period from
15 2014 to 2017, as well as ongoing higher than Canada
16 average -- averages in terms of fatalities and,
17 finally, the number of pedestrian deaths in 2019.

18 Our client wishes to highlight as well
19 the ongoing reality that rural Manitobans experience a
20 disproportionate share of fatalities with se --
21 seatbelt use being an ongoing concern, and that the
22 social costs of collisions in Manitoba is estimated to
23 be about \$2 billion annually, or about 3 percent of
24 Manitoba's gross domestic product.

25 From our client's perspective, it's

1 important to Manitobans, but it's also important to
2 the rate approval process. Successful road safety
3 efforts and investments impact claims, claims costs,
4 and the premiums required to fund the Basic program.

5 And our client notes the longstanding
6 priority placed by this Board on whether the value of
7 road safety programming is being maximized.

8

9 (BRIEF PAUSE)

10

11 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Of concern to our
12 client is the fact that the Provincial road safety
13 budget has not yet been developed and it's not clear
14 if we're concerned about efficiency, if we're
15 concerned about values for dollars, if we're concerned
16 about optimization, it's not clear that it's a
17 priority.

18 There is no evidence on this record to
19 conclude that Manitoba Public Insurance is able to
20 assess whether it is optimizing its investment as part
21 of the broader provincial road safety system. And no
22 provincial road safety budget has been issued as part
23 of the overall road safety strategy.

24 Ms. Dilay had an interesting discussion
25 with Mr. Eden (phonetic) at slide 71 of this Power

1 Point, from which our client concludes that the road
2 safety priority setting pro -- priority setting
3 process is conducted in a vacuum without the full
4 picture of road safety programs in Manitoba.

5 And Ms. Dilay suggests to the MPI
6 witness, pages 769 to 70 of the transcript, that the
7 priority setting process of Manitoba Public Insurance,
8 with regard to road safety, is currently been -- being
9 applied without reference to a spreadsheet of
10 Manitoba's road safety programs, and associated
11 budgets and the respected funding.

12 And it -- and that's confirmed and
13 that's of course because the document does not yet
14 exist.

15 Also mentioned in our introductory
16 comments, but of particular concern to our client is
17 the absence of a First Nation and/or Indigenous road
18 safety strategy, which our client believes is not only
19 troubling, but inconsistent with our duty,
20 collectively, of reconciliation.

21 Our clients notes that no First Nations
22 or Indigenous political organizations were invited to
23 participate in the road safety technical conference,
24 and that there is currently no First Nation or
25 Indigenous representation on the provincial road

1 safety committee level.

2 Our client was greatly concerned with
3 the sharing of Mr. Wennberg, not that he shared it,
4 but his observations of his visit to the four (4)
5 island lake -- well, the Island Lake region and the
6 communities there.

7 Anecdotally, presumably, Mr. Wennberg
8 made observations that there is maybe even up to 80
9 percent of the people are unlicensed, a number of the
10 cars over half of them don't have insurance, and don't
11 have plates, even in terms of driving around, and
12 obviously rough roads and signage concerns.

13 Obviously concerned himself, this is,
14 from our client's perspective, in a province where we
15 assume that we're all insured, that we're all
16 licensed, this is a concern to all ratepayers and all
17 citizens.

18 In terms of road safety, our client
19 recommends that this Board recognize and confirm the
20 importance of road safety to all Manitobans, including
21 rate payers, and that road safety issues should remain
22 a regular, periodic feature at PUB hearings.

23 And Ms. Dilay has some guidance in
24 terms of the frequency of that in the final
25 recommendations.

1 Second, that a road safety budget, a
2 provincial road safety budget, would assist this Board
3 in determining whether MPI's portfolio is truly
4 optimized and assist MPI in that important endeavour,
5 not only within its own budget, but within the broader
6 context of managing scarce resources and optimizing
7 investments in road safety.

8 And third, that following good practice
9 engagement, and this is from our client's perspective,
10 is -- is urgent.

11 MPI should report back to the PUB at
12 its next general rate application regarding its
13 progress in developing a Canadian best practice, First
14 Nations and Indigenous road safety strategy.

15 Our client has a couple of slides
16 regarding the elimination of the monthly credit card
17 option. And the starting point is that that
18 elimination of the pre-authorized payment option was
19 done without consultation with consumers.

20 That option was an important option to
21 many Manitobans, affecting roughly 10 percent of the
22 customers of MPI.

23 And notably, MPI, prior to making its
24 decision, engaged in discussions with the Insurance
25 Broker's Association and with the government.

1 And you'll see from pages -- the
2 reference from the October 16th transcript to the
3 conversation with Mr. Remillard, referring to
4 engagement with brokers then the province, but asking
5 what type of engagement was undertaken with consumers,
6 directly, if at all.

7 With consumers, replace MPI? Yes. So
8 meaning Manitobans? Good question. We will
9 acknowledge that we did not directly go to customers
10 to seek their input as to how they would feel about
11 eliminating this option.

12 This comes back to the rates for
13 service dialogue and our client likes to think of
14 themselves as fiercely fiscal, but it's rates for
15 service and for certain Manitobans, 10 percent of
16 Manitobans, this was an important option.

17 And from our client's perspective, this
18 is an unfair burden on vulnerable consumers who may be
19 challenged to afford to make a larger payment all at
20 once or change now and pay their bills later.

21 They are losing a viable payment option
22 that helps make -- make ends meet while those who can
23 afford a three (3) or four (4) payment cost are still
24 able to use credit as their form of payment. And for
25 our client, that is deeply troubling.

1 Our client notes rather lengthy
2 commentary by Manitoba Public Insurance about the
3 regulatory process. With the Board's permission,
4 we're not able to digest that commentary today or
5 reply to it.

6 Our client, in due course, perhaps
7 after the efficiency Manitoba hearing is done, would
8 appreciate the opportunity to -- to respond to those
9 comments.

10 And our client never wants to diminish
11 the cost of any expenditure by Manitoba Public
12 Insurance and agrees totally that every cent, every
13 penny, should be scrutinized.

14 But our client did wish to notice in
15 what they think is an apples to apples comparison,
16 that regulatory appeal costs, including both the
17 Public Utility Board and Automobile and Injury
18 Compensation Commission constitute about one half
19 (1/2) of 1 percent of total claims cost percentage
20 wise.

21 In effect, the price of a monopoly, the
22 price of accountability is about half of 1 percent of
23 claims costs mathematically. And from our client's
24 perspective, we always have to scrutinize those costs.
25 We always want to be efficient, but we also want to be

1 effective.

2 And this process has delivered
3 tremendous value to ratepayers in terms of
4 accountability, transparency, and ensuring that
5 Manitobans have confidence that decisions are being
6 made based upon evidence in public, not in back -- not
7 in back rooms and non-tra -- transparent fashions.

8

9 (BRIEF PAUSE)

10

11 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: We use the credit
12 card example on behalf of our client to highlight what
13 bad consumer engagement looks like, or nonexistent
14 consumer engagement.

15 Best practice consumer engagement
16 suggests that customers, consumers should be engaged
17 often and should be informed about options. There are
18 tremendous learning opportunities for MPI and for this
19 Board in consumer engagement.

20 Stakeholder engagement is important,
21 but direct engagement with consumers is, as well. One
22 (1) of those examples is service delivery and
23 engagement with Manitoba consumers about future
24 operating models, including the provision of online
25 services, the important role of brokers.

1 The important role of MPI and different
2 challenges and options in urban versus rural and
3 remote areas may assist this Corporation in forging a
4 path forward that will benefit ratepayers and be more
5 likely to be successful.

6 In terms of road safety, while MPI
7 consults with consumers in evaluating its programs,
8 there is room for improvement in pro -- program
9 selection and development by engaging consumers early
10 in the pro -- process.

11 Given experience in other jurisdictions
12 and the fact that the majority of serious collisions
13 happen in rural areas and on gravel roads, there would
14 be substantial merit for MPI to engage with rural
15 Manitobans and with Manitoba First Nations and
16 specifically towards developing a First Nation road
17 safety strategy.

18 In terms of driver safety rating, CAC
19 (Manitoba) was very pleased with the MPI's engagement
20 with customers to date and looks forward to receiving
21 results of further engagement that will serve to
22 inform the decision-making process.

23

24

(BRIEF PAUSE)

25

1 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Madam Chair, just
2 if I could just -- maybe four (4) minutes, five (5)
3 minutes, just -- and then we'll finish her -- finish
4 her off, if that's okay with the panel?

5 THE CHAIRPERSON: That's -- that's
6 certainly fine, Mr. Williams. I just have one (1)
7 question, and that is when do you expect that you will
8 be concluded for today?

9 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: I'm expecting
10 around 4:30.

11 THE CHAIRPERSON: Okay.

12 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Just one (1)
13 second. I want to...

14 THE CHAIRPERSON: Yeah, that's sort of
15 the outside-end as far as --

16 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Okay.

17 THE CHAIRPERSON: -- the panel's
18 concerned, if that's all right with you.

19 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: That should be
20 fine.

21

22 --- Upon recessing at 3:11 p.m.

23 --- Upon resuming at 3:14 p.m.

24

25 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

1 Mr. Williams...?

2 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Thank you. We're
3 on the overall health of the Corporation and taking
4 into account reasonable reserves.

5 And our client has identified six (6)
6 critical questions for the setting of the rate
7 stabilization reserve and the consideration of the
8 capital management plan.

9 First, what do we know generally about
10 the overall health of the insurance lines of business
11 and the relationship between Basic, Extension, and
12 SRE?

13 Second -- this relates to Mr. Todd's
14 evidence -- what did generally accepted regulatory
15 practices suggest?

16 Third, how does the proposed capital
17 management plan and underlying reserve regulation
18 compare to generally accepted regulatory practice?

19 Fourth -- Ms. Dilay's area -- to the
20 extent that the capital management plan does not
21 appear to be consistent with good practice, what are
22 the options of the Public Utility Board? Is the
23 regulation lawful and binding?

24 Five, if it's not lawful or binding,
25 what weight, if any, should be given to that document?

1 And sixth, if the reserve regulation is
2 lawful and binding, is the capital management plan
3 consistent with it?

4 I'll just note that in terms of our
5 timing, I'll try to finish Questions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6
6 in the next thirty (30) minutes or so, giving
7 Ms. Dilay the opportunity for about half an hour to go
8 through the -- the legal submissions for which we've
9 already filed substantial briefs.

10 THE CHAIRPERSON: And just one
11 question, Mr. Williams, if that doesn't afford you
12 enough time, is Ms. Dilay available for tomorrow
13 morning?

14 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: She is. And
15 the -- the issues that follow, including the
16 recommendation she would have -- she would be
17 available for.

18 THE CHAIRPERSON: Okay. Thank you.

19 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And the CSI,
20 Ms. Dilay, is versed in the material and could present
21 it as -- as well.

22 THE CHAIRPERSON: Okay. Thank you.

23 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: When we know
24 generally about the overall health of the insurance --
25 of the insurance lines of business and the

1 relationship between Basic, Extension, and SRE,
2 generally our clients conclude that the overall health
3 of the Corporation is strong underpinned by its
4 statutory monopoly in Basic and market dominance in
5 the allegedly competitive Extension and SRE Special
6 Risk Extension lines of business.

7 The characteristics of the Extension
8 line of business which is directly relevant to the
9 capital management plan include longstanding dominance
10 at over 95 percent -- at or over 95 percent of the
11 market for over a decade and with over 85 percent of
12 all Basic Autopac policyholders purchasing Extension
13 coverage.

14 Another characteristic is stable
15 expenditures buttressed by the certainty, as
16 Mr. Wennberg shared, that roughly 60 percent of its
17 claims costs associate -- are associated with
18 deductibles which it has that certainty that they're
19 limited to a certain amount per claim.

20 We also know that the current state of
21 the MPI Extension line of business includes unusually
22 high profit range, not in the 15 to 20 percent range
23 noted by Mr. Graham on the opening day on the hearing
24 as standard in marketplaces, but in the range of
25 32 percent in its most recent year with profit targets

1 in the range of 27 to 28 percent in the current and
2 test years.

3 We also know that the strength of the
4 Extension line of business is its relationship with
5 Basic -- the benefit it draws from Basic. For the
6 most part, Basic and Extension customers, as noted by
7 Mr. Johnston, are the same people.

8 Core elements of that market dominance
9 include shared customer information, seamless shared
10 screens and service delivery platforms, ease of claim,
11 and price, and it is unclear whether all or many
12 Extension customers are aware they have a competitive
13 choice.

14

15 (BRIEF PAUSE)

16

17 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: On slide 82,
18 you'll see Mr. Watchman pushing Mr. Todd in terms of
19 whether there's indicia in -- in the current
20 marketplace of Extension of anti-competitive
21 behaviour. Mr. Todd is cautious, noting he hasn't
22 conducted any detailed analysis, but that would be a
23 reasonable starting assumption for any analysis.

24 What do generally accepted regulatory
25 practice -- what do those principles suggest in terms

1 of process, and how have they been applied in Manitoba
2 regarding the rate stabilization reserve? Our client
3 finds particularly helpful Mr. Todd's evidence
4 generally and in particular pages 21 to -- 2,124 to
5 2,137. We're trying to highlight some of those key
6 elements for the -- for the Board.

7 The starting point is: Why are we
8 doing this? Mr. Todd notes that it's a legislative
9 monopoly. Basic fits the mode of a regulated utility,
10 and the purpose of rate approval of rate regulation is
11 to protect customers and to service a proxy, a
12 substitute for competition in areas whether there's
13 either a natural monopoly or, in the case of MPI, a
14 statutory one.

15 We've already spoken that the essential
16 starting point of independent rate setting is balance.
17 Here's the well known words of the Court of Appeal
18 about the Public Utilities Board balancing act of
19 ratepayer's interests and the financial health of the
20 utility in the public interest.

21 Mr. Todd notes the prudence and
22 balance -- excuse me -- the balance requires a
23 prudence consideration including for necessary
24 reserves. The purpose is to set rates that recover
25 prudently incurred costs, fully recovered but not over

1 recovered. That implies in the MPI context that rates
2 should be sufficient to achieve the required reserves
3 but no more than sufficient.

4 What happens in circumstances like with
5 Extension in particular but also SRE when there are
6 new non-utility services offered by a monopoly? In
7 those circumstances, issues arise a fairness to
8 monopoly customers and the importance of avoiding
9 anti-competitive behaviour.

10 As Mr. Todd notes in slide 87, the
11 concern for regulators is that the fair treatment and
12 pricing of the utility services -- that's the concern,
13 the fair treatment of pricing of the utility service
14 as it interplays with the revenues that are generated
15 by the competitive services to ensure the customers of
16 the monopoly are fairly treated.

17 What does subsidy mean? Mr. Todd notes
18 that it is open to regulators to adopt a broad
19 interpretation of subsidy meaning anything that
20 affects the competitive position of the competitive
21 services could be viewed as a subsidy.

22 He also notes that excess benefits are
23 generally returned to the monopoly consumer. Most
24 regulators say, he advises, that those benefits
25 flow -- flow from the monopoly consumer and that the

1 value of the benefits to the other line of business
2 should flow back to them. This statement assumes that
3 the goal is to benefit monopoly customers.

4 Mr. Todd's conclusion is that
5 100 percent of excess profits in excess of prudent
6 cost recovery -- it is appropriate to -- including
7 prudent reserves for the non-utility service can be
8 flowed back to monopoly consumers.

9

10 (BRIEF PAUSE)

11

12 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Applying these
13 principles to Manitoba Public Insurance requires, in
14 Mr. Todd's view, consideration of appropriate reserve
15 levels for the non-utility service.

16 As he puts it, whatever the Board
17 decides is the -- the regulatory Board is the
18 appropriate reserve structure in generally accepted
19 principles. If you're generating reserves in excess
20 of what's needed for that, the concept says the only
21 reason they can get excess reserve is because they're
22 being -- benefitting from being associated with Basic.

23 And that excess revenue in excess of
24 prudent reserves becomes the way you define the
25 benefit of the joined operation of competitive and

1 Basic services. And again without the benefit,
2 competitive pricing would not result in excess
3 benefits. Therefore, the excess earnings should
4 accrue back to Basic.

5 What are the implications for the
6 capital management plan? First, recognize as a fact
7 that the benefit that Extension and SRE derive from
8 Basic has legitimate value for Basic to recover.

9 Second, Mr. Todd concludes that would
10 you -- you would limit, consistent with good
11 regulatory practice, the capital target for Extension
12 and SRE to a level that reflects sound actuarial
13 practices.

14 And that's so that the competitive
15 services won't retain the benefit of the joint
16 operations as the subsidy from Basic but rather would
17 flow back to the benefit of Basic and that whatever
18 success should be flowed back to Basic systematically.

19 Mr. Todd is an economist, indicated a
20 preference for lump sum rebates as opposed to rate
21 reductions because it enables you to keep the price
22 signal on the premiums for insurance at a cost base
23 level.

24 In this slide, we're moving from
25 Mr. Todd to what this Board has historically done in

1 terms of the relationship between Extension and Basic
2 and the rate stabilization reserve target.

3 First of all in our client's
4 conclusion, this Board has endorsed the concept of the
5 rate stabilization reserve as a vehicle for protecting
6 customers from rate instability from one time only
7 events or significant variances.

8 Second, it has considered the adequacy
9 of Basic reserves within a broader conversation of the
10 overall health of the Corporation. It's looked at
11 Basic reserves, but it's also looked at reserves for
12 the other lines of business.

13 Third, it has adopted an
14 evidenced-based approach to the approval of RSR levels
15 grounded in a one (1) in forty (40) risk tolerance,
16 and the recognition that excess conservatism and risk
17 tolerances is inconsistent with fairness and social
18 utility.

19 Fourth, it has expressly rejected the
20 hundred percent MCT as an upper RSR target. And
21 fifth -- and we'll come to this in a couple seconds --
22 it has asked whether the benefit provided to Extension
23 from Basic is fully reflected in cost allocation
24 principles.

25 Sixth, it has established cost

1 allocation rules to prevent more narrowly defined
2 subsidies, and seventh, it has sought express
3 statutory authority to regulate Extension and again,
4 as recently as last year's hearing, question the
5 utility of excess reserves in the Extension and SRE
6 lines of business. That's the historic practice.

7 To date, what the Board has not done
8 which is the logical step from Mr. Todd's analysis, it
9 has not imputed excess profits from non-utility lines
10 of business into its Basic rate calculation or its --
11 its reserve calculation.

12 And to date, the Board has not
13 recommended mechanisms, to our client's knowledge, to
14 improve competitive outcomes for the Extension line of
15 business.

16 The point of these two (2) slides is
17 that the Board has actively been following some
18 aspects of the analysis set forward by Mr. Todd in
19 terms of good practice. An evidence-based approach to
20 risk on the Basic line of business, considering the
21 relationship between Extension and Basic, but it
22 hasn't gone those two (2) final steps that are set out
23 in his analysis: imputing excess profits into the --
24 into the Basic rate calculation or recommending
25 mechanisms to improve competitive outcomes for the

1 Extension line of business.

2

3 (BRIEF PAUSE)

4

5 MR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Just a couple
6 quotes from prior decisions of the Board. The first
7 one expresses discomfort with the Basic Extension
8 relationship and questions arise in both the language
9 at the top of page 94 as to the wisdom of allocating
10 costs on a basis that ignores the centrality of Basic
11 and the value that Basic brings to Extension, SRE, and
12 DVR -- DVA operations.

13 And then you see later in this -- in
14 this lengthy paragraph reference to prior practices of
15 transferring Extension premiums back to Basic.

16 At the bottom of the page, we've also
17 put in the Board's express rejection of the MCT and
18 the threshold MCT ratio of a hundred percent as the
19 upper limit of the RSR target.

20 The Board, at that point in time,
21 expressing a concern with the degree of conservatism
22 implied by that target, potentially giving risk to
23 utilitarian concerns and concerns of moral hazard.

24

25 (BRIEF PAUSE)

1 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Our client does
2 note a bit of a discussion from our learned friend,
3 Mr. Guerra, with Ms. Sherry and Dr. Simpson in terms
4 of the Board's comments last year about the purpose of
5 the rate stabilization reserve, including the question
6 of insolvency.

7 And from our client's perspective,
8 there are many sources saying -- suggesting that, in
9 the context of rate stability, the concept of
10 insolvency is of questionable relevance for a Crown-
11 owned monopoly with annual access to an independent
12 rate approval process.

13 Those sources include Kopstein, Dr.
14 Simpson, Ms. Sherry, and Ernst & Young, and the report
15 done for ICBC. And we're going to go to that Ernst &
16 Young commentary on the next slide.

17 This is Ernst & Young in 2016, noting
18 that whereas -- noting why insolvency is such a
19 concern for the office of the superintendent of
20 financial insurance and why it's such a concern in
21 competitive marketplaces and in the MC -- for the MCT,
22 but how it's of questionable relevance for Crown
23 Corporations.

24 Whereas a sole private insurer would
25 face bankruptcy in the event of insufficient capital,

1 leaving policyholders and claimants at risk of not
2 being fully indemnified for their losses, a government
3 insurer is implicitly backed by the Government,
4 meaning the risk is minimal in comparison.

5 And if we think of the whole OSFI
6 intent of the MC intent -- MCT intent, those
7 significant levels of reserves are there because, if a
8 Corporation is facing having a bad year, if it raises
9 rates, it loses more market share and gets in a
10 vicious death circle.

11 Ernst & Young is arguing here that
12 that's not the issue when you're looking at a more
13 narrow question of stability of rates with regard to a
14 Crown monopoly.

15 And you'll see there, they're raising
16 the concern or making the recommendation that
17 consideration should also be given to whether the
18 OSFI, O-S-F-I, MCT ratio is the appropriate framework
19 for setting capital for the Basic product.

20 How does the proposed capital
21 management plan of MPI and underlying reserve
22 regulation compare to generally accepted regulatory
23 practice?

24

25

(BRIEF PAUSE)

1 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: It may be
2 implicit, but our client would argue that one (1)
3 positive aspect of the capital management plan
4 proposed by MPI is recognition of the concept of
5 excess profits.

6 Our client is concerned that MPI does
7 not demonstrate rigour in its assessment of the risks
8 faced by Extension, but that the actual proposed
9 transfer of the access in excess of the RSR target is
10 consistent with the concept of Mr. Todd of excess
11 profit.

12 Our client's concerns, and some of
13 these were expressed by Mr. Todd, as well, our -- I --
14 we don't think MPI has acknowledged it -- acknowledged
15 that the Extension profits are excessive.

16 And our clients believe that MPI has
17 not yet accepted that the transfer of excess profit is
18 not simply a matter of its discretion, but it
19 consistent with good regulatory practice and the ambit
20 of the Crown Corporation's Governments Act.

21 I just want to be clear on this point,
22 Madam Chair, as it gets late in the day. As our
23 client understands Mr. Todd's authority -- or Mr.
24 Todd's advise, and also the legislation itself, the
25 point he's making is that the benefit flowing to

1 Extension that enables its market dominance and excess
2 profits, it is appropriate for the Public Utilities
3 Board in its rate setting analysis to impute tho --
4 those excess profits into the Basic rate calculation.

5 The Public Utilities Board cannot force
6 the Extension line of business to transfer those
7 profits. But given its authority under the
8 legislation, given a finding that the benefit and the
9 excess profit on the Extension side is attributable to
10 the relationship with Basic, it is consistent with
11 good regulatory practice to impute those dollars in
12 the rate setting process for Basic.

13 So, I hope that makes his point clear
14 and that what he said in evidence on Tuesday morning
15 which is inconsistent with MPI, they seem to think it
16 an act of charity, Mr. Todd would say that imput --
17 imputation (phonetic) of excess profits into the rate
18 calculation is consistent with good regulatory
19 practice.

20 And our client would argue that it is
21 contemplated under the Crown Corporation Governance
22 Act.

23 So, that's the generally positive side
24 of the capital management plan. Where our client
25 takes fundamental disagreement with the capital

1 management plan is if we think of the central role of
2 this Board, which is balancing interest, balancing the
3 interest of ratepayers and balance versus the
4 interests of the Corporation.

5 In the exercise of that balancing act,
6 this Board has for a number of years come up with that
7 risk tolerance level of one (1) in forty (40). Our
8 clients don't like it. They would like it lower.
9 Manitoba Public Insurance definitely doesn't like it.
10 They would like it higher, a one (1) in one hundred
11 (100) year risk tolerance.

12 But that's the Board's job, not to make
13 us happy, but to create that balance in the public
14 interest. And our client's fundamental concern with
15 the reserve regulation and the capital management plan
16 is that that concept of balance has been undermined
17 because the risk tolerance of the Manitoba Public
18 Insurance has been substituted for the risk tolerance
19 envisioned in prior Public Utility Board orders.

20 That is one (1) of the fundamental
21 disputes. That authority that has long resided in the
22 Public Utilities Board to approve the RSR level, to
23 approve the methodology, including risk tolerances,
24 had been undermined, usurped by the regulation.

25 And here you see a discussion with Mr.

1 Johnston. He's asked whether the one (1) in one
2 hundred (100) year risk tolerance captured in the
3 Corporation's analysis more closely align with the
4 risk appetite of the MPI Board of Directors.

5 And he says, yes, we have been
6 targeting a hundred percent MCT as our capital, not
7 just in this application, but in previous
8 applications. But the hundred percent MCT aligns with
9 this risk tolerance, that's the comfort level of our
10 Board.

11 And it's fine for their Board to have
12 that risk tolerance, but in independent rate approval
13 processes, that judgment call, as it has for the last
14 thirty (30) years, resides with the independent
15 regulator.

16 And our client notes numerically that
17 Mr. Johnston confirmed that from the lower bound of
18 the RSR target, based upon a one (1) in forty (40)
19 risk tolerance to a one (1) and one hundred (100) risk
20 tolerance, there is an increase up in the range of
21 about \$200 million.

22 I think his language at page 1,218 of
23 the transcript was something, like, about 200, maybe a
24 little less, 200 million.

25 So, there is a substitution of the

1 Board of Director of Manitoba Public Insurance's risk
2 tolerance for the balance determination of the Public
3 Utilities Board, but where is the evidence of
4 increased risk?

5 In this Hearing, Manitoba Public
6 Insurance has not adduced evidence suggesting a
7 material increase in risk as compared to 2019/'20.
8 And if the Board reflects upon the record in its
9 entirety, the Board will remember comments by Manitoba
10 Ins -- Public Insurance, saying that, with the
11 completion of asset liability management, it has
12 derisked that Basic portfolio.

13 Our client may take issue with that
14 factual assertion in terms of derisking, but MPI, if
15 anything, is suggesting that risk is rel -- reduced as
16 compared to 2019/'20.

17

18 (BRIEF PAUSE)

19

20 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Another
21 fundamental error -- sorry, area where the capital
22 management plan approach as envisioned in the reserve
23 re -- regulation is inconsistent with good regulatory
24 practice, is in the setting of the reserve targets for
25 Extension and special risk Extension.

1 Go back to the logic of Mr. Todd.
2 Recognize that there's a benefit flowing to the non-
3 utility business. Recognize the right of the Board to
4 impute the excess profits back into the Basic or
5 monopoly calculation.

6 How does one determine excess profits?
7 Look at a prudent -- go back to prudence. What is a
8 prudent risk target for the Corporation? And in this
9 discussion at transcript pages 1,234 to 1,237, our
10 client raises with Mr. Johnston the suggestion that
11 the 200 percent MCT target for Extension is built upon
12 the myth of competition.

13 And you'll remember our learned friend,
14 Mr. Guerra's, cross-examination of Mr. Todd. And he
15 suggested, on average, the MCT target in the private
16 sector is a little north of 200 percent MC -- MCT.

17 And at the top of this page being slide
18 101, you see Mr. Johnson (sic) be -- it being
19 suggested to him that the Board of Directors'
20 deliberations as represented in the 200 percent MCT
21 target would be analogous to a target adopted by a
22 number of firms in the private sector and in
23 competitive markets. Agreed.

24 And then the suggestion being put to
25 Mr. Johnson (sic) that, given the 95 percent share in

1 Extension extending back over a decade, a 2018 profit
2 target in excess of 30 percent and flat expenses,
3 would it not be fair to describe the assertion that
4 Extension is a competitive market is a myth.

5 While Mr. Johnston rejected that
6 premise in the question, he added more evidence,
7 noting that it's not only Extension that has that
8 market dominance, it's -- it's well on the
9 commercials, the SRE side, where that market dom --
10 dominance exists, as well.

11 From our client's perspective, this is
12 a fundamental weakness in the reserve regulation
13 analytically and in the capital management plan
14 because the capital risk targets, the MCT targets for
15 the MCT -- for the Extension line of business based on
16 200 percent is based upon the analytical and
17 mathematical fallacy that the Extension market is
18 competitive.

19 Where is that evidence? Excess profits
20 -- 95 percent market share enduring over a decade.
21 This record is replete with foundational, fundamental
22 evidence that that allegation of competition in that
23 marketplace is empirically mythological.

24 And Board counsel had an interesting
25 discussion with Mr. Todd at transcript pages 2,322 and

1 2,323, and put to them elements of, if memory serves
2 me right, the Manitoba Public Insurance investment
3 strategy for Extension and SRE, and our client would
4 urge this Board to go back to that analysis, and if --
5 if it does so, we think you will accept the conclusion
6 of Mr. Todd based upon that discussion and consistent
7 with the information put to him that the kind of risk
8 that you see with the Basic polidy -- policies, those
9 long-tailed personal injury protection plan policies,
10 are not being observed in the Extension or special
11 risk lines of business, further undermining the -- any
12 suggestion that the SRE or Extension targets are based
13 upon evidence and based upon market realities and
14 based upon prudent risk principles.

15 And our client asks a final question on
16 this subject matter on slide 102, again from the
17 principle of good regulatory practice. If you think
18 of Mr. Todd's analysis, the objective was to prevent
19 subsidy broadly defined to the competitive lines of
20 business and also prevent anti-competitive behaviour.

21 Recognizing the myth of the competitive
22 and ex -- or the Extension and SRE lines of business
23 as competitive, what does excessive reserves --
24 imprudent reserves in those lines of business do for
25 the competitive marketplace that is already so

1 fundamentally compromised? More room to lower rates
2 to preserve market share, more room to, as MPI said in
3 their Board of Directors' minutes, in -- or
4 recommendation 2014, to inoculate the market from
5 competition.

6 What public interest purpose is served
7 by ext -- excessive reserves in Extension and special
8 risk except to further compete the already compromised
9 competitive balances in these lines of business, and
10 not to the benefit of the Basic customers from whom
11 these benefits enure.

12 There's been a lot of target in this --
13 a lot of target -- a lot of talk in this hearing about
14 targets versus ranges. Mr. Johnston has an opinion,
15 Ms. Sherry has an opinion, Dr. Simpson has an opinion.
16 Mr. Todd put the subject and the issue, I think, in --
17 in good light, drawing analogies is with the revenue
18 cost coverage ratio in Hydro, 95 percent to 105
19 percent, one (1) of the objectives being more rate
20 stability, the point being that a range is more
21 consistent with the objective rate stability than a
22 target.

23 And our client -- before we leave that
24 slide, with my apologies, Ms. Dilay -- will note that
25 there are circumscribed rules around the MPI Capital

1 Management Plan, the five (5) years to -- to build it
2 up, the three (3) years to bring it down, but still
3 will suggest strongly that if rate stability is the
4 objective, that whatever the determined target number,
5 it's better achieved with the range around that number
6 rather than a target.

7 We're going to come back to item number
8 4 in just a minute, and I will shut up, no doubt to
9 your pleasure. But I wonder if we can go to -- to the
10 next one.

11 One (1) of the que -- the last
12 questions that I'll be challenged with addressing is
13 if the reserve regulation is neither lawful or binding
14 what weight, if any, should be given to that document?
15 And I'll confess -- I'll confess to this Board that I
16 didn't come across that -- that question till about
17 four o'clock in the morning, so I started to look at
18 the -- at the Crown Governance Act and the -- and
19 other legislation, and from our clients' perspective,
20 this is how we would approach this issue.

21 Just one second.

22

23 (BRIEF PAUSE)

24

25 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: I've made this

1 mistake once before, but I also made it on this slide.
2 When we're speaking of the legislative amendments,
3 those are 2018 amendments, with my apologies to the
4 Panel, and I -- I've made that mistake on the record.

5 But the starting point for our answer
6 to this question is, let's go back to those changes to
7 the Crown Corporations -- the introduction of the
8 Crown Corporations Governance Act replacing the Crown
9 Corporations Review and Accountability Act, as well as
10 changes to the MPI Act.

11 What was the legislative purpose of
12 those amendments? And Ms. Dilay will speak to this,
13 and you'll see it in our written brief, but Minister
14 Schuler, in introducing those amendments, spoke of
15 clarifying the rules of government, the Corporation,
16 and the PUB, clarifying the roles. Minister Schuler
17 also spoke of the desire to reduce political
18 interference. So what was actually done in those
19 legislative amendments?

20 First of all, the express power of the
21 Cabinet with regard to vehicle insurance in terms of
22 the rate approval process was removed. That power
23 that had been in the legislation for decades, under
24 what is now known as Section 33 of the MPI Act, was
25 taken out with regard to vehicle intersher --

1 insurance.

2 So that's one (1) of the acts of
3 clarity from the legislature, in its wisdom, get
4 government, get politicians out of the business of
5 vehicle insurance rates.

6

7 (BRIEF PAUSE)

8

9 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: So that's the
10 first step of our analysis.

11 The second step in the analysis was
12 recognizing that the Crown Corporations Governance Act
13 is about clarifying the respective rules of
14 government, the Corporation, and the PUB, what tools
15 are in that Crown government -- governance -- lead --
16 lang -- legislation for government to communicate with
17 the Corporation or -- or the Public Utilities Board?

18 Well, there are two (2) tools in the
19 legislation. One (1) is a mandate letter under
20 Section 6, and one (1) is a directive to the
21 Corporation under Section 13(1). From our client's
22 perspective, the directive to the Corporation, the
23 language of that provision, Section 13, does not
24 contemplate the type of activities such as the reserve
25 regulation. And in terms of the mandate letter, that

1 is directed to the Corporation, not to the Public
2 Utilities Board.

3 So from our clients' perspective, if
4 you think of the long-standing independence of the
5 Board is in trying -- in trying first, and the Crown
6 Corporations Public Review and Accountability Act and
7 the Crown Governance Act, the express removal of the
8 power of cabinet in any regard with regard to vehicle
9 insurance rate setting, and the absence of a tool in
10 the legislation -- legislation defined to clarify the
11 respective rules of government, the Corporation, and
12 the PUB, from our clients' perspective, the reserve
13 regulation, if it is neither lawful or binding, is
14 interesting information.

15 But if one thinks to the intent of this
16 legislation in 2018, to put government in its proper
17 role, to put the Corporation in its proper role, and
18 the PUB in its proper role, what more can it be?

19

20 (BRIEF PAUSE)

21

22 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Our client did
23 not create the dilemma imposed by the cabinet action,
24 and neither did Manitoba ratepayers. If the cabinet
25 wishes to remove the thirty (30) year old independent

1 authority of the Public Utilities Board in terms of
2 rate stabilization reserves, in terms of their
3 methodology and their level surcharges and rebates,
4 the answer to cabinet is not to propose a regulation
5 that is not within its authority as an interference in
6 rate setting, but to propose a legislative bill which,
7 if passed by the legislature, could turn back the
8 clock on independent rate app -- approval.

9 But from our clients' perspective, in
10 light of the legislative changes established in 2018,
11 that regulation by itself is deserving of no weight.

12 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Sorry, Mr.
13 Williams, can I just interrupt you for a second?

14 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: I was hoping I
15 could sneak through that comment, sir.

16 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Go back to the
17 last chart. No, it's just --

18 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Yeah.

19 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: -- I want to
20 clarify for the record. Your comment was, Our client
21 did not create the dilemma imposed by cabinet action.

22 And the wording is, The PUB did not
23 create the dilemma imposed.

24 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: So --

25 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Which -- which

1 one is it?

2 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: I would say both,
3 Mr. Chair (sic). So -- so the point I was simply
4 trying to make --

5 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: No, I understand
6 the point.

7 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Yeah.

8 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: I just want to
9 make sure that --

10 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Yeah. Yeah. So
11 --

12 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: -- that the --
13 the record is accurate.

14 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Yeah. And what I
15 -- what I erred in, sir, the intent of that arrow was
16 to say that ratepayers did not create the dilemma, nor
17 did the Public Utilities Board. And my apologies for
18 misspeaking.

19 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: You're fine.
20 That's fine.

21

22 (BRIEF PAUSE)

23

24 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Finally, from my
25 perspective, if the reserve reg -- regulation is

1 lawful and binding, the question was posed by the
2 Board: is the Capital Management Plan consistent with
3 it?

4

5 (BRIEF PAUSE)

6

7 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: From our clients'
8 perspective, if the reserve regulation was validly
9 enacted and binding on the PUB for rate approval
10 processes, Manitoba Public Insurance's current capital
11 position and its proposed Management Plan are not in
12 compliance with the reserve regulation.

13 That reserve regulation doesn't say,
14 create a range around MCT of 100 percent. It does not
15 say, build up to MCT of 100 percent over five (5)
16 years.

17 That rate reserve regulation, if valid
18 and binding, which our clients deny, imposes mandatory
19 language. The minimum amount the Corporation must
20 maintain in its Basic insurance RSR is the amount
21 determined using an MCT ratio of 100 percent, the
22 minimum amount the Corporation must maintain.

23 MPI embarks upon a novel and creative
24 effort to sidestep the mandatory language of the
25 reserve regulation, both in PUB-MPI Information

1 Request 1-100 and Undertaking 18. But that dancing
2 around the regulatory language, the mandatory
3 regulatory language, cannot be reconciled with the
4 reserve regulation itself.

5 And our client adds that there has been
6 no legislative fact evidence adduced to undermine or
7 challenge the unambiguous regulatory language. And
8 just on that point, and Ms. Dilay will talk about it
9 more, in our client's analysis of the evolution of the
10 statutory regi -- regime, we do rely upon statements
11 made, whether in Hansard, in the legislature, or in
12 the Kopstein report prior to the development of the
13 legislation to give insight into the legislative
14 intent.

15 That is what is known as legislative
16 fact evidence. There is no such legislative fact
17 evidence on the record that would in any way undermine
18 the unambiguous regulatory language.

19

20 (BRIEF PAUSE)

21

22 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: So -- so Madam
23 Chair, just in terms of timing, I did go fifty (50)
24 minutes longer.

25 Ms. Dilay's available today. Would it

1 -- we're at the Board's -- you sh -- we will do as you
2 -- we can keep going, or we can stop and then resume
3 in the morning -- or she can, anyways. We're at your
4 -- we'll -- we'll wait for your guidance.

5

6 (BRIEF PAUSE)

7

8 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: And Madam Chair,
9 I apologize. Ms. Dilay reminds me that if you do have
10 presentations on the non-law -- or, presentations --
11 questions on the non-law side -- or, the not -- I -- I
12 can make myself available to answer those as well.
13 It's obviously where -- whatever you decide.

14 THE CHAIRPERSON: Well, perhaps what
15 we could do is this. I would think that if Ms. Dilay
16 were able to start and continue uninterrupted, that
17 would be preferable, which would be tomorrow morning.
18 But if there are questions with regard to your portion
19 of the presentation, perhaps we could deal with those
20 now. Is that acceptable to you?

21 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Yes, and thank
22 you for your guidance.

23 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

24

25 (BRIEF PAUSE)

1 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Mr. Williams, the
2 only -- the only question I have -- you made a
3 reference to ICBC and the interference there, and I'm
4 -- I'm trying to understand what the interference
5 there is. I -- I know of situations, quite frankly,
6 where the government has issued an Order in Council
7 saying here's what the rate is, contrary to -- to the
8 Board. I -- I don't know if that's what you're
9 talking about or if you're talking about something
10 else.

11 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Yes, and thank
12 you, and I apologize for being imprecise. What our
13 client was referring to -- as everyone knows, the
14 Insurance Corporation of British Columbia is in
15 significant financial distress. I think that's on the
16 record of this -- this proceeding.

17 Our clients' understanding of some of
18 those events, both based upon the record in documents
19 they've reviewed as well as from media commentary, is
20 that on -- on more than one (1) occasion, the
21 indicated rate, the rate necessary to -- was -- was
22 politically interfered with by the Cabinet at the
23 time.

24 So that was what I was trying to refer
25 to, sir. And -- and the -- the point that I was

1 inelegantly trying to make is that from our clients'
2 perspective, the independence of the Board as set on
3 the statute is -- is sacred, and it's sacred because
4 one doesn't know whether it will be a government
5 making a well-meaning intention or a politically --
6 well-meaning recommendation or exp -- expedient ones.
7 Once there starts to be that interference in the
8 independent rate setting process, then our client
9 believe (sic) that undermines the integrity of the
10 process but also undermines and -- and puts at risk
11 ratepayers.

12 And I'll just finish to say that those
13 are the specific examples, but even the kind of
14 Cabinet directive setting out risk targets, which was
15 allowed under the BC legislation, different than our
16 legislation -- from our clients' perspective, it begs
17 the question, who's better placed and situated to --
18 to do that. And certainly, the Manitoba practice has
19 been the independent regulator.

20 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Right. But I
21 just want to clarify, this was by way of Order in
22 Council as a directive to the utilities commission in
23 BC --

24 DR. BYRON WILLIAMS: Yes, as
25 authorized under the legislation, sir.

1 BOARD MEMBER GABOR: Right. Okay,
2 thank you.

3 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much
4 for you presentation, Mr. Williams. And just subject
5 to comments from PUB counsel, I understand we have the
6 other Interveners who will be presenting tomorrow,
7 together with our continuation with Ms. Dilay first
8 thing in the morning. From a timing perspective, is
9 that going to be acceptable?

10 MS. KATHLEEN MCCANDLESS: I -- I
11 believe so, yes. So I have been in touch with counsel
12 for all of the Interveners who have not yet presented.
13 Counsel for CMMG gave a time estimate of fifteen (15)
14 minutes. I believe Mr. Unfried's estimate was ap --
15 approximately an hour, but he can correct me if I'm
16 wrong. A little more? Maybe...

17 MR. CURTIS UNFRIED: I expect that
18 we'll be closer to an hour and a half.

19 MS. KATHLEEN MCCANDLESS: And Mr.
20 Monnin is -- he said about thirty (30) minutes to
21 maybe an hour at the outset -- outside, so.

22 THE CHAIRPERSON: Okay, thank you.
23 And we have the day reserved tomorrow, so I think we
24 should be capable of finishing that then, well within
25 that time frame.

1 So thank you very much to everyone.
2 We'll adjourn for the day and start tomorrow morning
3 with Ms. Dilay. Thank you.

4

5 --- Upon adjourning at 4:05 p.m.

6

7 Certified correct,

8

9

10 _____

11 Wendy Woodworth, Ms.

12

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